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TESTIMONIAL CONSISTENCY: THE HOBGOBLIN OF
THE FEDERAL FALSE DECLARATION STATUTE
SIDNEY DELONG*
INTRODUCTION
When a witness testifies inconsistently with his former testimony,
any one of several things might be happening. The witness might be
expressing a change in his memory or understanding of the events about
which he is testifying, the witness might be correcting an intentional
falsehood in the former testimony, or the witness might be lying. Be-
cause inconsistent testimony per se is neither harmful nor beneficial to
the judicial process, the law has no apparent reason to deter a witness
from testifying inconsistently with his former testimony. Yet, inconsis-
tent testimony is penalized under federal perjury law. This article ques-
tions the wisdom of such a rule.
A perjury statute cannot be judged in isolation from the judicial sys-
tem in which it functions. In the American adversary trial process, evi-
dence is taken through factual narratives that unfold during trial
examination. Attorneys from one side, then from the other, ask wit-
nesses questions designed to elicit favorable testimony. A witness's
story is not told all at once but in bits and pieces over time. Under
cross-examination the witness is asked to test his first account against his
memory, common knowledge, or the examiner's suggestions. As a re-
sult of cross-examination, a witness's recollection or understanding of
events may change, even as he testifies. An ability to explain, revise, or
even to disavow former testimony is implicit in the adversary examina-
tion as presently structured.
As presently formulated and construed, the federal perjury laws un-
realistically ignore the needs of the adversary trial process by mandating
a sort of "foolish consistency" in trial and grand jury testimony. Wit-
nesses who change their testimony for any reason are jeopardized by a
statute that deems inconsistent testimony to be prima facie evidence of
perjury. Simultaneously, the law appears to invite witnesses to correct
testimonial errors, promising immunity from prosecution if they do. In
reality, the promise is empty. The provisions are not merely theoreti-
cally incoherent, they are counterproductive as well. To inhibit incon-
sistent testimony is to inhibit truth as well as falsehood. A rule
mandating consistency in testimony costs more than it is worth as a de-
terrent to perjury.
This article focuses on the inconsistent statement provision of the
Federal False Declaration Statute. Part I of this article identifies certain
* Visiting Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law, A.B. Vanderbilt
University, 1969; J.D. Yale Law School, 1974.
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anomalous aspects of perjury that make it particularly difficult to control
by threats of punishment. Perjury's resemblance to innocent mistake
creates a risk that criminal sanctions will be misapplied. These sanctions
may have counterproductive effects, at times inducing people to commit
perjury and at others inhibiting people from correcting inaccurate testi-
mony that they have previously given. Part II demonstrates the way in
which the conflict between the goals of deterrence and mitigation is
manifested in the federal perjury laws, which seek both to penalize "in-
consistent" testimony and to encourage "recantation" of incorrect testi-
mony. Statutory restrictions and judicial construction have resolved this
conflict against mitigation. Part III describes the harmful effects of this
statutory policy on witnesses and the attorneys who represent them. It
also questions the strategic value of the inconsistent statement provision
to federal prosecutors. Part IV offers a recommendation for a more co-
herent statutory policy toward inconsistent testimony and evaluates that
recommendation in light of the regulatory problems identified in Part I.
It concludes that federal law should more liberally encourage correc-
tions of prior testimony even at the cost of some additional loss in
deterrence.
I. A BRIEr EXAMINATION OF SOME PROBLEMS IN REGULATING PERJURY
The crime of perjury tends to resist analysis under the traditional
criminal law model of deterrence. Deterrence theory assumes that peo-
ple will refrain from criminal activity if they know that criminal acts will
be met with swift and certain punishment. In its modem, economic in-
carnation, deterrence theory sees the potential criminal as a rational
economic actor capable of calculating the costs and benefits of different
courses of conduct. ' Such a theory posits that if such an actor concludes
1. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205-06 (3rd ed. 1986); Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLO. L. REV. 1193 (1985). This analysis also as-
sumes that the criminal is risk neutral, accurately informed about the relevant factors, and
can do his math correctly.
Perjury laws find their economic justification in the costs that false testimony imposes
on the litigation system. Perjured testimony, if it succeeds in its objective, misleads the
trier of fact into inaccurate judgments, which in turn result in injustice and in social costs.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw at 514. The possibility of perjury also in-
creases the transaction costs associated with litigation. In the absence of any sanction
against perjury, litigants and triers of fact would be driven to seek more complete, and
thus more costly, corroboration of witnesses' testimony.
To act as a deterrent, perjury laws must impose risks that offset the benefits that wit-
nesses may anticipate from the commission of perjury. The potential perjurer who thinks
like a risk-neutral economist or gambler will forego perjury when his estimate of the cost
of the penalty multiplied by what he perceives to be the likelihood of its imposition (the
"cost product") exceeds his estimate of the product of the value to him of what perjury
would bring about, multiplied by the perceived likelihood that the perjury will bring the
benefit about (the "benefit product"). Increasing the cost product by increasing the sanc-
tions or by increasing the likelihood of their imposition should decrease the amount of
perjury committed. When the benefit product is large, as it may be for witnesses who are
criminal defendants facing capital charges, it is unlikely that increasing the cost product
will decrease perjury.
The potential perjurer's actual calculation of potential costs and benefits can be a bit
more complex than this description suggests because of a form of reciprocal relationship
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that the costs to him of conviction multiplied by the likelihood of convic-
tion exceed the product of the crime's benefits to him multiplied by the
likelihood that he will realize such benefits, he will refrain from commit-
ting the crime. Lawmakers can alter the costs of conviction by changing
the penalties for conviction. They can alter the probability of conviction
by changing the elements of the offense. Applied to perjury, then, the
assumptions of deterrence theory imply that increasing the cost or
probability of conviction of perjury will lead to a reduction in the occur-
rence of the offense, making trial testimony more truthful and judg-
ments more reliable.
Several phenomena make application of the deterrence model to
perjury problematic. Evidence tending to prove the actus reus of perjury
is often ambiguous, making perjury difficult to distinguish from inno-
cent behavior. Depending on its response to this problem, the law of
perjury risks over or under-deterrence. The cost/benefit analysis of the
deterrence model is also complicated by the tendency of perjury laws
that penalize inconsistent testimony to dissuade witnesses from mitigat-
ing the effects of prior perjury or innocently incorrect testimony. The
following subsections discuss these phenomena.
A. The Problem of Detection
Perjury at common law is the willful making of a false oath about a
material fact in a judicial proceeding.2 Although the crime of perjury
occurs under the very nose of the judicial system, its detection and pun-
ishment have always presented serious difficulties. The theory of deter-
rence requires that the trier of fact be able to identify the proscribed
between the cost product and the value component of the benefit product. The value of
the perjury to the witness will depend in part upon the likelihood that the jury will believe
him. Anything that makes the perjury more believable will increase its value and increase
the incentive to lie, up to a limit represented by the potential gain represented by a
favorable judgment or the loss represented by an unfavorable one. The believability of
the perjury will depend in part on the jury's estimate of the witness's perception of the risk
of punishment if he is caught lying. Thus prosecutors argue in capital cases that a defend-
ant who testifies has nothing to lose by perjury: the cost product will exceed any benefit
product. This calculation leads to an anomaly: the greater the likelihood of punishment,
the more likely the jury is to believe the witness, and the greater the incentive he has to lie.
That is, the increased risk of punishment makes it more likely that the jury will believe the
lie, increasing the value of the lie. The risk would, for the same reason, also tend to de-
crease the likelihood of a perjury conviction, reducing the risk component of the cost
product.
But there are wheels within wheels. A rational jury would take this increased incentive
into consideration and would both discount the cost product and increase its estimate of
the benefit product. The jury's reaction would reduce the witness's incentive to commit
perjury. A rational witness, however, would know that the jury would discount the credi-
bility of his testimony in this way. This knowledge, which of course a rational jury will
foresee, once again makes his testimony more credible. But if the jury takes this into ac-
count, etc. This endlessly oscillating, reciprocal relationship suggests that even if all the
actors are rational, the effect of an increased risk of punishment will depend on indetermi-
nate interactions among the actors. See Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1263, 1280-84 (1985).
2. See infra note 16. Additional elements not pertinent to the discussion here are that
the matter be material and that the statement be given in a judicial proceeding.
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behavior reliably in order to avoid over or under-deterrence.3 Optimal
enforcement of perjury laws requires an accurate way of identifying per-
jurious statements and distinguishing them from innocent testimonial
inaccuracies. Unfortunately, the chief objective manifestation of the
crime of perjury, the falsity of a witness's sworn statement, is a common
characteristic of innocent behavior or even behavior that the justice sys-
tem should encourage.
4
The giving of false evidence can be wholly innocent. False evidence
can result from truthful testimony about inaccurate observation, mem-
ory lapse, misunderstanding, or miscommunication. A witness who mis-
perceived an event may truthfully testify to his misperception. A
forgetful witness may truthfully describe his inaccurate recollection of
an event. A witness who misunderstands a question may truthfully an-
swer the question that he thought he heard. In some of these instances,
the witness might even be said to have "known" the truth at the time he
testified falsely. Yet in none of them has the witness willfully made a
false oath. Mere falsity of the witness's statement furnishes an inade-
quate inference of perjury.
An arguably more obvious manifestation that a witness intentionally
lied is that he made inconsistent sworn statements. Here, it would seem,
the inference of intentional lying is stronger than that resulting from
mere falsity because in making one of the statements, the witness seems
to acknowledge that he knows the other to be false. Yet, inconsistent
statements alone are insufficient to support an inference of perjury. A
witness will testify inconsistently whenever he corrects any of the inno-
cent testimonial errors noted in the preceding paragraph.
The difficulty of identifying perjury creates a risk that perjury laws
will result in overdeterrence if they identify and penalize ambiguous be-
havior or inconsistent statements, as a substitute for the behavior sought
to be regulated, intentional lying. As will be seen, federal perjury law
has adopted this strategy.
B. The Problem of Counterproductivity
Haldeman: [Speaking hypothetically] But Magruder then says
. . ."Now, I go down to the Grand Jury, because obviously they
are going to call me back, and I go to defend myself against
McCord's statement which I know is true... You're saying to
me, 'Don't make up a new lie to cover the old lie.' What would
you recommend that I do? Stay with the old lie and hope I
would come out, or clean myself up and go to jail?
' 5
3. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 514. Over-deterrence refers to the inhibition of
nontargeted behavior by the threat of punishment; under-deterrence refers to the failure
of the threat of punishment to deter all of the targeted behavior.
4. In a sense, the very nature of the trial process implies that false testimony must be
and remain commonplace. The raison detre of a trial is to resolve conflicting accounts of
events by announcing a form of public truth, a finding of fact. Such a finding necessarily
implies that some of the conflicting evidentiary accounts are "false." In this sense, trials
are replete with evidence that is later regarded as having been false, but not perjurious.
5. THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRitrs 246 (G. Gold ed. 1974).
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Laws that punish lying often have unpredictable effects. Threats to
punish lying sometimes induce people to lie precisely in order to avoid
the punishment for lying, as in the quoted example. 6 This paradoxical
risk is most pronounced whenever the witness is asked to acknowledge
that prior testimony was inaccurate, e.g. during cross-examination. If
inconsistent testimony increases the likelihood of punishment, the wit-
ness who realizes that her original testimony was inaccurate will have an
incentive to lie on cross-examination whether or not the original re-
sponse was perjurious. Unlike most other criminal laws, perjury statutes
can create a perverse incentive to commit the very act they forbid. As a
corollary, they are also unusually7 counterproductive in deterring wit-
nesses from engaging in the forms of inconsistent testimony that the
judicial system wishes to encourage. Inconsistent testimony is often a
sign of bonafides rather than duplicity. Testimonial revisions are the nat-
ural concomitant of candor and are often essential to the development
of evidence at trial.
This potential for counterproductivity precludes a simple reliance
on the assumption that maximizing the penal costs imposed on perjury
will necessarily inhibit it: such "disincentives" might actually be incen-
tives. Increasing their severity might well increase the incidence of the
harm they are intended to prevent. 8 Any perjury prevented by an in-
crease in punishment must be additionally discounted by the value of
the useful testimonial corrections that such punishment inhibits.
6. In economic terms, a lie may reduce the witness's chances of being apprehended
and convicted of committing prior perjury. It also may reduce the witness's exposure to
conviction for perjury when the witness has innocently testified inaccurately. The witness
who contemplates changing previously inaccurate testimony must perform a rather com-
plicated calculation of the probability-weighted costs he will face under each course of
action, i.e. affirmance of the previous testimony or retraction of the testimony. Affirmance
may decrease the chance of detection yet increase the likelihood of conviction if the lie is
detected because it reduces the defendant's ability to argue that the lie was inadvertent.
Retraction will have effects that vary with the legal effect of retraction, as discussed below.
7. Normally, criminal sanctions do not threaten to deter desirable behavior. Laws
against murder, theft, or drug dealing, for example, rarely jeopardize or inhibit activities
generally thought to be socially useful because the activities involved in those crimes rarely
resemble socially useful behavior. When the behavior to be regulated itself is sometimes
socially useful, regulations can, in theory, be tailored so as to permit the behavior at the
optimum level. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968); A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 73-84 (1983);
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984) (characterizing sanctions as
involving abrupt jumps in the cost of illegal activity and prices as more elastic). Even if we
assume that perjury is never socially useful however, it does not follow that laws against
perjury do not jeopardize socially useful activity.
8. The problems of detecting perjury make this possibility doubly perplexing be-
cause the effects of perjury statutes cannot be measured. Unlike some other crimes, occur-
rences of perjury cannot be quantified. Without data on the relative effects of the
counterproductive potential, we cannot tell whether the benefits of an increased likelihood
of conviction will exceed the costs. The lack of any data on the ratio of punishment to
occurrence makes it impossible for either the perjurer or the legislator to engage in classic
risk/benefit analysis that is central to the instrumentalist calculus. "Proof" of the relative
effectiveness of various forms of the perjury statute must therefore proceed by argument
based on speculation and anecdote. In this respect, we have not advanced much since
Holmes' plaintive question: "What have we better than a blind guess to show that the
criminal law in its present form does more good than harm?" O.W. HOLMES, The Path of
the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 180 (1920).
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C. The Problem of Deterrence versus Mitigation
Conflict between the goals of deterrence and mitigation is inevita-
ble in any criminal statute. The more effective a criminal statute is in
deterring conduct through the threat of swift and certain punishment,
the more such a statute inhibits people who have engaged in the con-
duct from admitting it so as to minimize the damage caused by the con-
duct. With some crimes, this loss of mitigation is negligible in relation
to the value of deterring the conduct. Thus, it is presumably more im-
portant to deter murder than it is to encourage confessions of murder
because a confession does little to remedy the harm caused by the act. 9
One cost of severe sanctions against murder may well be to increase the
costs of investigation of such crimes but this cost is thought to be out-
weighed by the value of the deterrence purchased by those sanctions.
Perjury does not yield to such simplistic analysis. Although the
crime of perjury is complete when the witness makes the the false state-
ment, perjury usually does not cause serious harm until a tribunal acts in
reliance on the false statement. Such harm can be largely obviated if the
perjury is corrected before the tribunal acts. Thus, in most cases there is
a window of time after the perjury is committed and before the tribunal
acts during which the harm can be mitigated. The judicial system has a
strong institutional interest in encouraging witnesses to correct perjuri-
ous statements before tribunals act in reliance on them. In addition, as
noted in the preceding subsection, the judicial system also has an even
greater interest in encouraging the correction or mitigation of inno-
cently inaccurate testimony.
Yet, to give witnesses an opportunity to correct perjury and thereby
avoid punishment weakens the deterrent effect of sanctions against per-
jury and could increase the incidence of the crime and its associated
costs. Witnesses might be more inclined to make the initial decision to
commit perjury under a rule that permitted them to correct the perjury
without risk of punishment.' 0
Because maximum punishment for intentional lying will always in-
terfere with maximum incentives to correct lies, as well as innocent er-
rors, any perjury rule must mediate the conflict between the institutional
goals of deterrence and mitigation. The conflict is clearly apparent in
the federal perjury statutes.
II. THE FEDERAL PERJURY STATUTES
Two federal statutes prohibit the giving of intentionally false testi-
mony in federal trial and grand jury proceedings: the General Perjury
9. Where social gain can be seen from the defendant's mitigation of the effects of his
criminal behavior, the law does encourage such mitigation, as in the defense of withdrawal
in the law of attempt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) and accompanying Comment (de-
fense offers defendants a motive to desist from criminal designs); Rotenberg, Withdrawal as
a Defense to Relational Crimes, 1962 Wisc. L. REV. 596.
10. This possibility is discussed below, Part IV.
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Statute" and the False Declaration Statute.12 Considered together,
these statutes create a bewildering schedule of risks and rewards for the
witness who contemplates changing his testimony.
Because of the difficulty in distinguishing perjured testimony from
innocent mistakes, courts have historically applied the severe sanctions
of the law of perjury with caution, so as not to punish innocent behavior
or unduly frighten prospective witnesses. 13 This reluctance has, until
recently, been manifested in evidentiary rules that make perjury excep-
tionally difficult to prove.' 4 The federal perjury laws illustrate both the
old reluctance and a newer approach, designed to facilitate conviction.
A. The General Perjury Statute and the Common Law Evidence Rules
The General Perjury Statute, which derived from the common
law,' 5 defines perjury as "willfully and contrary to . . . oath [stating or
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). See infra note 16.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). See infra note 26.
13. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) ("The seminal modern treat-
ment of the history of the offense concludes that one consideration of policy overshad-
owed all others during the years when perjury first emerged as a common law offense:
'That the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage wit-
nesses from appearing or testifying.' Study of Peigury, reprinted in REPORT OF NEW YORK LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, LEGIS. Doc. No. 60, 249 (1935)); Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S.
606, 608-10 (1945). See alo United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (The rule
that perjury convictions not be based on excessively vague or fundamentally ambiguous
questions prevents witnesses "from unfairly bearing the risks associated with the inade-
quacies of their examiners, and . . . encurage[s] participation in the judicial system."); 7
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2041 (Chardbourne Rev. 1978) (herein-
after EVIDENCE) (citing W.M. BEST, EVIDENCE 605-06 (1849)):
Measured merely by its religious or moral enormity, perjury, always a grievous,
would in many cases be the greatest of crimes, and as such be deserving of the
severest punishment which the law could inflict. But when we consider the very
peculiar nature of this offence, and that every person who appears as a witness in
a court ofjustice is liable to be accused of it by those against whom his evidence
tells, who are frequently the basest and most unprincipled of mankind; and when
we remember how powerless are the best rules of municipal law without the co-
operation of society to enforce them, - we shall see that the obligation of pro-
tecting witnesses from oppression, or annoyance by charges or threats of charges
of having borne false testimony, is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its
deserts. To repress that crime, prevention is better than cure; and the law of
England relies, for this purpose, on the means provided for detecting and expos-
ing the crime at the moment of commission, - such as publicity, cross-examina-
tion, the aid of a jury, etc.; and on the infliction of a severe, though not excessive
punishment, whenever the commission of the crime has been clearly proved.
14. See discussion at Part I-A, below. Perhaps as a result of these rules, the number of
prosecutions for perjury in the federal courts has been miniscule in relation to the amount
of intentional false testimony that common experience tells us must take place. For exam-
ple, in the ten year period from 1956 to 1965, out of 307,227 federal criminal defendants
charged, only 713 were charged with perjury. The conviction rate for perjury was 52.7%
in comparison to 78.7% for all other crimes. 115 CONG. REc. 5880 (1969) (remarks of
Sen. McClellan). These data antedated the passage of the False Declaration Statute.
15. At common law, perjury consists of willfully making a false oath with regard to a
material matter while under oath in a judicial proceeding. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 601 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 511 (3d ed. 1982);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment I ("In general, [perjury] consists of four elements:
(i) the making or reaffirming of a false statement; (ii) that is material to an official proceed-
ing; (iii) in violation of an oath or equivalent affirmation; (iv) when the party making the
statement does not believe it to be true."). An answer that is literally true is not perjury,
even if it is not responsive and arguably misleading by negative implication.
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subscribing] any material matter that [the witness] does not believe to be
true." 16
Prosecutions under the General Perjury Statute must satisfy strict
common law proof requirements. The government must prove that the
witness willfully made a statement without a belief that the statement
was true. 17 This lack of belief must usually be inferred from the untruth
of the statement.' 8 Federal courts have added as an element that the
government prove that statement was actually untrue. 19
To prove that the statement was untrue, the government must sat-
isfy the two-witness rule, which provides that the falsity of the oath can-
not be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of only one witness.
20
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The text of the statute is as follows:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and con-
trary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of per-
jury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully
subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This
section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or
without the United States.
17. Untrue testimony is not perjurious unless the witness does not believe it to be
true. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982). Thus, untrue testimony is not perjury if it results from a
slip of the tongue, a misunderstanding of the question, misperception, or a faulty memory.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 3. Some courts held that a sworn untruth made
recklessly, or without knowledge of whether it was true, was not perjury, although most
held that it was. Compare id. (recklessness is sufficient for guilt) with WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW §§ 602-03. See also United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952); WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 604; and R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 516-17. The general federal rule is that true testimony given under a mis-
taken belief that it is false is not perjury. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 2(d).
18. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411 (1950); United
States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) ("In the
absence of an admission by the defendant, the only way a defendant's knowledge of the
falsity of his statement can be proved is through circumstantial evidence."); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 241.1 Comment 2(d) ("In the usual perjury prosecution, corroboration of an in-
tent to lie is provided by the falsity of the statement made.").
19. United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 924
(1980); United States v. Magin, 280 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960).
The rational of such a requirement is that, in the absence of the corroboration of the
defendant's intent established by the falsity of the statement, a significant danger exists
that a conviction would be based upon jury speculation.
20. Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 626 (1926). In Weiler v. United States,
323 U.S. 606 (1945), the Court justified retention of the two witness rule as follows:
The special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the evidence of
single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries. That it renders successful per-
jury prosecution more difficult than it otherwise would be is obvious, and most
criticism of the rule has stemmed from this result. It is argued that since effective
administration ofjustice is largely dependent upon truthful testimony, society is
ill-served by an "anachronistic" rule which tends to burden and discourage pros-
ecutions for perjury. Proponents of the rule on the other hand, contend that
society is well-served by such consequence. Lawsuits frequently engender in de-
feated litigants sharp resentment and hostilities against adverse witnesses, and it
is argued, not without persuasiveness, that rules of law must be so fashioned as to
protect honest witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the form of un-
[Vol. 66:2
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The two-witness rule thus prevents a perjury conviction based solely on
a swearing match between the defendant and a single government
witness.
A corollary of the two-witness rule is the inconsistent statement
rule, a much-criticized rule of pleading and proof that applies when the
defendant himself has made two or more contradictory sworn state-
ments. The rule has two prongs, one applying to the indictment and
one to the proof required of the prosecution. The indictment must
specify which of the defendant's inconsistent statements is alleged to be
false; it cannot simply charge that, as a matter of logical necessity, one of
them was false.2 ' In proving the falsity of the statement charged, more-
over, the prosecution must adduce some corroboration in addition to
the defendant's sworn contradictory statement.
22
The extent to which these common law evidentiary rules actually
founded perjury prosecutions .... The rule may originally have stemmed from
quite different reasoning, but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has
been the fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted in
perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were adopted.
323 U.S. at 608-10. See also United States v. Diggs, 560 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 925 (1977) (two-witness rule still applies to prosecutions under the General Per-
jury Statute after passage of the False Declaration Statute).
21. See United States v. Buckner, 118 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1941).
22. See Cuesta v. United States, 230 F.2d 704, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1956) (defendant's
sworn oral admission of the falsity of his sworn written application for registry as an alien
was not sufficient evidence of perjury without corroboration of falsity); United States v.
Nessanbaum, 205 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1953) (dictum); McWhorter v. United States, 193 F.2d
982 (5th Cir. 1952); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 8.
It would appear that the seminal case from which the federal rule evolved was system-
atically misread. McWhorter cited United States v. Wood, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430,438 (1840),
for the rule that proof of defendant's contradictory sworn statements alone is insufficient
to prove perjury. 193 F.2d at 983. Yet Wood does not support that rule. In Wood, the
defendant was charged with perjury in preparing invoices. The proof of falsity was limited
to written correspondence from the defendant. No corroborating witness testified. The
Court noted the existence of the two-witness rule, but held that the purpose of the rule
was satisfied by the evidence presented, which came from the defendant himself. In dic-
tum, the Court cited Rex v. KniUl (referred to in Rex v. Harris, 5 Barn. & Aid. 926, 929
(1822)) for the rule that a single witness is sufficient to establish perjury if he testifies that
the defendant testified to contradictory statements. In Knill, the defendant was charged
with having committed perjury in testimony before the House of Lords. The defendant
had testified inconsistently before a committee of the House of Commons. The evidence
was limited to proof of the contradictory oaths. The conviction was affirmed despite the
absence of a second witness, the court holding that contradiction by the party himself was
sufficient. In Rex v. Harris, the court reversed a conviction upon similar facts because the
prosecution had not specified in the charge which of the two statements was false, but had
simply alleged that they were inconsistent and that one or the other must have been false.
The Harris court reasoned that the ambiguity of the charge would not permit the defend-
ant to plead acquittal in the suit as a bar to a subsequent charge of having committed
perjury in making one or the other of the statements alone.
Although United States v. Wood does not establish that a defendant's sworn contradic-
tory statements alone are insufficient to prove the falsity of his testimony, post-Wood deci-
sions in England did hold that the defendant's sworn inconsistent statement alone was
insufficient to satisfy the two-witness rule. R. v. Wheatland, 8 C.& P. 238 (1838); see gener-
ally 11 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND § 950 (4th ed. 1976) and cases cited therein; 12
HALSBURY'S STATUTES 192 (4th ed. 1985) (Perjury Act of 1911 § 13). However, McWhorter
and its progeny apparently ignored the effect of the rules announced in Wood, i.e. that,
although the prosecution is required to charge and prove which of the two inconsistent
statements was false, once the prosecution charges that one of the statements is false, the
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impair federal prosecutions for perjury is uncertain. Critics of the Gen-
eral Perjury Statute have argued that the two-witness rule and the incon-
sistent statement rule seriously impede federal perjury prosecutions.
23
The rules have also been subject to theoretical challenge. Discount-
ing any special problem in regulating perjury, critics argue that the two-
witness rule requires corroboration that is unnecessary for proof of
other, more serious, crimes.2 4 They see the inconsistent statement rule
as pointlessly forcing the prosecutor and the jury to guess which state-
ment was false when, as a matter of logic, one of them must have been.
25
From the critics' point of view, prosecutorial efficiency and logic tri-
umphed with the passage of the False Declaration Statute.
B. The False Declaration Statute
The False Declaration Statute prohibits false swearing in federal
court and grand jury proceedings.2 6 Congress enacted the statute as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 with the announced
intention of making perjury convictions easier to obtain than they had
been under the General Perjury Statute, 2 7 thereby improving the relia-
bility of evidence given in federal court and grand jury proceedings
defendant's contradictory statement is sufficient under the two-witness rule to establish
falsity.
The inconsistent statement rule was not followed in several state cases, and Wigmore
opined that it was not the prevailing rule in non-federal jurisdictions. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2042.
Just as the two-witness rule acquired a new rationale after its original rationale
withered away, Cf O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 32 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("[W]hen
ancient rules maintain themselves ... new reasons more fitted to the time have been found
for them .... ) the inconsistent statement rule also finds support in other arguments.
One such justification is that inconsistent statements do not necessarily imply perjury. A
witness may testify inconsistently at different times because his recollection or opinion
changed in the interim or because of mistake or misunderstanding. Mere proof that the
defendant testified inconsistently does not establish that he made either statement without
a belief that it was true. Despite this justification, however, the inconsistent statement rule
might prove frustrating in rare cases in which the nature of the inconsistency makes it clear
that the witness uttered an intentional falsehood but the prosecution has no independent
proof as to which of the statements was false in order to satisfy the two-witness rule.
23. As evidence they cited the relative paucity of federal prosecutions for perjury.
24. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2041 ("In modern times, cogent reasons have been
given for believing that the rule has outlived its usefulness."); New York Law Revision Com-
mission, 1935 Report, Legis. Doc. 322 (1935).
25. See United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729, 734 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
899 (1961) ("It is hard to see why in a case where, e.g., two or more witnesses testified that
the defendant, repeatedly and under varying cirmustances, had made statements differing
from his sworn testimony, ajury could not be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not believe that latter to be true."). See also, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2043;
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 9.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). Subsection (a) provides as follows:
(a) Whoever under oath ... in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration...
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
The statute also prohibits the use of false documents in federal court and grand jury
proceedings. This article will discuss only the provisions relating to false swearing. It
could be argued that the use of false documents evidences a greater degree of conscious
intention to mislead and so is not subject to the problems discussed in this article.
27. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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against organized crime figures. 2 8 The False Declaration Statute was to
make convictions for perjury more easy to obtain by defining a new spe-
cies of perjury, false declaration, to which the "outmoded" evidentiary
rules of the General Perjury Statute would not apply.2 9 The premise of
the legislation was simple: by increasing the likelihood that a perjurer
would be convicted, the statute would increase the risks associated with
perjury and thereby reduce its occurrence. 30 It is, of course, this prem-
ise that is in doubt, given the potential counterproductivity of perjury
statutes.
The elements of the False Declaration Statute are as rigorous as
those of the General Perjury Statute, although there are some changes
in operative language. The False Declaration Statute prohibits a federal
witness from knowingly3 l making a "false declaration." The defendant
28. Id.
29. See supra note 14. "Title IV eliminates outmoded evidentiary restrictions in prose-
cutions of those who give false testimony in grand jury or court proceeding [sic]." Hearings
Before the Sub-Committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on theJudiciary on
S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292, 91st
CONG. lST SESS. 3 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings] (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
30. In committee hearings, witnesses favoring the legislation testified that if the gov-
ernment could more easily obtain convictions for perjury, witnesses would be less likely to
succumb to illicit pressure to testify falsely. Government prosecutors were said to have
been often frustrated by witnesses who testified favorably to the government in grand jury
proceedings, then changed their story because of intimidation or for other reasons at the
ensuing criminal trials. The government wanted its own counter-pressure, a licit threat
with which to confront the wavering witness. In addition, it was argued that making per-
jury convictions easier to obtain would permit the government to enforce the immunized
witness's obligation to testify truthfully under the Act's witness immunity provisions. The
immunity provisions contained in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 are found at
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1986). It was thought that facilitation of perjury prosecutions was es-
sential to insure truthful testimony by immunized witnesses:
The criminal law must offer more effective deterrents against false statements.
The integrity of the trial depends on the power to compel truthful testimony and
to punish falsehood. Immunity can be an effective prosecution weapon only if the
immunized witness then testifies truthfully. Perjury statutes provide criminal
penalties for false testimony under oath, but the infrequency of their use and the
difficulty of securing convictions in perjury cases has limited the effectiveness of
this criminal sanction.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society
(quoted in Hearings, supra note 29, at 335).
31. The legislative history suggests that the change in the level of intent from "will-
fully" to "knowingly" was intended to have no substantive effect. See S. REP No. 617 at
149 ("language changes have been made in the provision [on intent] as introduced to
achieve economy of words"). Compare United States v. Stassi, 443 F. Supp 661, 666 (D.N.J.
1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 122 (1978) (rejecting defendant's argument that his statements were
not knowingly false, the court said: "the mens rea element of'knowingly' does not apply to
whether the statements were false but rather to how they were made. (citations omitted).
The requirement dictates that only knowing, intentional or voluntary (as opposed to in-
advertant or accidental) statements be the subject of prosecution.") and United States v.
Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1206 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding refusal to give jury instruction
that false declaration must be willful) with United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 914-15 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (noting that the mens rea element was changed, with-
out comment on the substatntive effect of the change) and United States v. Lardieri, 497
F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1974) (approving instruction for prosecution under subsection (a)
stating that "knowing" means with knowledge of the falsity of the statement). This ques-
tion will be discussed further in Part II-A.
In contrast to the General Perjury Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982), the witness's "be-
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must have knowledge of the falsity of the statement.3 2 Consistent with
prior law, the statute explicitly requires the prosecution to prove that
the matter asserted in the defendant's statement was objectively false.
33
The lightening of the prosecutor's burden occurred not in the elements
of the crime but in the evidentiary rules.
1. Relaxation of Evidentiary Rules
Subsection (e) of the statute abandons the two-witness rule alto-
gether by providing that proof of false declaration need not be by any
particular number of witnesses or type of evidence.3 4 The government
need only prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
This section permits proof of the falsity of the defendant's testi-
mony to be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single wit-
ness, making proof of false declaration similar to that of most other
crimes. In theory, subsection (e) also permits a conviction based solely
on an inconsistent statement made by the defendant, whether sworn or
not, if evidence of such a statement would permit the trier of fact to find
the sworn statement to have been false beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the foregoing provision permits the government to convict a
defendant of false declaration based solely on the witness's inconsistent
statement, it does not solve the problem presented by the need to
choose which of two inconsistent statements is charged to be false. This
matter is taken up in subsection (c) of the statute, which lessens the gov-
ernment's pleading and proof requirements in cases in which the de-
fendant has made inconsistent statements under oath. Under the
statute, an indictment or information sufficiently charges false declara-
tion by alleging that the defendant knowingly made two or more sworn
declarations "which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is
necessarily false .... -35 The prosecution need not allege which of the
statements was false. Likewise, at trial the prosecution need not prove
which of the two inconsistent declarations was false.3 6 Proof of their




The False Declaration Statute provides for two defenses to charges
lief" in the truth of the statement is referred to only once, in the inconsistent statement
provision discussed below.
32. United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). But see infra Part II-C-I-a
(discussion of the inconsistent statement provision in which such knowledge may not need
to be proved when the witness has testified inconsistently).
33. United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1976).
34. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction.
It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or
by documentary or other type of evidence." 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1982).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
36. Id.
37. Id. This provision reverses the McWhorter rule.
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made under the statute. As an incentive to correct false testimony,3 8 the
statute permits an affirmative defense of recantation to a charge of false
declaration. Recantation, or retraction, refers to the witness's statement
that his previous testimony was false. A defense of retraction or recanta-
tion was not recognized under the General Perjury Statute. Although
some common law decisions barred conviction for perjury if the defend-
ant had corrected the falsehood in the same proceeding in which it had
been given,3 9 in United States v. Norris,4 0 the Supreme Court held that the
crime of perjury was "completed" at the time of the false utterance and
that recantation was no defense to a charge of perjury under the federal
statute.
4 1
Subsection (d) changes the Norris rule for the crime of false
declaration:
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury pro-
ceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the
declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission
shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the ad-
mission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected
the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity
has been or will be exposed.
4 2
The recantation provision was modeled on a similar provision in the
New York criminal code.43 The Model Penal Code contains a similar
retraction provision.4 4 Under both the New York and Model Penal
Code perjury statutes, the defense, if successful, bars prosecution for
perjury. But because the False Declaration Statute did not displace the
General Perjury Statute, the defense afforded by its recantation provi-
sion does not apply to prosecutions under the General Perjury
Statute.
4 5
The statute provides an additional affirmative defense to a charge of
having made inconsistent sworn statements. This defense is set out in
subsection (c) which provides that it "shall be a defense to an indictment
38. "[The recantation provision] serves as an inducement to the witness to give truth-
ful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring
the risk of prosecution by doing so." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4024 (1970). See
also same source at 4008, 4023 (the sole purpose of the recantation defense is to en-
courage the discovery of truth in judicial and grand jury proceedings) United States v.
Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v.
Lardieri, 506 F.2d 319, 324 ("Section 1623 deters perjury in the first instance by punish-
ing it, and encourages the correction of false testimony by barring prosecution if a witness
recants before he knows his lie will be exposed or before the proceeding has been substan-
tially affected.") United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 627 and cases cited therein.
40. 300 U.S. 564, 574-76 (1937).
41. Id.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982).
43. This provision adopts in modified form a New York statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 210.25 (McKinney, 1988); 2 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4023-24 (1970).
44. "No person shall be guilty of an offense under this Section if he retracted the
falsification in the course of the proceeding in which it was made before it became manifest
that the falsification was or would be exposed and before the falsification substantially
affected the proceeding." MODEL PENAL CODE, § 241.1(4) (1980).
45. See infra notes 118-19.
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or information made [under subsection (c)] that the defendant at the
time he made each declaration believed that the declaration was true."
4 6
The relationship between this defense and the government's affirmative
obligation to prove that the defendant knowingly made a false statement
is discussed in the next subsection.
C. Treatment of Inconsistent Testimony Under the Federal Perjury Statutes
As part I of the article suggested, perjury is difficult to regulate in
part because of the conflict between the deterrence and mitigation goals
of the justice system: to inhibit perjury is to discourage rectification of
testimonial error. Inconsistent testimony is especially sensitive to this
conflict because, although it can provide strong evidence of perjury, it is
nevertheless the only way in which a witness can correct the harm done
by his previous testimony. As one would expect, therefore, the deter-
rence and mitigation interests of perjury law clash most clearly in the
statutory treatment of inconsistent testimony.
The two federal perjury statutes treat inconsistent testimony in op-
posite ways. Under the General Perjury Statute, the two-witness rule
and the inconsistent statement rule tend to make testimonial correction
less risky for a witness. The government may charge that either state-
ment was perjurious, but is required to corroborate by some additional
evidence the falsity of the statement charged. 4 7 The government also
bears the burden of proving the defendant's lack of belief in the false
statement.48 Nevertheless, by refusing to acknowledge the defense of
recantation, 4 9 the General Perjury Statute discourages testimonial cor-
rections whenever the witness believes that the correction would corrob-
orate other evidence of the falsity of the former testimony, thereby
satisfying the two-witness rule.
The False Declaration Statute reverses this approach: under sub-
section (c) certain forms of inconsistent testimony constitute conclusive
evidence of falsehood, while under subsection (d) other forms of incon-
sistent testimony will give the witness a defense of recantation. The
False Declaration Statute thus makes testimonial revision less risky, but
only if it can be characterized as recantation. Otherwise, it is more risky
because of the reduced pleading and proof requirements of subsection
(c).
In order to analyze the combined behavioral effects of these stat-
utes, it is necessary to look more closely at the basis for the radically
different treatment accorded recantation and other inconsistent state-
ments under the False Declaration Statute. The following analysis sug-
gests that these two categories of testimony are, for most practical
purposes, equivalent. They are treated differently not because they are
of different values to the judicial system but because they symbolize the
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
47. See supra note 23.
48. See supra note 18.
49. See supra note 43.
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two sides of the unresolved conflict between the deterrence and mitiga-
tion policies of the statute.
1. The Inconsistent Statement Provision
By permitting the government, in effect, to plead and prove false
declaration in the alternative when the defendant has testified inconsis-
tently, the inconsistent statement provision 50 prevents a defendant who
obviously lied on one of two occasions from avoiding prosecution be-
cause the trier of fact cannot determine upon which occasion he lied.
The provision rests on the tautology that when a witness utters "two or
more declarations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them
is necessarily false [sic]," 5 ' the witness has uttered a false declaration.
While the requisite degree of inconsistency alone might permit an infer-
ence that one of the statements was false, however, it does not establish
that the falsity was intentional. 52 The inference of intent will depend
50. (c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in
any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declarations,
which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need
not specify which declaration is false if-
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations
for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the
indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof
that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilable contradictory declara-
tions material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to
any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information
made pursuant to the first sentance of this subsection that the defendant at the
time he made each declaration believed the declaration to be true.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
Compare the inconsistent statement provision of the Model Penal Code:
Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under oath or equivalent
affirmation, both having been made within the period of the statute of limitations,
the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsistent statements in a
single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false and not
believed by the defendant. In such a case it shall not be necessary for the prose-
cution to prove which statement was false but only that one or the other was false
and not believed by the defendant to be true.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(5) (1980).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982). One presumes that the adverb "necessarily" modifies
"is" rather than "false." Only self-contradictory statements are necessarily false.
52. It should be noted that the standard of inconsistency set forth in the statute is not
as self-evident or easy to apply as one might imagine. Consider:
1. No two non-contemporaneous statements purporting to describe a witness's
recolleciton of an event can ever meet the statutory requirement that one of them was
necessarily false when made. Regardless of the form that factual testimony takes, it can
only describe the witness's contemporaneous recollection. An exception might be state-
ments of contemporaneous perception. But no two of these could be contradictory be-
cause they would describe perceptions at different times. "The light was red" is
understood to mean "My present recollection is that the light was red," although the latter
expression conventionally suggests that the recollection is weak. Indeed, a witness's at-
tempt to testify to anything other than his recollection of his perceptions would ordinarily
be inadmissible as either opinion or speculation. Cf FED. R. EviD. 602 (requirement that
testimony be based on witness's personal knowledge); 701 (lay opinions inadmissible un-
less based on perception). Because statements of past facts describe only the witness's
current recollection, non-contemporaneous factual statements made by the same witness
about the same event actually describe different mental states. Thus, no two statements
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instead upon such factors as the nature of the matter testified to, the
about a witness's recollection can ever come into direct conflict. See United States v. Flow-
ers, 813 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the court held that two contradictory state-
ments concerning an event were not inconsistent within the meaning of the statute when
the witness also testified that his memory of the event had changed.
Such a strict reading of "necessarily false" in the inconsistent statement provision
would render it nugatory. In order to avoid the problem of under-inclusiveness that this
argument creates, one might argue that the statute refers only to inconsistency between
the statements of matter recollected. This reading, however, quickly leads to problems of
over-inclusiveness because it conflicts with the central idea that witnesses are asked about
and testify to their recollection of events rather than to the events themselves. It strains
credulity to believe that subsection (c) is to come into play whenever a witness's recollec-
tion changes.
The Model Penal Code seeks to avoid this problem by using the idea of rational in-
compatibility. MODEL PENAL CODE Comment 241.1(8) (1980):
Finally, it should be noted that the word 'inconsistent' is preferable to 'contradic-
tory' in the statutory formulation, since statements may be rationally incompati-
ble without literal contradiction. It is, according to the definition of 'statement' in
Section 241.0(2), the total impact of the 'representation' made by the defendant
that is to be considered in a perjury prosecution. Inconsistent representations
need not literally contradict one another in order for the total picture conveyed
by the witness to be quite different from one occasion to another.
The total picture test, however, does not meet the statutory standard that requires
one of the statements to have been "necessarily" false. Although this test would overcome
the problem of the under-inclusiveness of logical inconsistency, it would create the oppo-
site problem of overbreadth by loosening the definition far too much. The "total picture"
of a witness's testimony can change dramatically when facts are added or different lan-
guage is used, without any false statements being uttered. Moreover, because reasonable
minds can often differ about whether two statements are rationally inconsistent, such state-
ments would not be "necessarily" inconsistent as required by the federal statute.
The possibility of rapid memory loss would never seem to be "necessarily" excluded,
as the statute seems to require. This problem of under-inclusiveness can be avoided only
by expanding the notion of "necessarily false" to include weaker forms of inconsistency,
which would risk removing the certitude that the statutory standard provides.
2. Consistency or inconsistency may not be self-evident from the statements them-
selves but may instead depend upon facts unexpressed in the statements but assumed to
be true, for example, "Mr. Bush attended the meeting" and "The President did not attend
the meeting." These statements are inconsistent because of the unexpressed fact that Mr.
Bush is the President. Such essential unexpressed facts may not, however, always be so
clear or undisputed. If the unexpressed facts were uttered by the defendant under oath,
they should be included in the indictment: the provision refers to two or more inconsis-
tent statements, apparently covering the situation in which no two of the defendant's state-
ments are inconsistent without taking into account additional statements. For instance,
"The President attended the briefing," "The President did not know of the plan," "The
plan was disclosed at the meeting," and "The President knew of all plans disclosed at the
meeting." No two of these statements contradict each other, but one statement of the four
must be false.
The statute's failure to specify whether and to what extent extraneous information can
be taken into account in determining the degree of inconsistency the statements contain is
much more troublesome when the extraneous evidence does not come from statements
made by the defendant and the defendant does not admit the truth of the extraneous
evidence necessary to such a determination. Because it acts as a substitute proof of falsity,
which the government would otherwise be required to establish to the jury, the inconsis-
tent statement provision should not apply to statements whose inconsistency depends
upon the acceptance of extraneous evidence whose truth is open to rational question.
3. The inconsistent statement provision does not clearly define where one statement
leaves off and the next begins. This failure leads to ambiguity when a witness's testimony
might be characterized as either a single self-contradictory or incoherent statement or as
two inconsistent statements. The statute does not refer to the time between the inconsis-
tent statements, making it possible that it either reaches corrections made in the same
breath or does not reach corrections made days later.
The Model Penal Code's solution to this problem is to define "statement" to include
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specificity of the testimony, the witness's certainty and demeanor on the
stand, the passage of time between the statements, the narrative context
of the statements, the clarity of the questioning, the surrounding facts
assumed by the trier to be true, and the defendant's explanation, if any,
for the inconsistency. Thus, proof of inconsistent statements per se does
not establish the mens rea element of the false declaration statute. Yet, to
an extent not yet made wholly clear by judicial construction, the incon-
sistent statement provision permits proof of inconsistency to replace
proof of knowingly false declaration.
Because the degree of inconsistency, logical or rational, is the same
for innocent as well as perjurious inconsistencies, the only way to rescue
innocent revisions from the operation of the statute is to require the
prosecution to prove that the false statement in a pair of inconsistent
statements was knowingly false when made. Two statutory provisions
bear on the question. Subsection (a) in defining false declaration refers
to one who "knowingly makes any false material declaration."' 5 3 This
provision requires the government to prove that the defendant knew of
the falsity of the statement.
54
But the inconsistent statement provision permits the burden of pro-
duction of evidence on this element of the offense to be shifted to the
defendant once inconsistent statements are proved. That provision re-
fers to one who "has knowingly made two or more declarations, which
are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false."
The sentence is ambiguous in that this "knowingly" might refer to the
making of the statements, the logical inconsistency between the state-
ments, or the actual falsity of one of the statements. Subsection (a) im-
plies that "knowingly" in subsection (c) refers to the actual falsity of one
of the statements, thus requiring the prosecution to prove knowledge in
addition to inconsistency. If "knowingly" in subsection (c) refers only to
the making of the statements or the fact of their inconsistency, then sub-
section (a)'s mens rea requirement would be evaded.
Yet, one court has indeed held that "knowingly" in subsection (c)
refers only to the making of the statements. In United States v. Stassi,
55
the defendant was convicted of having made inconsistent sworn state-
ments in a guilty plea proceeding and in an affidavit on a motion to
vacate the plea. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
government had not proved that his statements were knowingly false,
the total impression left by the witness's testimony. "[S]tatement means any representa-
tion .... MODEL PENAL CODE § 24 1.0(2). A representation is:
[T]he total impression conveyed by a sequence of declarations by the accused
rather than the literal content of a single sentence taken from the sequence ....
Thus, even though a single declaration in the course of a series of questions was
false, the 'representation' for purposes of perjury would be the total impression
conveyed by the answers as a whole.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment b.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1982).
54. See United States v. Crippen, 570 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1069 (1979).
55. 443 F. Supp 661 (1977).
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stating: "[T]he mens rea element of 'knowingly' does not apply to
whether the statements were false but rather to how they were made....
The requirement dictates that only knowing, intentional or voluntary (as
opposed to inadvertent or accidental) statements be the subject of pros-
ecution." '5 6 The court held that, unless a defendant adequately raises
the affirmative defense of belief in the truth of the statements, the gov-
ernment need not prove that they were made with knowledge of their
falsity. 5 7 Slassi holds that proof of inconsistent statements alone dis-
charges the government's prima facie burden of proof of the element of
intent. 5 8 This holding implies that the defendant is not even entitled to
an instruction on the defense of belief in the truth of the statements
unless he adduces some evidence of that intent.
The result of Stassi is that, upon the government's proof that the
defendant made sworn inconsistent statements, the burden of produc-
ing evidence bearing on knowledge of falsity shifts to the defendant.
5 9
Although knowledge of falsity is an element of the offense of false decla-
ration, Stassi requires the prosecution to prove knowledge only if the
defendant adequately raises the defense that he believed in the truth of
each statement when it was made.6 0  Shifting the burden of producing
evidence to the defendant as to an element of the crime before the gov-
ernment has proved that element is of doubtful constitutionality.
While a statute's allocation of the burdens of proof and production
of evidence offends a defendant's fifth amendment due process right if it
has the effect of relieving the government of proving one of the ele-
ments of the crime charged,6 1 the Court has not determined whether or
56. Id.
57. Id. at 667.
58. Id.
59. In addition to knowledge and materiality, the government must show falsity.
Defendant argues convincingly that the government has not proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant knew that the June 22, 1976 affidavit was false
when it was signed and sworn to. The court agrees. Indeed, the government's
burden in this situation is greater than even the defendant suggests. Once a de-
fendant raises the affirmative defense of his belief in the truth of a statement, the
burden is on the government to disprove this belief beyond a reasonable doubt.
[citation omitted] However, success on this issue does not serve to exonerate the
defendant from the charges against him. Under § 1623(c), the government may
prove that one of the statements was necessarily false merely by introducing two
irreconcilably contradictory declarations to the point in question. [citation omit-
ted] The defendant in the two-statement situation must then demonstrate or at least raise the
issue that he believed each declaration to have been true at the time it was made. [citation
omitted] While the defendant has sufficiently demonstrated his belief in the ve-
racity of the June 22, 1976 statement, he has not presented any evidence toward
his belief that the June 2, 1975 declarations were true when they were made.
Indeed the argument defendant puts forward which tends to show his belief in the veracity of
the latter statement also demonstrates the defendant's belief in the falsity of the former
declarations.
Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67 (emphasis added). This suggests that, to be entitled to an
instruction on the belief defense, the defendant must meet the burden of production of
evidence on the issue.
60. Id.
61. The fifth amendment due process clause, U.S. CoNsT. Amend. V, requires that the
government prove each element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (the due process clause "protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
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in what circumstances shifting the burden of production of evidence
bearing on an element of a crime might violate due process. 62 Such a
presumption might well be held violative of due process because, while
it operates, it has the prohibited effect of relieving the government of
tute the crime with which he is charged." [emphasis added]). See also Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952):
[Tihe trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the
law raises a presumption of intent from an act .... A conclusive presumption
which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an in-
gredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not require the
jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the
jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury
to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logi-
cally establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. [foot-
note omitted]. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which ex-
tends to every element of the crime.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274-75.
Evidentiary presumptions that have the effect of relieving the prosecution of this bur-
den have been held to violate due process. See also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698-701 (1975) (State may not redefine elements of crime as punishment factors
thereby relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving them) Cf Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (conviction of second degree murder does not violate due pro-
cess by placing burden on defendant to prove affirmative defense where defense does not
negative any fact essential to conviction of crime, although there are limits beyond which
the state cannot go in reallocating burdens of proof by labeling elements of the crime as
affirmative defenses.)
In conducting this analysis, the Court has distinguished between mandatory and per-
missive presumptions. A mandatory presumption may be either conclusive or rebuttable.
A conclusive mandatory presumption "removes the presumed element from the case once
the State has proven the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption." Francis v. Frank-
lin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2. A conclusive mandatory presumption as to an element of the
crime is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 517. A rebuttable
mandatory presumption requires the jury to find the presumed element upon proof of the
predicate facts unless the defendant persuades the jury otherwise. Francis at 314. Such a
presumption is also unconstitutional.
Stassi denies that the statute creates a mandatory presuption by affirming that the
prosecution must prove knowlege of falstity. "Once a defendant raises the affirmative de-
fense of his belief in the truth of a statement, the burden is on the government to disprove
this belief beyond a reasonable doubt." Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67.
A permissive presumption permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer an
element of the offense from proof of some other fact. Such presumptions are constitu-
tional so long as there is a rational connection between the element inferred and the fact
proved. Francis at 314-15; Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
62. A mandatory presumption may shift the burden of production by requiring that
the jury find the presumed fact unless the defendant produces some evidence of its non-
existance, and only thereafter putting the burden of proof of the element on the prosecu-
tion. The Court has not determined under what circumstances such a presumption shift-
ing the burden of production to the defendant would be unconstitutional. Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314 n.3; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 230 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); see also WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487, 2512.
Characterizing the element as a defense on which the defendant has the burden of
proof has been held to be unconstitutional when the element is a natural element of the
crime charged, as has characterizing the element as a factor to be considered upon sen-
tencing. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra note 62. The defendant's belief in the truth of the
statement is nothing more than the negative of the element of knowledge of the falsity of
the statement. The False Declaration Statute cannot, under the guise of establishing an
element of the affirmative defense of belief, constitutionally compel the defendant to
shoulder the burden of negativing the element of knowledge of falsity.
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the burden of proving an element of the offense. 63 Moreover, under
Stassi, in order to discharge the burden of production, the defendant
must introduce some evidence of his belief in the truth of both of his
statements. 64 This almost certainly requires the defendant to take the
stand, waiving his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Regardless of the constitutionality of the statute under the Stassi
rule, there is no doubt that a witness will face a difficult task in attempt-
ing to invoke the defense of belief in the truth of the inconsistent state-
ments. This chilling effect applies to innocent witnesses contemplating
testimonial corrections as well as to potential perjurers. The witness
must produce some evidence that he believes both statements to have
been true when made. Any evidence tending to show that the witness
believed one of the statements tends to make it less likely that he be-
lieved the other one.6 5 The witness will usually have no objective evi-
dence of his belief; his personal credibility will be determinative of the
issue.
Congress expressly denied that the inconsistent statement provision
relieves the government of the burden of proving intent to falsify. 6 6
Stassi's may have read the provision differently because the court could
not understand how the government could discharge such a burden
when, as is likely, one of the inconsistent statements was true when
made. It is impossible for the government to prove a defendant's knowl-
edge of falsity of a true statement. The government might, however,
prove with respect to each statement that if it was false, then the defend-
ant knew that it was false when he made it.
It is suggested that the proper reading of the statute is that the
defendant may be convicted of false declaration upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) that he made sworn statements [otherwise qualify-
ing] that were so inconsistent that one of them must have been false
when made and, (2) that whichever one was false, the defendant must
have known it to have been false when made. This formulation would
63. But see Mlullaney, 421 U.S. at 703 n.31 (suggesting that shifting the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant may be subject to less stringent due process requirements than
shifting the burden of persuasion); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 231 in whichJustice Powell opines
that shifting the burden of production may be permissible on such issues as malice, citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, comment, p. 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Official Draft
of the Model Penal Code, however, seems to limit permissible shifts in the burden of pro-
duction to affirmative defenses, not elements of the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1)
& (3).
64. Stassi, 443 F. Supp at 666-67. It is possible that a burden of production could be
met by evidence put in by the prosecution or by inferences from other evidence put in by
the defendant. See supra note 63. However, Stassi implies that discharging this burden
would require evidence of more than the inference that any witness under oath believed
that what he said was true.
65. Id.
66. Under present law, even if a witness makes two statements which are so pa-
tently contradictory that one or the other must be false, the prosecution must
nevertheless prove which of the statements is false and then prove an intentional
falsehood. In accord with the commission recommentdation, the committee
rightfully retained the requirement that an intent to falsify be shown. However, if
one of two statements logically must be false, then title IV recognized that fact.
116 CONG. REC. 589 (1970).
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permit alternative pleading and proof without changing the govern-
ment's affirmative burden of proof and production as to any of the ele-
ments of the offense.
If this reading is correct, however, then the statutory defense that
the defendant believed each statement to have been true when made is
superfluous because it simply denies one of the elements of the crime
that the prosecution must prove anyway. The defendant cannot prove
that he believed to be true what the government proves that he knew to
be false.6 7 If the government fails to meet the burden of proving that
the defendant must have known of the falsity of the false statement when
he made it, the defendant should be acquitted.
2. The Statutory Treatment of Recantation
The recantation provision permits the witness to bar prosecution
for a false declaration by making a timely admission that the declaration
was false. In contrast to subsection (c)'s disincentives for inconsistent
statements, the recantation provision is supposed to serve as "an incen-
tive to the witness to give truthful testimony by permitting him volunta-
rily to correct a false statement without incurring the risk of prosecution
by doing so."1
6 8
Two problems attend the recantation defense: its inconsistency
with the inconsistent statement provision and the judicial and statutory
barriers that have frustrated its achievement of its legislative purpose.
(a) Recantation versus Inconsistent Statement
The sharp contrast between the statute's treatment of "inconsistent
statements" and "recantations" requires courts to differentiate between
the two. But such a distinction is difficult to draw. A recantation obvi-
ously denies the truth of the statement recanted. Since any recantation
is inconsistent with the statement recanted, every recantation and the
statement it recants satisfy subsection (c)'s definition of inconsistent
statements: either the recantation or the statement recanted must nec-
essarily be false. Conversely, every statement admits, at least implicitly,
the falsity of any contradictory statement previously made; the latter of
any two inconsistent statements thus implicitly recants the former. In
substance, all recantations are inconsistent statements, and vice versa.
The statute does not permit both subsections to be applied to the
same pair of statements made in the same proceeding. 69 If recantations
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 3 (1980).
68. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4024 (1970).
69. Subsection (c) will not conflict with subsection (d) unless both provisions could
apply to the same statement. Since a recantation must occur-within the same continuous
proceeding and must be timely, for example, only subsection (c) can apply to inconsistent
statements made in different proceedings or result from recantation which is untimely.
On the other side, it might be possible to recant without uttering an inconsistent
statement. Subsection (c) requires that the inconsistent statements be made under oath,
but this is not expressly required by subsection (d) for recantations. Thus, an unsworn
recantation would not constitute an inconsistent statement. See United States v. Crandall,
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were inconsistent statements, then they would not bar prosecution. If
inconsistent statements were recantations, then they could not be prose-
cuted. Courts must therefore endeavor to distinguish the admission
required by the recantation provision from a simple inconsistent state-
ment. Federal courts have had numerous occasions to struggle with this
problem in cases where defendants charged with having made inconsis-
tent statements sought to characterize them as recantations.
Whether or not a statement constitutes a recantation, i.e. an admis-
sion of the falsity of a previous statement, has been held to be a question
of law as to which the defendant has no right to a jury trial.7 0 In deter-
mining whether a statement constitutes a recantation, courts have con-
strued with uncommon strictness the requirement that the defendant
admit the falsity of the statement recanted. Although the statute does
not so provide, decisions have held that the recantation must be an ex-
plicit, unequivocal admission that the prior testimony was false. 7 1 The
requirement that the witness admit the falsity of the prior statement in
order to recant effectively has been construed to mean that an attempt at
recantation that explained the earlier statement as a mistake or an inno-
cent error is not effective.
72
These holdings mean that a witness who retracts an earlier inconsis-
tent statement and truthfully explains it as a mistake will not fulfill the
requirements of the recantation defense. Such a witness could recant
effectively only if she were to [falsely] admit that the earlier statement
363 F. Supp 648 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aft'd, 493 F.2d 1401, aff'd, 495 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974) (statement given to a prosecutor while the grand jury was in
recess held adequate as a recantation because the statement was read to the grand jury
when it reconvened, but held not to constitute an effective recantation on other grounds);
and United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1091. But see United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d
1012, 1017 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983) (suggesting that the statement must be made directly to the
grand jury). These decisions suggest that a witness may recant grand jury testimony by
letter or other out-of-court statements to the prosecutor.
70. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1983); DAuria, 672 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1982).
Recantation has been held to be a jurisdictional bar to prosectution that must be raised in
a motion under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 472 (5th
Cir. 1975); Denison, 663 F.2d at 618.
71. United States v. Brown, No. 84-5546 (D.C. Cir. March 24, 1986) (unpublished slip
opinion available in LEXIS) (although defendant's answers were sufficiently inconsistent
to satisfy subsection (c), the latter answer did not amount to an admission of falsity of the
former); Goguen, 723 F.2d at 1018 ("[F]or an effective recantation the accused must come
forward and explain unambiguously and specifically which of his answers in prior testi-
mony were false and in what respects they were false."); DAuria, 672 F.2d at 1092 (witness
must make an "outright retraction and repudiation").
In D'Auria the court affirmed the conviction of a grand jury witness whose counsel had
unsuccessfully requested permission for the witness to return to the grand jury to "add to
and clarify" his grand jury testimony, stating that he had not "completely understood"
some of the questions and wished to "come forward with any additional information he
could provide." The court held that this was too equivocal to constitute an adequate offer
to recant. The court read the statute as requiring that not only the recantation, but also
the offer to recant, must admit the falsity of the declaration in question.
72. See cases and discussion in note 70. Technically the original statement in such
cases was not a false declaration. Apparently for this reason, these decisions imply that a
witness may not bar prosecution for making a non-perjurious false statement. If the origi-
nal statement was intentionally false then subsequent testimony that it was an innocent
error is itself a false declaration.
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was intentionally false. Despite the legislative intent, the statute thus
provides no safe harbor for the honest witness seeking to rectify an in-
nocent error.
The decisions announcing such an interpretation arguably distort
the statutory language. The recantation provision requires only that the
defendant admit the falsity of the prior testimony, not that she embellish
the admission with further affirmative representations explaining how
she came to testify falsely. If the defendant offers such an explanation,
and it is false, then she may indeed have committed a second false decla-
ration, but that subsequent falsehood cannot change the legal effect of
her admission of falsity. The simple acknowledgment that the prior
statement was false will remedy any damaging effect it would have had
on the proceeding and should be sufficient for the defense of
recantation.
73
Thus far, case law has tried to keep the statute from coming un-
hinged by holding that a recantation avoids being an inconsistent state-
ment only by making an express allusion to the prior declaration. 74 For
example, if the witness first testified that "The light was red," and later
testified "My statement that the light was red was false" she would have
recanted, whereas if she later testified simply that "The light was not
red" she would have uttered inconsistent statements and committed
false declaration. 7 5 Thus, the court in United States v. Brown 76 held that a
statement that was sufficiently specific to constitute an inconsistent
statement contradicting former testimony did not constitute recantation
of that testimony because the witness did not also state that the former
testimony was false.
77
It is overwhelmingly likely that witnesses who have testified incon-
sistently with former testimony would, if asked, also readily admit that
the prior testimony was false. Few people will knowingly maintain posi-
tions that are so inconsistent that one of them is necessarily false. A
witness's failure to make an explicit statement that prior inconsistent
statements are false is a failure of form, not substance, and results from
the examiner's failure to draw the prior statement to the witness's atten-
tion. Thus, the classification of statements as inconsistent statements
instead of as recantations depends on the fortuity of the questions asked
rather than the answers given.
Such hyperformalism is to be expected when courts are required to
discriminate between functionally similar phenomena. Both inconsis-
tent statements and recantations inform the trier of fact that prior testi-
73. A second serious consequence of this interpretation of the statute is that a witness
must in effect admit guilt under the General Perjury Statute in order to bar prosecution
under the False Declaration Statute.
74. United States v. Brown, No. 84-5546 (unpublished slip opinion).
75. Note that an inconsistent statement can give the trier more information than the
formal recantation. Compare: (1) "My statement that the light was red was false"; with
(2) "The light was green."
76. No. 84-5546 (unpublished slip opinion).
77. Id.
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mony was false. Both recantations and inconsistent statements may be
either truthful attempts to correct the record or false attempts to deny
prior truthful testimony. Both inconsistent statements and recantations
leave the trier of fact to figure out which version of the events was true
and which was false. Both inconsistent statements and recantations may
be motivated by similar fears of exposure or similar desires to correct
innocent errors. Yet, because the statute attaches radically different
consequences to each, courts are driven to "find" differences between
them, implementing an inconsistent policy toward testimonial
inconsistency.
The "difference" between the two forms of testimonial inconsis-
tency is symbolic rather than functional and is rooted in the need of
perjury law to mediate between the values of deterrence and mitigation.
Courts seem to see the difference between inconsistent statements and
recantation as similar to the difference between bragging about one's sin
and confessing it, a difference in the witness's attitude rather than the
substance of the witness's communication. Such courts will sacrifice the
mitigative benefits of testimonial correction to achieve the punitive ef-
fect of contrition.
The Model Penal Code addresses the similarity of inconsistent
statements and retraction in applying its inconsistent statement provi-
sion.7 8 The Code seeks to rescue testimonial corrections from classifi-
cation as inconsistent statements provision by defining the term
"statement" 79 to be equivalent to the term "representation." This lat-
ter term is defined as "the total impression conveyed by a sequence of
declarations" and "the total impression conveyed by the answers as a
whole." 80 The Code Commentary opines that a witness who changes
his testimony in response to a single line of questioning will not be sub-
ject to prosecution for inconsistent statements: either he will be deemed
to have made only one statement or he will be deemed to have re-
canted.8 1 While superior to the federal scheme, this approach must
78. The Model Penal Code provides:
Inconsistent Statements. Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under
oath or equivalent affirmation, both having been made within the period of the
statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsis-
tent statements in a single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other
was false and not believed by the defendant. In such case it shall not be necessary
for the prosecution to prove which statement was false but only that one or the
other was false and not believed by the defendant.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1.
79. "[S]tatement means any representation, but includes a representation of opinion,
belief or other state of mind only if the representation clearly relates to state of mind apart
from or in addition to any facts which are the subject of the representation." MODEL PE-
NAL CODE, § 241.0(2).
80. Comment to the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 241.1.
81. It is not intended, of course, that a defendant who changes his story in re-
sponse to a single line of questioning thereby will subject himself automatically to
prosecution under Subsection (5) ... [E]ither the definition of "statement" or the
retraction defense should come into play to prevent such a prosecution. Indeed,
it might be suggested that in order for Subsection (5) to become operative, the
declarant's inconsistent statements should either have been given on different
occasions or at least pursuant to distinct lines of questioning.
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solve the problem of determining where an "occasion" or "line of ques-
tioning" ends. Does it end when the interrogator changes topics, when
the examination ends, when the cross-examination ends, or when the
witness leaves the stand? The proposed solution in Part IV avoids this
problem by referring solely to the proceeding in which the statements
occur.
(b) Barriers to Recantation
The conflicting policies of deterrence and mitigation are not only
expressed in distinctions between "bad" inconsistent statements and
"good" recantations. The conflict creates inconsistent attitudes toward
the recantation defense itself, both in the statutory language and the
courts. Congress limited the utility of the defense by erecting formal
barriers to its invocation. In addition, most courts have tended to view
the defense of recantation as an undeserved gift of grace to the perjurer
rather than as a Congressional recognition of the judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining evidence of even intentional misstatement before its
tribunals act. As a result, the courts have dispensed the benefit of the
defense with a grudging hand, rather than liberally to encourage correc-
tion of the record.
The statute requires that a recantation be timely in three ways: it
must occur during the same continuous proceeding as the false declara-
tion, it must occur before the false declaration has had a substantial ef-
fect on the proceeding, and it must occur before the exposure of the
falsity of the declaration has become manifest. While the purpose of
these requirements is to encourage rapid recantation, narrow judicial
interpretation has severely limited the availability of this defense.
The statutory requirement that the falsehood not have a substantial
effect on the proceeding demands an inquiry into whether, as a factual
matter, the falsehood has caused the tribunal to take or omit some ac-
tion in reliance upon the falsehood.8 2 In the absence of proof that the
falsehood affected the tribunal's process, the defendant presumably
should be encouraged to correct prior testimony. Otherwise, avoidable
injury to the judicial process could occur.
Decisions construing this provision, however, have precluded in-
quiry into causation. In United States v. Tucker 83 the court held that a
witness's false denial of criminal activity had substantially affected a
grand jury proceeding by causing the prosecution to grant immunity to
another witness in order to obtain the testimony it desired. The defend-
ant argued that, because the grant of immunity was unnecessary, the
grant was not caused by the perjury. The court rejected this argument,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 Comment 8, n.108.
82. New York precedent before and after enactment of the federal statute provides no
guidance as to the meaning of "substantially affect." Cf People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439,
440, 141 N.E.2d 580, 581, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (1957) (suggesting that the deliberative or
investigative body must have been misled or deceived by the lie, and that the deception
harmed or prejudiced the deliberation or investigation-these are issues of fact).
83. 495 F. Supp 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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holding that the statute does not require a detailed inquiry into the
thought processes of grand jurors or into the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.
84
In United States v. Krogh,85 the court denied a motion to dismiss a
prosecution for false declaration made before a grand jury. The defend-
ant argued that an affidavit he had given to the prosecutor recanted the
falsehood. The court rejected the defense, finding that the grand jury
had acted before the recantation, although the opinion discloses no ef-
fect that the false testimony might have had on that action. The court
held that false statements are presumed as a matter of law to have been
considered by the grand jury and to have substantially affected the pro-
ceedings whenever the grand jury has acted following the false
testimony.
8 6
These holdings establishing a conclusive presumption that testi-
mony has had an effect on the proceeding ignore the language of the
statute. If Congress had intended to establish a presumption that any
action subsequently taken by the tribunal was substantially affected by
the false declaration, it surely could have so provided in the statute in-
stead of using language that stimulates a factual inquiry into proximate
cause. The restrictive reading of the statute instead reflects judicial
hostility toward the defense of recantation, a hostility that rejects the
relatively novel principle of mitigation for the time-honored principle of
deterrence.
The recantation must also occur before "it has become manifest
that such falsity has been or will be exposed."' 8 7 Decisions interpret this
language to mean that it is too late to recant if it has become manifest to
the witness that the falsity has been or will be exposed to the tribunal or
the government.88
This rule leads to disqualification in many cases in which the incen-
tive to recant arose from the witness's fear of exposure. The reason for
this rule is unclear. Rejection of recantation in such cases might be
based on one of three notions: (1) the information contained in the re-
cantation is of no value to the tribunal; (2) the witness who recants only
when facing exposure does not deserve a defense; or (3) to permit such
recantations will encourage perjury because the witness will always have
an "out" if the perjury is exposed.
The first justification is questionable. Even where the tribunal has
84. Id. at 614. This decision seems to hold that the required substantial affect can be
found not only in actions of the tribunal, but also in actions of a litigant, i.e. the prosecu-
tor. No warrant for this conclusion was given.
85. 366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Id. at 1256. See also United States v. Crandall, 363 F. Supp. 648, 654-55 (W.D. Pa.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974) (delay of two months in recanting substantially
affected grand jury proceeding by depriving it of evidence for that period of time, even
though the grand jury was aware of the falsehood before the recantation).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982).
88. United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 1981); United Staes v.
Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States v.
Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
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heard another witness directly contradict the defendant's prior testi-
mony, the tribunal may be uncertain about which account was accurate.
The defendant's recantation would often permit the tribunal to achieve
a more certain resolution of the contradiction. Such useful recantations
are discouraged by the statutory restriction, to no apparent purpose.
Rejecting such recantations for moral reasons also seems to frus-
trate the statutory policy of enhancing testimonial reliability.8 9 There is
little to choose between the morality of a witness who tells the truth
initially because of fear of exposure and the morality of a witness who
recants later because of a fear of exposure.
The third possible justification has received the most support inju-
dicial opinions.9 0 Courts fear that if the exposure requirement were
abandoned, perjurers will lie with impunity, secure in the knowledge
that if the lie is exposed, they can admit it and avoid prosecution. This
fear seems exaggerated, as discussed in Part IV, below. 9 1
In addition to the constraints placed upon recantation by Congress,
the courts too have displayed a reluctance to adopt the policy justifica-
tions of the recantation provision when construing the statute in areas in
which it is silent.9 2 For example, they have held that the government
has no duty to warn a witness that he may recant false statements, and
that it has no duty to give a witness who it believes to have testified
falsely an opportunity to recant.
93
Courts have also manifested a distrust of the behavioral effects of
the incentives the recantation provision is thought to offer to witnesses.
89. Speaking of a similar requirement contained in New York law, one judge said:
"[S]ince the recantation rule's purpose is not to reward or punish the liar but to get the
truth into the record, the perjurer's motive for recanting has nothing to do with it at all."
People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 141 N.E.2d at 583-84, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (dissent-
ing opinion). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) and accompanying Comment (denying
a withdrawal defense to the crime of attempt where the withdrawal resulted from
probability of detection or other factors that made accomplishment of the criminal pur-
pose more difficult).
90. See infra, text accompanying notes 95-97.
91. The situations that give rise to disqualification because of exposure should be
noted. Courts have held that recantation comes too late if it comes after the prosecutor
warns the defendant that he may be charged with perjury. Thus, a prosecutor may appar-
ently cut off any possibility of recantation by confronting a suspected perjurer with his
falsehood immediately after his testimony. See United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d at 324.
Exposure becomes manifest in other situations in which it would seem inappropriate
to deny the recantation defense. For example, if the witness first makes an inconsistent
statement, and then, when it is drawn to his attention, more explicitly recants his original
declaration, the recantation might be deemed to be too late because exposure of falsity
became manifest to the witness by reason of his inconsistent statement. Another possibil-
ity of a disqualifying "manifestation" is the disclosure to a witness by his counsel that the
untruth will be revealed to the tribunal if the witness does not do so himself. See discus-
sion below at Part III.
92. Id. See Denison, 663 F.2d at 617 ("Section 1623(d) balances the need to encourage
a witness to correct his testimony against the need to prevent his perjury at the outset. We
see no reason to disturb this balance by broadening the immunity accorded to a witness
who recants ...."). See also United States v. Lardieri, 506 F.2d at 324 (making a similar
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In United States v. Moore,9 4 the court construed the relationship between
the two prerequisites to recantation, lack of effect on the tribunal and
lack of exposure of the falsehood. The statute requires that the recanta-
tion must occur "before the false declaration has had a substantial effect
on the proceeding, or before the exposure of the falsity of the declara-
tion has become manifest."'9 5 Although the New York statute upon
which the False Declaration Statute was modeled9 6 expresses the pre-
requisites in the conjunctive, using the word "and," the False Declara-
tion Statute expresses them in the disjunctive, using the word "or." In
Moore, the defendant argued that his recantation was timely because,
although disclosure of the falsehood had become manifest to him, the
falsehood had not yet affected the proceeding.
The court refused to read the False Declaration Statute disjunc-
tively, reasoning that to do so would frustrate Congressional intent.
The court acknowledged the inconsistency between the deterrent and
mitigation elements of the statute,9 7 but reasoned that construing the
recantation prerequisites in the disjunctive would weaken the deterrent
effect of the statute and would disrupt the intended balance between
these elements. This argument neatly begged the question by assuming
what it set out to prove, i.e. exactly where Congress intended to place
the balance point between deterrence and mitigation.
The court then speculated on the behavior that different construc-
tions of the statute would induce in witnesses, reiterating a fear origi-
nally articulated in United States v. Norris98 that the easy availability of a
recantation defense would make perjury more attractive. The hypotheti-
cal witness would believe that perjury was risk free: if the lie was not
discovered, he would not be prosecuted while if the lie was discovered,
he could recant and would not be prosecuted. This reasoning led the
Norris court to reject the retraction defense under the General Perjury
Statute. The Moore court 99 likewise reasoned that the False Declaration
Statute's deterrent effect would be nullified by giving perjurers the stat-
utory right to recant after their lies were disclosed, but before the pro-
ceeding was substantially affected.
The court was here engaged in open warfare against the policy of
the recantation provision. Citing Norris to explicate the recantation pro-
vision ignores the simple fact that the recantation provision was in-
tended to change the law that Norris expounded. The Moore decision is
more nearly an argument against the concept of a recantation defense
than an attempt to construe it: the court simply rejects the statutory
premise that recantation may induce more accurate testimony than inac-
94. 613 F.2d 1029 (1979).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. See infra text accompanying note 44.
97. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1041.
98. 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
99. Moore, 613 F.2d at 1041. This argument appears in Scrinmgeour, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1981) and Denison, 663 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1981).
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curate testimony.' 0 0 The decision is, however, understandable because
of the ambivalence toward recantation displayed in the statute itself.
In summary, the federal perjury statutes treat inconsistent testi-
mony inconsistently, at times seizing on testimonial inconsistency as evi-
dence of perjury and at others seeming to urge inconsistency that
recognizes former testimony as false. What one might euphemistically
describe as the resulting "tension" between the deterrence and mitiga-
tion policies of the statutes is, for federal witnesses and their counsel, an
insoluble double bind.
III. CONFLICTING INCENTIVES CREATED BY THE FALSE
DISTINCTIONS OF THE STATUTE
The probable effect of criminal and other instrumentalist statutes is
usually analyzed by predicting the behavioral responses they are likely to
engender, using assumptions about rationality and self-interest not un-
like those used in economic analysis.' 0 ' Thus, for example, the deci-
sions in Moore and Norris rely on a typical, instrumentalist thought
experiment: How would a rational, self-interested witness who was
aware of the statute and its judicial construction take it into account in
deciding whether or not to commit perjury? One should be exception-
ally wary of such exercises when applied to perjury, for which no reliable
data exist to test the accuracy of the assumptions or the conclusions. In
default of empiricism, however, rhetoric remains the only instrument for
critique of criminal laws.
This section will use this approach to analyze the incentives and dis-
incentives relating to inconsistent testimony created by the federal per-
jury statutes for federal witnesses and federal trial attorneys. It will also
analyze the strategic benefits that the inconsistent statement provision
gives to federal prosecutors. It will attempt both to predict the actions
that the statutory sanctions will lead to and to weigh the desirability of
those actions against the goals of the statute.
A. Effects of the Perjury Statutes on Federal Witnesses
The inconsistent statement and recantation provisions will have ef-
fects on three categories of witness: those who contemplate committing
perjury for the first time in a proceeding; those who have committed
100. The Moore court's reading means that the defendant's attempts to prove the two
prerequisities to the recantation defense would often tend to be mutually exclusive. A lie
that has not been exposed is more likely to have substantially affected the proceeding.
Conversely, one major reason that a lie may not have substantially affected the proceeding
is that it has become manifest. In most cases, therefore, one of the two prerequisites
would probably fail, making the defense unavailable.
101. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalist in Twentieth CenturN American Thought-A Syn-
thesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
861 (1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1; Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, IJ. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261 (June 1972) (seeking to quan-
tify deterrence).
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perjury and contemplate correcting it; and those who have made unin-
tentionally false statements and contemplate correcting them.
Even if the witness is one whose behavior would be influenced by a
perjury statute, 10 2 the inconsistent statement provision would have no
deterrent effect on the decision to commit perjury in giving an initial
testimonial account. It would, however, provide a strong disincentive
to any witness whose original testimony was true and who is thinking of
testifying falsely by contradicting that testimony. Even in the absence of
the inconsistent statement provision, however, such a witness could be
prosecuted under the False Declaration Statute for making the second
statement. In such a prosecution, the original statement might be suffi-
cient evidence of guilt. In addition, as discussed below in this subsec-
tion, by employing a number of well-known strategies, such witnesses
can usually avoid repeating the original testimony in a different
proceeding.
It is possible that a recantation provision could affect the initial de-
cision to commit perjury, on the theory that recantation would be avail-
able if the lie failed. However, as seen above, such exposure disqualifies
an attempted recantation, which makes the recantation provision of little
importance to a witness contemplating perjury in giving an initial testi-
monial account of a matter.
For witnesses who have already testified inaccurately, the federal
perjury statutes inhibit any change in testimony, regardless of the truth-
fulness of the change or its value to the tribunal. A summary of the
provisions analyzed in the preceding section shows that a rational wit-
ness has no statutory incentive to correct prior testimony whether or not
the prior testimony was intentionally false.
First consider the witness whose original testimony was innocently
mistaken. Under the General Perjury Statute, although inconsistent tes-
timony alone will not suffice for conviction, an attempt to correct earlier
testimony may corroborate other evidence of the falsity of the earlier
testimony and permit a prosecution that would have been otherwise un-
maintainable. Because the Norris rule denies the witness the defense of
recantation, a witness who corrects prior testimony faces Norris's fate.
For the same witness, under the False Declaration Statute, correc-
tion of prior testimony constitutes an inconsistent statement unless it is
timely and in the correct form for a recantation. If it is held to be an
102. It is probable that a great deal of testimony is not actually affected by statutory
sanctions. Several categories of potential perjurers will presumably commit perjury under
any statutory regime. First, criminal defendants who perceive the benefit products risks of
perjury to exceed its cost products will not be deterred. To the witness/defendant
charged with a capital crime, if the the perjury is successful, it is rewarded, whereas if it
fails, the incremental punishment is insignificant. Likewise, witnesses who are induced by
intimidation to commit perjury will not be deterred if the threat of criminal sanctions is
less certain or severe than the intimidator's threat. Witnesses who are confident that their
lies will not be exposed, or that conclusive proof that they lied cannot be obtained, will not
perceive the risk of conviction for perjury to be significant. Finally, of course, witnesses
who do not reflect before committing perjury will not be affected by the statutory scheme
in making the initial decision to lie.
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inconsistent statement, the correction establishes a prima facie case of
false declaration against the witness. The False Declaration Statute
gives the innocently incorrect witness nothing to gain and everything to
lose by correcting former testimony. Indeed, to the extent that the stat-
ute gives the innocent witness an incentive to testify in any particular
way, it encourages the witness to testify consistently with former testi-
mony even when that testimony was false.'
0 3
The hoped-for counter-effect of the False Declaration Statute's re-
cantation provision has been frustrated by statutory limitations and se-
vere judicial construction. The provision is as useless to witnesses
whose original testimony was innocently mistaken as it is to those whose
original testimony was intentionally false. A witness who truthfully
states that his former testimony was innocently mistaken will not be held
to have recanted.' 0 4 The statute offers no opportunity for such a wit-
ness to correct the record without risk of prosecution.
As for the witness whose original testimony was perjurious, the re-
cantation provision is of uncertain application because of the timeliness
requirements. An attempt to recant that fails because of one of these
requirements will destroy the witness's ability to defend against a charge
of false declaration because the attempted recantation provides compel-
ling evidence of both the falsity of prior testimony and the defendant's
knowledge of the truth.10 5
But even a timely recantation is no bargain to the perjurer.
Although recantation is a defense to a charge of false declaration, a wit-
ness remains susceptible to prosecution under the General Perjury Stat-
ute for making the recanted statement. No reported decision, 0 6 has yet
ruled on a defense that prosecution was barred under the General Per-
jury Statute by reason of a recantation under the False Declaration Stat-
ute, but language in several decisions suggests that such a prosecution is
possible.' 0 7 Thus, a witness may be prosecuted under the General Per-
103. Although the federal statutes do not address the issue, decisions construing the
General Perjury Statute have held that repetitions of a perjurious statement do not subject
a witness to multiple counts of perjury. Thus, the risk of perjury is not increased apprecia-
bly by a witness's repetition of a prior incorrect statement while correction of it holds far
more peril.
104. See discussion above at Part II-C-2.
105. Once rejected, the recantation issue may not be raised at trial and argued to
the jury. The rule of [United States v. Norris] that recantation is no defense to
perjury still holds sway when a defendant does not come within the recantation
provisions of section 1623(d) and creates a bar to prosecution.
United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d at 618.
106. In United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir. 1973), the court failed to
reach this issue because it found the defendant, convicted under the General Perjury Stat-
ute, had failed to recant before the falsehood was exposed. However, it expressed discom-
fort with the idea that the government could prosecute under the General Perjury Statute
if recantation successfully barred prosecution under the False Declaration Statute.
107. Denison, 663 F.2d at 616 n.6 (the recantation defense is available only to defend-
ants charged under section 1623, not to those charged under section 1621.); United States
v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (dictum). In
United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977),
defendants argued that the recantation provision was unconstitutional on grounds, among
others, that the government could prosecute a recanting witness for perjury under 18
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jury Statute for making a statement that he recanted.10 8 It is likely that
a recantation would corroborate falsity, in partial satisfaction of the two-
witness rule, because of the rule that a recantation must unambiguously
admit the falsity of the original statement and cannot attribute that inac-
curacy to innocent error. 10 9 Thus, the perjured witness who is genu-
inely afraid of prosecution has absolutely no rational motive to recant.
The disincentives created by the federal perjury law's treatment of
inconsistent testimony pose a threat to the process of cross-examina-
tion. The adversary trial examination, not prosecution for perjury, is
the judicial system's chief institutional mechanism for assuring accurate
testimony.110 The adversary system relies primarily on the skill of the
trial attorney in marshalling evidence and cross-examining witnesses in
order to expose and neutralize inaccurate testimony, of both the inten-
tional and unintentional variety.iII
The inconsistent statement provision impedes the cross-examiner's
ability to expose inaccurate testimony. Once a federal witness has given
testimony, the federal statutes' command is not to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is rather to tell the same
thing, and nothing but the same thing, that the witness told before.1
1 2
Cross-examination can grind to a halt when the risks associated with
changes in testimony brook so large as to lead witnesses to assert their
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination."l
3
U.S.C. § 1621. The court rejected this argument, holding that Congress could, consistent
with due process, condition access to the protection of the recantation provision by requir-
ing the defendant to increase his exposure to prosecution under the General Perjury
Statute.
108. See supra note 107. The curious interplay between the General Perjury Statute and
the recantation provision illustrates the effect of borrowing a statutory provision out of
context. Both the New York Penal Code, the form on which the False Declaration Statute
was modeled, and the Model Penal Code contain a recantation defense. In each case,
recantation exonerates the witness from all criminal liability for the perjury. The False
Declaration Statute, however, merely supplements the General Perjury Statute. The re-
cantation defense thus has radically different implications in the federal scheme of law.
Recantation under the False Declaration Statute exposes the witness to greater liability
than exists under the General Perjury Statute.
109. Under the General Perjury Statute, admission that prior testimony was false can
provide essential ammunition for the prosecution. The recantation may corroborate an-
other witness's testimony as to falsity, thereby satisfying the two-witness rule. The recan-
tation can also establish that the witness knew the truth at the time of the first statement,
tending to prove that the original statement was intentionally false. Thus, the General
Perjury Statute offers the strongest disincentives to correct inaccurate testimony.
110. See Best, supra note 13 (quote).
111. Wigmore celebrated cross-examination as:
[T]he greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth .... If we
omit political considerations of broader range, then cross-examination, not trial
by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of
law to improved methods of trial procedure.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 13, at 1367.
112. Because of the "freezing effect," witnesses have been shown to become stub-
bornly committed to the first version of facts that they recount, even in the face of signifi-
cant evidence to the contrary. E. LoFrus & J. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 84-87
(1979). Thus, there is a bias against correcting previous testimonial accounts. Cf State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939). This bias is aggravated by threaten-
ing a witness who thinks of revising his testimony.
113. Witnesses often assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid cross-examination
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It is reasonable to assume that innocent error is considerably more
common than perjury. The effect of discouraging correction in cases of
innocent error would seem to exceed the marginal harm of any perjury
inhibited by the inconsistent statement and recantation provisions as
presently formulated. In addition, one must charge the inconsistent
statement provision with the costs of perjury committed by witnesses
who falsely affirm prior inaccurate testimony. For such witnesses, dis-
honest reaffirmation of the error keeps the testimony consistent and may
be the less risky alternative.
B. Effects on the Legal Profession
The risks created by the federal perjury statutes create quandaries
for lawyers advising federal witnesses. Both the American Bar Associa-
tion Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (ABA Rules)" 4 and the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA
Code)" i 5 require that an attorney who learns that false evidence has
been presented to a tribunal must try to persuade the witness to correct
the error and, failing that, must advise the court of the falsehood if the
attorney can do so without revealing privileged matter. 1 6 Disclosure
in criminal trials. See United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1292 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) (striking the direct testimony of a government witness who
invoked the fifth amendment when cross-examined by defendant's counsel). Accord,
United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. Candor Toward the Tribunal. (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . (2) fail to
disclose a material fact to a tribunal when the disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; . . . (4) offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. (b) The
duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected
by rule 1.6. [pertaining to client confidences].
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3 (1983). Comment 5 discusses the lawyer's
duties when false evidence has been offered:
When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may arise be-
tween the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty
of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the law-
yer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered or,
if it has been offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If
that persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures.
See also Comments 4, 6, 11 and 12.
115. Representing a Client within the Bounds of the Law: (A) In his representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not: ... (4) Knowingly use perjured or false evidence ... (7)
Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraud-
ulent .... (B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (I)
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged com-
munication. (2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-102(A)(4), 7-102(B)(1) & (2)
(1981).
116. The Model Rules require the attorney to take "reasonable remedial measures" if
the persuasion is not effective:
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper
course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the
advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal
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may result in the witness, perhaps the attorney's client, being prose-
cuted for perjury or false declaration.
117
In the context of federal perjury statutes, the warning requirement
creates a particularly acute dilemma for the witness's counsel. The
warning makes the imminent exposure of the falsehood to the tribunal
manifest to the witness. This exposure arguably renders the witness's
recantation, if he chooses to give it, ineffective."l
8
The ABA Rules and the ABA Code harmonize poorly with the fed-
eral perjury statutes. A witness who changes his testimony incurs seri-
ous risks, yet, attorneys are instructed to urge witnesses to take precisely
those risks. The attorney who urges a witness to correct a falsehood
does so because of his professional responsibility as an officer of the
court, not out of concern for the interests of the witness.1 1 9 The wit-
ness, who may have committed a crime, is urged to waive his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination and give what amounts to an
in-court, sworn confession. It is disquieting to contemplate a court-
will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclo-
sure to the court. It is for the court then to determine what should be done-
making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or
perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client, the client may con-
trovert the lawyer's version of their communication when the lawyer discloses the
situation to the court. If there is an issue whether the client has committed per-
jury, the lawyer cannot represent the client in resolution of the issue and a mis-
trial may be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to
produce a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second
such encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel
and as such a waiver of the right to further representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3, Comment 11 (1983).
117. Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is
that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence
of the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can
result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal
but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alterna-
tive is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the
truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement ....
Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty
to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's
advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the
client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DE-
VELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 125 (1987). Cf. Why Did Lee Testify in the
W1"ang Case, The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 1988 at 17, col.3 (recounting the story of an
attorney who advised his client to recant, risking prosecution for the crimes about which
the client had testified, in order to avoid perjury charges).
118. If an attorney's advice tainted the recantation, the statute would conflict with the
policies of the rules regarding professional conduct. The warning given to the client
would strip the client of a possible opportunity to avoid criminal liability. Yet, no obvious
policy relevant to the False Decalaration Statute would distinguish an attorney's threat of
disclosure from a threat made by others, such as the prosecutor or a third party. The
statutory policy seems to emphasize the morality of the witness's decision to recant, per-
mitting the defense if the recantation is stimulated by a guilty conscience but denying a
defense if the recantation results from fear of exposure. Courts have emphasized this dis-
tinction in applying the statute. See e.g. United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085 (1981).
119. The witness's interests would require that he be advised to seek independent




enforced rule of professional conduct that requires an attorney to advise
a person to waive a fundamental constitutional right.
These conflicts are not inevitable, but flow in large part from the
statutory scheme now in place, a scheme that jeopardizes any witness
who risks rectification of testimonial errors. A rule that would remove
the risk of recantation would reduce the occasions for such troublesome
professional dilemmas. '
20
C. Effects on the Prosecution of Organized Crime
One might seek to justify the behavioral effects just described by
arguing that the inconsistent statement provision has great utility to the
government in criminal prosecutions. When Congress enacted the Fed-
eral False Declaration Statute'21 as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,122 it heralded the statute as part of a new arsenal of weap-
ons in the war against organized crime. 123 Witnesses are difficult to
prosecute for perjury under the General Perjury Statute. 124 Elimination
of the common law evidentiary restraints, including the inconsistent
statement rule, was intended to make it easier for the government to
obtain convictions for perjury, consequently deterring perjury and in-
creasing convictions for the substantive offenses.
12 5
But does the inconsistent statement provision really alter the bal-
ance of power between the prosecution and the criminal defendant? In
light of the abandonment of the two-witness rule, the inconsistent state-
ment provision would seem to be of value only in the relatively rare
circumstance in which the government cannot decide which of a wit-
ness's contradictory statements to charge as false. The provision has,
however, the potential for considerably more utility because it can be
called into play when the government is unwilling, rather than unable,
to designate the false statement. Consider the following scenario:
120. These dilemmas are difficult enough if, as is implicit in the discussion, it is as-
sumed that the lawyer "knows" that the witness testified falsely. As Justice Stevens noted:
A lawyer's certainty that a change in his client's recollection is a harbinger of intended
perjury . . . should be tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest
witness may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked.
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2535 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1623
(1982)).
122. The False Declaration Statute was enacted as Title IV of the 1970 Organized
Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 932 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982))
and was amended in Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2535.
123. "[W]e are going to try to make S.30 [The Organized Crime Control Act] the vehi-
cle for the legislation that is directed primarily at organized crime and providing additional
weapons with which to combat organized crime." See Hearings, supra note 29, at 107 (re-
marks of Sen. McClellan). "The purpose of the [Organized Crime Control Act] is to cor-
rect certain defects in our evidence gathering process."
124. See Heaings, supra note 29.
125. By facilitating perjury prosecutions, the False Declaration Statute was intended to
enhance the reliability of testimony before the federal courts and grand juries and afford
greater assurance that "testimony obtained in grand jury and court proceedings will aid
the cause of truth." S. REP. No. 617, 59 (1969). See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100,
107-08 (1979).
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Government calls Witness, who testifies at a grand jury proceeding.
In response to the prosecutor's questions and in the absence of objec-
tions or cross-examination, Witness implicates Defendant in criminal ac-
tivity.126 At the trial of Defendant, however, Witness changes or recants
his grand jury testimony. As a result, Defendant is acquitted. Govern-
ment charges Witness with perjury.
Under the General Perjury Statute, Government must choose which
of Witness's statements to charge as perjurious. This is sometimes a
painful choice: If Government charges that the grand jury testimony
was perjurious, Government would be contradicting the position it took
at Defendant's trial, which would be institutionally embarrassing. If it
charges that the trial testimony was perjurious, it faces proving the truth
of Witness's grand jury testimony, something that it has just failed to
prove in Defendant's trial. The problem under the General Perjury
Statute is not so much that the Government does not know which ver-
sion of Witness's story to challenge; it is rather that any specific chal-
lenge would be difficult to maintain.
The inconsistent statement provision of the False Declaration Stat-
ute resolves this dilemma. The statute does not require that, in order to
prosecute under subsection (c), the government be ignorant of the
truth, or have no corroborating evidence. The government can simply
charge and prove that the witness made inconsistent statements, then sit
back and watch him try to explain the discrepancy. With the sublime
indifference of a logician exposing a contradiction, the prosecutor need
take no embarrassing positions as to which of the witness's statements
was really true.
By simplifying the prosecution of grand jury witnesses who change
their testimony at subsequent trials, Congress hoped to strengthen the
government's ability to hold wavering grand jury witnesses in line at the
trials of grand jury target defendants. 12 7 The provision nails such wit-
nesses to their grand jury testimony, testimony that was taken in the
absence of confrontation and without objections or contemporaneous
cross-examination by the defendant, testimony that might have been
quite different if taken under the adversarial conditions of trial. The
government can meet any substantive change in the witness's story with
a charge of false declaration under the inconsistent statement provision.
This threat diminishes the utility of the defendant's constitutional 128
right of cross-examination by preventing his counsel from obtaining
concessions of error during the cross-examination of such witnesses at
the defendant's trial.
Congress had these strategic effects of the statute in mind when it
enacted the statute. Part of the statutory purpose was to prevent grand
126. It is assumed that the prosecution does not have reason to believe that the wit-
ness's grand jury testimony is perjurious. A conviction obtained by the government's
knowing use of perjured testimony violates the fifth amendment due process clause. Gig-
lio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
127. See Hearings, supra note 31.
128. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
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jury witnesses from changing their testimony in response to underworld
pressure.' 29 Yet any statutory threat of sufficient magnitude to offset
underworld threats of personal violence would seriously inhibit a wit-
ness who desired to change his grand jury testimony for less compelling
reasons, e.g. that it was simply mistaken. And in civil litigation, where
underworld threats are a rarity, the potent threat of the inconsistent
statement provision is even more dis.tortive.
Ironically, caselaw suggests that witnesses in criminal cases who
want to change their grand jury testimony may be able to nullify the
effect of the provision anyway. A well-advised grand jury witness who,
because of intimidation or less venal motives, desires to testify differ-
ently at the defendant's trial has many alternatives. If he wishes to say
nothing at the defendant's trial, he can simply invoke the fifth amend-
ment when questioned at that trial. His basis for invoking the privilege
would be his fear of a prosecution for perjury before the grand jury.13
0
If the witness thus refuses to testify, the government cannot introduce
the witness's grand jury testimony, which is hearsay.' 3 1 Nor can it com-
pel the witness to testify over his objection without granting him use
immunity. 13
2
After being granted use immunity at the trial, the witness can dis-
claim his grand jury testimony without running afoul of the inconsistent
statement provision.' 3 3 The government cannot use immunized trial
testimony in prosecuting the witness for perjury at the grand jury,'
3 4
129. See Hearings, supra note 31.
130. Although a witness may not claim the fifth amendment for fear that what he is
about to say may be perjurious, United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903; United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 1141 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972) (dictum), he may invoke the privilege if he fears that the testi-
mony he will give would subject him to liability for perjury in an earlier proceeding. Wil-
cox, 450 F.2d at 1141; Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911). The prior
testimony does not waive the fifth amendment for this purpose. Wilcox, 450 F.2d at 1141.
If the witness intends to testify inconsistently with prior testimony, the privilege would
therefore be appropriate.
131. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (limiting use of prior statements to those made by a
declarant who testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1986).
133. The Federal Immunity Statute provides in part that if a witness is compelled to
testify over his claim of a fifth amendment privilege, "no testimony or other information
compelled under the order [compelling such testimony] (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the wit-
ness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) (emphasis added). False testimony
of an immunized witness may be admitted in a prosecution for perjury in giving the testi-
mony introduced as evidence of the corpus delecti. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1976). An immunized wit-
ness's truthful testimony can be introduced in a perjury prosecution for false testimony
given under the same grant of immunity and before the same tribunal. United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) ("[Immunized] testimony remains inadmissible in all
prosecutions for offenses committed prior to the grant of immunity that would have per-
mitted the witness to invoke his fifth amendment privilege absent the grant.") A witness,
however, may not assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony that will
be perjurious when given.
134. United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 11 (lst Cir. 1987) (immunized grand jury testi-
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nor can it charge the witness under the inconsistent statement provi-
sion.I3 5 The government must either charge that the trial testimony was
a false declaration (and in the witness's trial for this charge, the govern-
ment can use his grand jury testimony whether immunized or not)' 3 6 or
it can charge that the grand jury testimony was a false declaration and
attempt to prove its case by other evidence. But in neither case is the
inconsistent statement provision of any use.
A second strategy the reluctant witness can use is to affirm the
grand jury testimony on direct examination, then to refuse to testify on
cross-examination by defendant's counsel, claiming the privilege of the
fifth amendment. If, as a result of the claim of privilege, the defendant is
not permitted to cross-examine as to the substance of the testimony
given on direct examination, the defendant is entitled to have the testi-
mony stricken.13 7 The witness, unless granted immunity, need not con-
tradict his grand jury testimony using this technique. Nevertheless, the
government loses the use of it.
Even if the witness does not invoke the fifth amendment or insist on
immunity, the inconsistent statement provision does not prevent the ef-
fective disavowal of prior testimony through a claim of uncertainty or a
loss of memory. The provision refers to statements that are so "incon-
sistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false.' 3 8 A witness
who professes to a failure of memory between the grand jury proceeding
and the trial has not satisfied this standard; memories can fail. 139 Faced
with such a loss of memory, however, the government can introduce the
witness's grand jury testimony at the defendant's trial. 140 And this tech-
nique is riskier for the witness, who can be prosecuted for perjury in
mony cannot be used as evidence to prove charge of perjury in prior appearance); United
States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 988 n.5 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 259; United
States v. Seltzer, 621 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1986).
135. In re Grand Jury Porceedings, 644 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pat-
rick, 542 F.2d 381, 384-86 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); United States
v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf United States v. Dunn, 442 U.S. 100
(1979) (approving prosecution under subsection (c) where the second inconsistent state-
ment admitted the falsity of the immunized grand jury testimony).
136. United States v. Seltzer, 794 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pisani,
590 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
137. See supra, note 11. Cf United States v. Pelusion, 725 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 1983)
(it is not necessary to strike the direct testimony of a government witness who invokes the
fifth amendment on cross-examination on a collateral matter not related to his direct
testimony).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1982).
139. United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing conviction
under section 1623(c) where, although witness testified to different account in second pro-
ceeding, upon cross-examination he readily admitted that the differences in his testimony
were due to a faulty memory and that his memory was better in the prior proceeding).
140. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, the government can introduce the text of
the grand jury testimony of a witness who professes loss of recollection because the wit-
ness is deemed to be available for defendant to cross-examine. California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970); United States v. Russell, 712 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1983). See United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1977) (distinguishing a witness
who does not recall grand jury testimony at trial from one who pleads the fifth amendment
- the latter's testimony may not be introduced).
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denying memory. Again, however, the inconsistent statement provision
provides no way of forcing the immunized witness to testify truthfully.
Viewed strictly as a weapon in the war on organized crime, the in-
consistent statement provision would appear to offer the government
minimal strategic gain to offset its potential for harm to other trial
testimony.
These observations must, however, be qualified because of the way
in which the current statutes are enforced. The behavioral effect of stat-
utes is modified drastically by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Statutes that are enforced according to unstated standards of
prosecutorial discretion no longer mean what they say, or even what
courts say they say. Today's federal prosecutors do not seek indictments
under the present statute against witnesses in civil cases who, on cross-
examination, decide, well, yes maybe it was raining on the day of the
accident after all.
An impressionistic survey of the reported cases suggests that the
inconsistent statement provision is applied mainly to professional
criminals. Strict enforcement of the inconsistent statement provision
across the board would be too likely to ruin a good weapon in the war
on organized crime. The indeterminacy introduced by the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion thus makes both critique and justification of the
rule difficult.
Nevertheless, written law should conform to law in practice as much
as possible, if only to give the citizen and her attorney some idea of the
risks that actually attend their options. To hide the illogic of the False
Declaration Statute behind the benevolent judgment of the federal pros-
ecutors weakens the rule of law. If the False Declaration Statute is to
have a narrow scope, it should be amended to reflect that scope.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE FALSE DECLARATION STATUTE
The twin problems of overbreadth-the tendency of the statute to
reach innocent testimonial inconsistencies-and counterproductivity-
the inhibition of desirable correction of both perjurious and non-per-
jurious testimony-both arise because the federal perjury statutes em-
phasize deterring initial perjury at the expense of encouraging
mitigation of the effects of perjury through recantation. The root con-
flict between the deterrence and mitigation policies of the statutes has
created an incoherent approach to testimonial inconsistency.
At a minimal cost in deterrence, the problems of overbreadth and
counterproductivity could be ameliorated by a more uniform policy lib-
erally permitting testimonial corrections. Statutory amendments that
might accomplish this are described below:
1. Make the inconsistent statement provision of the False Declara-
tion Statute inapplicable to statements made in the same proceeding.
Given the abolition of the two witness rule, which simplified the
proof of false declaration, the additional or marginal value of the incon-
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sistent statement provision is slight in comparison to its cost. It will usu-
ally be unnecessary to secure convictions because, unlike prosecutions
under the General Perjury Statute, prosecutions under the False Decla-
ration Statute can proceed on the basis of the witness's contradictory
statement alone.
The inconsistent statement provision has little value when applied
to inconsistencies in the same proceeding, given the countervailing
value expressed in the recantation provision. The purely formal differ-
ences between inconsistent statements and recantations do not justify
inhibiting or punishing testimonial corrections that are made without
the necessary shibboleths.
2. Amend the Recantation Provision by (1) deleting both the
"substantial effect" and "disclosure" requirements; (2) permitting a
witness to designate as a recantation any statement that directly contra-
dicted a former statement for which the defendant is charged for false
declaration or perjury; (3) making recantation a defense to any charge
under the General Perjury Statute; and (4) providing that recantation
would be untimely if it does not occur in the same proceeding as the
statement recanted or if it occurs after indictment for perjury in making
the statement recanted.
These changes express a liberalized rule permitting mitigation of
perjury before the end of the proceeding in which it was uttered. Under
the proposed amendments, the existence of a recantation will not turn
on the precise form of the testimony with which prior testimony is dis-
avowed. A witness could designate what were formerly inconsistent
statements within the same proceeding as a statement and its recanta-
tion, regardless of the form of the second of the two statements. As a
result, a witness would be bound only by the last version of his testi-
mony within a given proceeding. Most importantly, the amendment
would permit witnesses to revise innocent testimonial errors without
risking liability under the federal perjury laws.
The statute would offer the perjured witness a real incentive to re-
cant because recantation would eliminate the risk of prosecution. The
proposed amendments eliminate the uncertainty about whether the re-
cantation timing prerequisites were satisfied, since the recantation
would be timely if it occurred at any time before the proceeding ended
and before the witness was indicted. 14 1 The Catch-22 liability to a
charge under the General Perjury Statute would be eliminated.
This change would also reduce the conflict between an attorney's
duties to disclose falsehood to a tribunal and her duties to clients or
witnesses who may have testified untruthfully. Because a witness could
change his testimony within the same proceeding without penalty, an
attorney who believed that a witness had testified falsely could urge the
141. By permitting recantations until the end of the proceeding, the proposed amend-
ment to the federal statute would avoid the problem raised by the Model Penal Code of




* witness to rectify the error on the record without, in effect, advising the
witness to create the very evidence that could convict the witness of a
crime. Even if the attorney were required to disclose the falsity to the
tribunal, the witness would still have an opportunity to avoid liability by
subsequent recantation prior to an indictment because recantation
would no longer be barred by the disclosure of the falsehood to the
tribunal.
A. Evaluation of Proposed Changes
The proposed amendments can be criticized for two reasons: they
do not go far enough in eliminating the evils associated with perjury
law's bias toward consistency and they go too far in reducing the deter-
rent effect of the present scheme. The proposed changes admittedly do
not eliminate the evils associated with the elevation of consistency over
truth where testimony is given in more than one proceeding. A grand
jury witness can still be prosecuted for testifying differently at a subse-
quent trial. If a grand jury witness fails to recant a false declaration
before the term of the grand jury expires, he cannot correct the error at
a subsequent criminal trial and can be charged under the inconsistent
statement provision. This inability might well prevent a witness from
testifying truthfully at the trial or subsequent proceeding. However, the
prospective gain from recantation is greatly reduced after the tribunal
relies on the lie. In addition, permitting a witness to recant at any time
after the end of the proceeding in which he lied would permit risk-free
perjury. 
14 2
The proposed amendments do not prevent a witness who recants
from being prosecuted for lying during his recantation, 143 nor do they
prevent the government from using the first declaration in such a prose-
cution. In some cases, this risk could inhibit a desirable revision of erro-
neous testimony. Otherwise, however, the witness would be able to lie
with impunity during recantation.
Many have voiced the fear that an unlimited right of recantation
might encourage perjury by those who think it possible that their lies
will be exposed, if at all, during the proceeding. 14 4 Such witnesses
might be deterred under the original statute because exposure would
142. The interests at stake in the grand jury proceeding differ from those at stake in
other contexts because of the effect on the non-witness's (the prospective criminal defend-
ant's) right of confrontation. A possible solution, consistent with at least part of the con-
gressional intention, would be to make the inconsistent statement provision applicable
only to grand jury witnesses who had testified under a grant of immunity. This rule would
give the government considerable control over such witnesses. A grant of immunity gives
the criminal defendant against whom the witness testifies grounds for impeachment that
partially offset the governments prosecutorial power over the witness.
143. It should be noted that prosecutors and courts are generally mistrustful for the
witness who recants incriminating testimony. Frossard, When the Accuser Recants: People v.
Dotson, 14 A.B.A.J. SEc. LITIG., No. 4, 11, 12 (1988). Yet, while experience may teach that
such recantations are usually false, the inconsistent statement provision and the recanta-
tion provision do nothing to inhibit them in the same proceeding.
144. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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instantly make recantation impossible. They would perceive the risk of
prosecution as much smaller if they could recant after exposure of the
falsehood.
This fear seems to be exaggerated. For one thing, the perjury is
"risk free" only if the perjury is exposed during the proceeding and not
afterward, when the possibility of recantation has passed. The perjurer
who does not anticipate disclosure until after the proceeding is over will
not be affected by the proposed statutory change because it will not af-
fect his likelihood of being prosecuted. In addition, critics of liberalized
recantation tend to ignore the effect of uncertainty on the potential per-
jurer's calculations. The uncertainty is most pronounced for witnesses
contemplating perjury before a grand jury, where testimony is taken in
secret. At the time when the witness must decide whether or not to lie,
he must estimate the likelihood that he can learn of such secret testi-
mony and recant before he is indicted by the grand jury. This requires
estimating the combined chances that (1) his lie will be exposed, (2) the
prosecutor and grand jury will believe the exposing testimony and (3)
the witness will learn of the lie and be able to recant before an indict-
ment for perjury against him is handed down or the jury's term ends.
Perjury under such uncertainty of risk is not "risk free."
The uncertainty of risk is less for witnesses testifying at trial, but
such witnesses must still evaluate the likelihood that the conflicting evi-
dence will be believed and the likelihood that the witness can recant
before being indicted for perjury. The witness must be concerned not
with his credibility before tribunal in which the perjury is committed but
with his credibility before a grand jury and another tribunal concerned
with his perjury. The witness cannot know whether the perjury will ulti-
mately "succeed" until after the end of the original proceeding. Again,
such perjury is not "risk free."
Admittedly, and despite the uncertainty, it is likely that permitting
recantation after exposure may increase perjury by some amount. Even
so, it is plausible that the overall gain that the amendment would pro-
duce in accurate testimony would exceed the loss. The number of non-
perjurious witnesses who have occasion to change their testimony is far
greater than the number of potential perjurers whose decision to lie will
be affected by the liberalized recantation provision. Untruth can have
the same harmful effect on the judicial process whether it is innocent or
intended. The potential harm of the present statutory scheme appears
to outweigh its benefit by a large margin.
The proposed amendments would make the law of perjury more
congruent with civil litigation practice as well. In the federal civil law-
suit, to which the False Declaration Statute also applies, witnesses are
expressly permitted to change sworn testimony that they believe to be in
error. A strict avoidance of inconsistent testimony would harden initial
positions far more than is desirable.
The proposed amendments would rationalize the incentives offered
federal court witnesses at little cost in prosecutorial enforcement. While
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they would not solve all the problems associated with the attempt to
compel honest behavior by threats of punishment, they offer the maxi-
mum encouragement to such behavior consistent with the punitive, in-
strumentalist regime of criminal law.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the False Declaration Statute, Congress gave little atten-
tion to the effect of the statute on the average federal witness. Its
threats against inconsistent testimony are probably not what Congress
wanted such witnesses to bear in mind during cross-examination. It is
certainly doubtful that Congress intended to enact a rule that encour-
ages all well-counseled witnesses in federal court to take the fifth
amendment as soon as cross-examination begins. Whatever strategic
advantage that the prosecution gains from such a rule is largely offset by
common strategies that well-represented dishonest witnesses can
employ.
The federal perjury statutes should incorporate a more accurate
recognition of the realities of the trial experience. Consistency is not a
testimonial virtue when it comes at the expense of truth. Inconsistency
is often the mark of the honest mind grappling with the frailties of




WATSON V. FT. WORTH BANK AND TRUST." THE CHANGING
FACE OF DISPARATE IMPACT
LINDA L. HOLDEMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 constitutes this country's
first serious commitment to eradicating the enormous economic disad-
vantages caused by hundreds of years of racial and gender-related preju-
dice. In July 1989, Title VII will be 25 years old.2 Its first 25 years have
seen significant changes in the economic opportunities available to
America's minorities and women. The most obvious forms of inten-
tional discrimination are largely gone. In 1989 it is a rare employer who
will admit racial or gender-related prejudice, even privately. 3 As a re-
sult, the percentages of mid-level jobs4 held by minorities and women
have greatly increased. 5 On Title VII's 25th Anniversary, there is much
cause for celebration.
But there is also cause for concern. While members of once ex-
cluded groups have entered the mid-level workforce, most have not
progressed to top-level positions. 6 Perhaps not surprisingly, the elimi-
nation of barriers to mid-level employment has spotlighted the unique
barriers to equal employment in top-level jobs. Title VII's capacity to
deal effectively with these barriers will be its major challenge for the
next quarter-century. Its success will depend, in large part, on the vital-
ity of the disparate impact proof model and its application to subjective
employment criteria. This article will identify the battleground and ana-
* Res. Instr., New York University; B.A. 1970, Florida State University; J.D. 1976,
University of Tennessee.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -
2000e-17 (1982)). Title VII prohibits both public and private sector employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982). It not only creates and empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion to enforce its requirements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1982), but it also creates a
private right of action by victims of discrimination against employers who have violated
Title VII's prohibitions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of
Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 45 (1974).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982), took effect on July 2,
1964.
3. See generally Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (1982).
4. Categories such as "mid-level" or "top-level" jobs defy definition. For purposes
of this article, "top-level" jobs will refer to the top third of an employer's work force using
salary, responsibility, visibility, and prestige as criteria. "Mid-level" jobs will refer to the
middle third of the work force, using the same criteria.
5. See generally Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of
Employment Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REt.. L. J. 313, 336-39 (1984).
6. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947
(1982).
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lyze the United States Supreme Court's struggle to define an impact
proof model applicable to subjective criteria.
II. HISTORY OF TITLE VII PROOF MODELS FOR INDIVIDUAL CASES
Title VII's tools for dealing with prohibited discrimination are its
proof models. Although proof models theoretically are designed merely
to facilitate the orderly consideration of relevant proof,7 they have sig-
nificant substantive impact. They define the levels of necessary proof,
utilize rebuttable presumptions, and explicitly interpret the substance of
the statute.
In the early years of Title VII litigation, the courts developed two
principal proof models8 for establishing an individual Title VII cause of
action: the disparate treatment model, and the disparate impact model.9
A. Disparate Treatment Model
The individual disparate treatment case is commonly considered
the classic discrimination case. 10 Under this theory, the plaintiff proves
that the employer has intentionally treated an employee less favorably
based upon a protected characteristic such as race or sex. ' The proof
model for an individual disparate treatment case proceeds in 3 stages:
(1) the plaintiff's primafacie case, (2) the defendant's claim of legitimate
business reason, and (3) the plaintiff's proof that the defendant's "legiti-
mate reason" was a mere pretext.
The first stage, the plaintiff's prima facie case, is so simple that it is
often treated by stipulation. For instance, in a case alleging discrimina-
tory hiring, the plaintiff need only prove:
(i) that he belongs to a [protected group]; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
12
7. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
8. The theory of perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination is not discussed in
this paper in light of its demise in Teamsters, id.. The proof model for failure to reasonably
accommodate religious practices is also omitted as it has limited practical relevance to the
issues discussed in this article.
9. In any given case, a plaintiff may proceed under both theories concurrently. See,
e.g., Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1979)
(en banc).
10. The Supreme Court first applied the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), two years before setting out the individual disparate
treatment model in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11. Disparate treatment... is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 129 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)).
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. McDonnell Douglas articulates the model in a
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The prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination by ruling
out the most common reasons for rejecting an applicant.' 3 In the sec-
ond stage of proof, in order to rebut this inference, the defendant need
only articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's
rejection.' 4 This is a burden of production only. The employer need
only present some evidence of a legitimate reason; he need not convince
the trier of fact that it was the real reason for the employment deci-
sion. 15 Thus, just as the plaintiff's primafacie task is relatively easy, the
defendant's stage two task is also relatively easy.
The heart of the individual disparate treatment case-where most
such cases are won or lost-is stage three. The plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's articulated "legiti-
mate reason" was a "mere pretext" for discrimination. 16 In other
words, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's true motive was
based upon the plaintiff's membership in a protected group. Because of
the subjective nature of intent, the increasing Title VII sophistication of
employers, and the defendant's exclusive knowledge of its own motives,
the plaintiff's burden at this stage of the disparate treatment case is
quite difficult.
B. Disparate Impact Model
While the individual disparate treatment model can be effective in
proving discrimination against a relatively unsophisticated employer
whose articulated motives are both illicit and transparent, it does little to
address the more subtle and invidious discrimination which results from
"artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers"' 17 to full employment.
These barriers are facially neutral but discriminatory in effect. Title VII
is, of course, intended to eliminate all unnecessary barriers to full
employment.18
In order to address such facially neutral employment practices, the
courts have applied the same sort of "disproportionate impact" analysis
which had previously been applied to Fourteenth Amendment cases. 19
The Supreme Court first applied disparate impact analysis in a Title VII
claim in the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,20 and more fully set
out the elements of the proof model in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.
2 '
Like the disparate treatment model, the disparate impact case pro-
hiring case. Comparable standards apply in promotion, firing, and conditions of employ-
ment cases.
13. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324.
14. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
15. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
18. Id. at 431.
19. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971);
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977).
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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ceeds in three stages; however, the first stage of an impact case is much
more burdensome than its counterpart in a disparate treatment prima
facie case. The plaintiff must demonstrate that a particular employment
device has an adverse impact on a protected group in marked dispropor-
tion 22 to its impact on employees outside that group. 23 This primafacie
case is almost entirely statistical. It often requires voluminous discov-
ery, thorough and detailed analysis of the employer's total organization
and operation, and expert testimony by statisticians, industrial psycholo-
gists, and personnel managers. The statistical comparisons must be
valid in terms of significance (based on a sample large enough to yield
reliable results), 2 4 scope (covering an appropriate category of employ-
ees), 2 5 and time (covering an appropriate length of time).
26
Under the Griggs/Albemarle proof model, once a plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of persuasion
(not merely the burden of production) shifts to the defendant to estab-
lish the business necessity 2 7 of the questioned employment practice.2 8
Like the plaintiff's initial task, this is usually a difficult undertaking. The
employer must show that the employment device is manifestly job re-
lated or necessary to his valid business purpose, despite its disparate
effect upon protected groups. The business necessity standard is usually
considered a higher standard than the corresponding standard (the ar-
ticulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason) in an individual dis-
parate treatment case.
29
22. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures have established a
suggested benchmark of eighty percent. A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gener-
ally be regarded by the federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1986). While the "80% rule" is not a precise formula for determining
adverse impact, it is a benchmark of prosecutorial discretion, Clady v. County of Los An-
geles, 770 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1985), and as part of the uniform guidelines, is entitled to
great deference by courts. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
23. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
24. See, e.g., Kim v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 772 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1985); Soria v. Ozinga Bros., 704 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1983); Harper v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
25. See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir. 1983);
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
26. See, e.g., Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983); Roman v. ESB,
Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4, 1607.15 A(2) (1986).
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
But see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1328-29 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
28. Of course, the defendant may also dispute the plaintiff's statistical analysis on the
impact issue. But the burden of persuasion on the impact issue does not shift, it remains
with the plaintiff.
29. The Supreme Court has neither precisely defined "business necessity" nor com-
pared it to "legitimate business reason." Most authorities, while recognizing the uncer-
tainty, view "business necessity" as a higher standard. L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 49-53 (2d. ed. 1988); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 1328-30;
Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419 (1982); Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII. An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1298
(1987).
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Once the defendant has established the necessity of the employ-
ment device, the plaintiff, in the third and final stage, must prove that
there are other reasonable alternatives which would have less adverse
impact. 30 This proof may take the form of evidence showing that there
are reasonable alternatives to the particular skill or characteristic re-
quired, but more often the plaintiff will seek to prove that there are rea-
sonable alternatives to the criteria used to measure the required skill.
The difficulty of this proof stage will depend largely on the facts of each
particular case and such factors as how much less discriminatory the al-
ternative practice must be, how much and what kind of evidence will
establish the impact level of the alternative practice, and how adequately
the alternative practice must address the employer's needs. 3 '
C. Equal Employment in Top-level Jobs: Importance of Disparate Impact and
Subjective Criteria
Despite progress in equal opportunity for mid-level jobs, minorities
and women will remain second class members of the workforce until
equal opportunity is a reality in top-level jobs. But equal opportunity
encounters unique barriers at top employment levels. Some of these
barriers may not be directly related to current employment discrimina-
tion.3 2 However, few would dispute that racial and gender-related dis-
crimination is alive and well at the upper echelons of employment. And
few would dispute that the higher the job level, the more subjective are
the criteria for measuring potential for success. Therefore, it is evident
that Title VII's treatment of subjective criteria will be crucial to the
achievement of equal opportunity in top-level jobs.
3 3
Further, a number of factors combine to make the disparate impact
proof model the primary focus of the subjective criteria issue. First, the
more subjective the criteria, the more difficult it is to prove intent. This
is true not only from a purely evidentiary standpoint, but also because
"intent" is often difficult to define,3 4 particularly in the context of sub-
jective criteria for top-level jobs. 35 The murky issues of intent will be
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
31. In the pre-Watson cases, these issues are not resolved; nor does Watson shed much
light in these areas. See infra section III (7).
32. For instance, successful applicants for top-level jobs usually need some combina-
tion of mid-level experience and/or particular skills and education. Regrettably, minori-
ties and women are still not equally represented in this applicant pool. Undoubtedly the
causes of this underrepresentation are varied and include time lag between increasing
mid-level employment and readiness for promotion, economic and cultural vestiges of
past discrimination, and personal lifestyle choices such as fulltime parenthood.
33. For the classic analysis of the relationship between disparate impact, subjective
criteria, and top-level jobs, see Bartholet, supra note 6.
34. See generally Bartholet, supra notes 3 & 6; Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers:
Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733
(1987).
35. For example, a university seeking to hire a dean would intentionally discriminate
by not hiring a black applicant because he is black. But does the university intentionally
discriminate on the basis of race by not hiring the black applicant because the search com-
mittee does not believe that the applicant possesses the cultural attributes which would
enable him to persuade potential donors to contribute scholarship funds to the university?
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affected by the importance of the employment position in question. The
more crucial the job, the more fact finders will tend to give employers
the benefit of the doubt on the question of intent. Thus, the disparate
treatment model is less useful for analysis of subjective decision-making.
In addition, the recent limitations on the availability of class ac-
tions36 have significantly reduced the viability of the pattern and prac-
tice suit;3 7 and this is particularly true for top-level jobs which, by their
nature are more distinctive and therefore less susceptible to class treat-
ment. Finally, recent years have seen a significant de-emphasis on af-
firmative action as a roncept, and a clear rejection of quotas as a "quick
fix" for thorny Title VII problems.3 8 The most appropriate remaining
analytical approach, then, is disparate impact analysis.
Thus, the dissection and evaluation of subjective decision-making,
especially in the context of the disparate impact proof model, will be a
key component of Title VII's next frontier-equal opportunity for top-
level jobs. The 1988 decision of Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust3 9 was
only the first step down a long and difficult road. As the next section
will explain, much remains undecided.
III. WATSON V. FT. WORTH BANK AND TRUST
A. Pre- Watson Uncertainties
Though the Supreme Court had never expressly limited disparate
impact's application, the Court had never applied impact analysis to sub-
jective decision-making. Prior Supreme Court disparate impact cases
had dealt with objective devices such as the requirement of a high school
diploma or an intelligence test,40 a height-weight requirement, 4 1 or a
written examination. 4 2 However, as plaintiffs searched for more effec-
tive ways to prove system wide discrimination, they sought to apply the
disparate impact proof model to subjective employment practices such
While it is certainly possible to analyze this issue in terms of intent, it is much more appro-
priately analyzed as a question of adverse impact and legitimate need for the criteria.
36. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); East Texas
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Redditt v. Mississippi Ex-
tended Care Centers, Inc., 718 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1983); Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987
Affirmative Action Cases: Its All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
37. The "pattern and practice suit" is the proof model for a Title VII disparate treat-
ment class action. In a pattern and practice suit, the plaintiff must first show that disparate
treatment is the defendant's standard operating procedure. Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). The defendant may then rebut the inference of discrimination
created by the plaintiff's statistics by attacking the plaintiff's statistics themselves, by at-
tacking the plaintiff's analysis of those statistics, or by offering an alternative statistical
analysis. Id. at 339-40.
38. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Cf. Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
39. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
40. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
42. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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as subjective evaluation systems or hiring or promotion interviews.
43
Defendants argued that disparate impact analysis was inappropriate in
the context of a subjective system for a variety of reasons, 44 and soon
the circuit courts were widely split, some even vacillating internally.
45
The District of Columbia Circuit and the First, Second, Third, Sixth,
Seventh and Eleventh circuits concluded that application of disparate
impact analysis to subjective criteria is appropriate.4 6 The Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth circuits held that disparate impact analysis does
not apply to employment decisions based on subjective criteria;4 7 yet,
each of these five circuits has applied impact analysis to subjective deci-
sions in other cases. 48 The Supreme Court undertook to resolve the
issue of whether disparate impact could be applied to subjective employ-
ment decisions when it granted certiorari in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
43. Infra note 46.
44. Infra notes 46-47.
45. Infra notes 46-47.
46. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir. 1985) (promotion practice with subjec-
tive standards subject to disparate evaluations); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d
1010 (1st Cir. 1984) (layoff selection guidelines, including subjective evaluations of em-
ployees' knowledge, past performance, and future potential, evaluated for disparate im-
pact); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (tenure decision involving
subjective peer evaluations upheld under disparate impact analysis); Coser v. Moore, 739
F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (prior experience requirements held to be job related, justifying
disparate impact on women professors and classified staff); Wilmore v. City of Wilming-
ton, 699 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1983) (fire department promotions system, incorporating sub-
jective evaluations, found to be disparate impact on racial minorities); Rowe v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control Inc., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (rehire system giving
plant foremen unrestricted discretion not sufficiently job related to justify adverse impact);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (subjective requirements
including good character, moral conduct and lack of dissolute habits held to violate Title
VII due to disparate impact on blacks), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Green v. United
States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (extended Wilmore, holding that an
unguided subjective hiring process, depending on interviewer's "gut-level reaction" to in-
dividual applicants, requires a more specific explanation to rebut prima fade showing of
disparate impact than the defendant's stated reason that he was seeking the best qualified
people).
47. Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact model
only applies to specific procedures, usually a criterion for hiring); Mortensen v. Callaway,
672 F.2d 822, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1982) (subjective system where numerous factors were
combined to evaluate chemists for supervisory positions did not constitute neutral em-
ployment practice amenable to disparate impact analysis); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651
F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (subjective decision-making system, such as supervisory eval-
uation of work quality, not the type of practice that can form the foundation of disparate
impact case); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (dispa-
rate treatment model appropriate where gist of plaintiff's claim is use of subjective or ill-
defined criteria).
48. Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (United States Post Office pro-
motion system, based on subjective prior "detailing" to upgraded jobs, subject to dispa-
rate impact analysis); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983)
(promotion system including oral interview and subjective performance appraisal invali-
dated due to disparate impact), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Hung Ping Wang v. Hoff-
man, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (predominately subjective promotion selection system
should be evaluated under disparate impact theory); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir. 1971) (seniority system limiting promotion to employees with experience in
certain, typically all-white departments, violated Title VII under disparate impact model),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Even the Fifth Circuit has approved the use of dispa-
rate impact for a subjective selection system. Page v. United States Indus. Inc., 726 F.2d
1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984).




In 1973, Clara Watson was hired by Fort Worth Bank and Trust
(the "bank") as a proof operator. During the next seven years Watson
was promoted several times and byJanuary 1980, she held the position
of commercial teller. 50 During 1980 Watson applied, and was rejected,
for four promotions. On each occasion Watson's objective qualifica-
tions were similar to those of the successful white applicants.
5 1
The bank employed some eighty people in the Ft. Worth area. In
1973, when Watson was hired, there were only four other black employ-
ees. Two printed checks in the basement, one was a kitchen worker, and
the other was a porter. The bank had never had a black supervisor, let
alone a director or officer. Statistics showing hiring, salary, promotion
rates, and evaluation results showed marked disparities between blacks
and whites.
5 2
Regarding the positions sought by Watson in 1980, the bank had no
objective procedure for evaluating applicants, nor had there been any
attempt to identify the training, experience, and skills required for any
of the four positions. Each hiring decision was made by the manager
who would supervise the open position. After an interview, the manager
would simply make an intuitive decision from among the applicants, by
considering whatever subjective criteria that manager believed to be
relevant.53
After her fourth rejection, Watson exhausted her administrative
remedies and filed suit. She alleged that the bank had discriminated
against her and against similarly situated persons on the basis of race, in
contravention of Title VII.
5 4
The trial court initially certified the class under Federal Rule 23, but
decertified the class after trial because of lack of commonality and
numerosity. On the merits of Watson's individual claims, the trial court
refused to apply the disparate impact proof model to the subjective sys-
tem. Using the individual disparate treatment model, the trial court
found that Watson had established a prima facie claim of discrimination,
but had failed to establish pretext.
55
Watson appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the disparate im-
pact model should have been applied to her claims. Adhering to its re-
cent precedent of Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. 56 and its progeny, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling on the disparate impact is-
49. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
50. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 808.
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2782.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2783.
56. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
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sue. 5 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the disparate impact
issue alone, 58 and on June 29, 1988 the Court handed down a decision
which extended the disparate impact model to subjective practices. The
decision, however, left considerable doubt as to what disparate impact
now means.
C. The Watson Opinion
1. Overview of Opinion
Watson was heard by only eight Justices, but it produced three opin-
ions. They concur only insofar as they reaffirm the disparate impact
model and uphold its application to subjective criteria cases.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, did not ex-
pressly overturn any part of Griggs or other previously controlling dispa-
rate impact authorities. On the contrary, Justice O'Connor opined that
-[o]ur previous decisions offer guidance .... ,,59 She did not character-
ize her articulation as a modification even to adapt the old standards to a
new context, but rather as "a fresh and somewhat closer examination of
the constraints that operate to keep [disparate impact] analysis within its
proper bounds."' 60 Justice O'Connor's use of the present tense suggests
that she considered the constraints she was articulating to be already in
place, and that she considered her opinion to be an examination rather
than an expansion of them. She also stated that the point of this articu-
lation was "to explain in some detail why the evidentiary standards that
apply in these cases should serve as adequate safeguards against the
danger that Congress recognized." '6 1 The express intent of the opinion
was not to impose new standards, but to demonstrate why the old stan-
dards are adequate to protect the legitimate interests of employers,
without forcing them to use quotas or preferential treatment. The prob-
lem is that the language Justice O'Connor employed to articulate the
evidentiary burdens of the parties sometimes varied from the terminol-
ogy previously used in the impact precedents and can be read as an at-
tempt to redefine the proof model. This redefinition came over the
objection of the three Justice concurrence, and over Justice Stevens'
opinion that the elements of the proof model were not at issue in the
case.6 2 The core problem of the case is how to resolve these contradic-
tions in a reasoned and judicially sound manner. The ultimate fate of
the new definition, if indeed the plurality opinion is a new definition,
must await the next disparate impact case to be heard by a full Court.
63
57. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
58. 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
59. 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Justice Stevens' opinion thus calls into question the precedential value of the plu-
rality's new standards since they may be considered dicta. There is further question as to
the precedential value of a plurality opinion.
63. For some of the issues raised by Watson, the wait may not be long. On June 30,
1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atonio v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 827
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) In Atonio, the Court will
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Though the Court was sympathetic to the Bank's argument that the
application of disparate impact analysis might force employers using
subjective criteria to secretly utilize quotas in order to insure against
disparate impact, all eight Justices agreed that application of disparate
impact analysis to subjecti e decision-making was essential to the vitality
of Title VII. 64 Justice 0' 4nnor observed that to hold otherwise would
largely nullify the disparate impact proof model even where objective
criteria were used. She wrote, "[s]o long as an employer refrained from
making standardized criteria absolutely determinative, it would remain
free to give such tests almost as much weight as it chose without risking
a disparate impact challenge." '6 5  The Court implicitly recognized that
society's interests in rational and fair economic decision-making, and in
equal employment opportunity would be undermined by a Title VII pol-
icy which tended to shield subjective employment practices from liability
exposure, while subjecting genuinely objective practices to close legal
scrutiny. Justice O'Connor further noted that there is no analytical im-
pediment to the application of impact analysis to subjective criteria,
since both objective and subjective criteria constitute "a facially neutral
practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, [but which] may have
effects that are indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory prac-
tices." 6 6  Both from the standpoints of sound policy and conceptual
coherence, subjective criteria cases must be subject to disparate impact
analysis.
The four-Justice plurality recognized an employer's need for the
flexibility of subjective decision-making, even in the face of a statistically
disparate impact on a protected class, where the subjective practice has a
rational and legitimate basis. The plurality was also concerned that de-
fense of a disparate impact claim challenging a subjective employment
device would be unduly expensive and difficult, and that the extension
consider (1) the probative effect of statistical evidence regarding jobs not at issue, (2) the
placement of the burden of proof, and (3) the application of disparate impact analysis to a
system wide challenge of an employer's personnel practices.
64. 108 S. Ct. 2786-87.
65. Id. at 2786.
66. Id. The conceptual framework of the application of disparate impact to subjective
decision-making has been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., D. BALDUS &J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 22-26 (Supp. 1984); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra
note 27, at 191-205, 1288; Bartholet, supra note 6; Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers
to Equality for Faculty Women, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975, 991-95 (1983); Maltz, Title VII and
Upper Level Employment-A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 776 (1983); Stacy,
Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976); Wain-
troob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional
Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 (1979); Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the
Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 165 (1976); Note, Title VII and
Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level "Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1614 (1973). Nor is Jus-
tice O'Connor's conclusion completely self-evident. There are fundamental differences
between a subjective selection device and an objective device, particularly for purposes of
disparate impact analysis. The disparate impact model analyzes the specific selection de-
vice for discriminatory effect. In the context of an objective device, this sort of analysis is
conceptually simple, because the device is the same whether applied by a single supervisor
or by a number of supervisors. Not so with a subjective device. As a matter of fact, one
could say that a subjective device applied by five different supervisors is actually five differ-
ent selection devices, despite the fact that they are all described by the same words.
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of disparate impact analysis to subjective decision-making would result
in the use of "surreptitious quota systems" 6 7 in order to insure impact-
free statistics.6 8 To extend the disparate impact proof model to subjec-
tive practices without forcing employers to use quotas, the plurality "re-
examined" the proof model in some depth. Whether the plurality ap-
preciably weakened the model is not a question subject to simple resolu-
tion. It is necessary to look closely at each element of the "re-
examined" proof model. It appears that some change in the model was
intended. Some changes may prove more cosmetic than substantive,
and some changes await clarification. The effect of most will depend on
case-by-case implementation by trial courts.
The O'Connor opinion first addressed the plaintiff's prima facie
case. The plurality expressly required the plaintiff to identify the em-
ployment practice which is alleged to be discriminatory, and emphasized
that the plaintiff must prove the causal link between the challenged prac-
tice and the disparate impact. Second, the plurality re-articulated the
employer's response necessary to counter such a prima facie case. The
traditional "business necessity" test was, however, clouded by language
suggesting that the employer need only show that the challenged prac-
tice is justified by "legitimate business reasons." The plurality expressly
held that the use of the challenged employment practice need not be
defended with formal validation studies. Moreover, the defendant's
burden on those elements may have been reduced to a mere burden of
production and not of persuasion. Finally, the plurality opinion offered
no guidance as to just what a plaintiff must show in order to establish
that an employer's legitimate interests would be adequately served by an
alternative, non-discriminatory practice.
Justice Blackmun's opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, squarely rejected the new articulation of the impact proof model.
They adhered to the precedent of Griggs6 9 and Albemarle70 as the defini-
tive statements of the elements of a disparate impact case. This concur-
ring opinion particularly stressed that the defendant's rebuttal burden is
one of persuasion rather than production of evidence, and criticized any
attempt by the plurality to relax the standards for validation of subjec-
tive criteria.
Justice Stevens also declined to endorse the plurality's new articula-
67. 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
68. The possibility that a more stringent disparate impact proof model will signifi-
cantly reduce the surreptitious use of quotas is questionable. While tougher proof stan-
dards will increase the difficulty of a disparate impact plaintiff's case, it is far from obvious
that new standards will significantly reduce the number of claims brought. Faced with the
necessity to defend, few employers would significantly weaken their defense efforts based
upon the assessment that their ultimate odds of success are better. This is particularly true
since the new standards themselves are subjective and few employers will be certain
enough of the outcome at trial to risk the high consequences of losing an impact case. It
will still be less expensive and more effective to insure that the prima facie statistical case
can not be made.
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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tion of the proof model. He argued that discussion of"evidentiary stan-
dards" should await another day when those issues are before the Court.
Essentially, this concurring opinion is significant in two respects. First,
it deprived the O'Connor opinion of majority status. Second, it under-
lined the fact that the plurality opinion may be viewed as dicta to the
extent that it rearticulated, if not redefined, the elements of the proof
model.
7 1
2. The Identification Requirement
The plurality noted that the plaintiff must identify the objectionable
employment practice as an element of the prima facie case.72 While this
element may not have been so clearly articulated in Griggs,7 3 and Al-
bemarle74 the requirement of identification of an objectionable employ-
ment practice was, at least implicitly, an element of a disparate impact
case before Watson. 75 However, it is not entirely clear how specific the
Watson plurality requires the plaintiff to be, and the degree of specificity
is crucial at the point of proving the causal link between the practice and
the disparate impact.
76
It is here that we must be most precise in defining and using termi-
nology. Assume a multi-component hiring procedure which combines:
(1) a degree requirement, (2) a check of references, and (3) an interview.
The interviews are conducted by a single decision-maker who subjec-
tively measures the applicant using a list of criteria such as ability to
communicate, leadership, ability to relate well with others, professional
appearance, and attitude. There is a system for recording the inter-
viewer's subjective assessments by ranking on a scale of one to six. A
formula assigning relative weight for each component then guides the
final decision. The decision is still substantially the result of subjective
judgments, but the decision-making process is fairly well documented.
In such a case, the Watson plurality would certainly require a plaintiff
to do more than show that overall hiring statistics are disparate. The
plaintiff would be able to, and therefore would be expected to, for exam-
ple, assess whether the degree requirement itself had an adverse impact,
71. See also supra note 58.
72. 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
73. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
74. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 405.
75. All prior cases in which the Supreme Court applied disparate impact analysis have
focused on specific components of a selection device. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination as a screening device for promotion); New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (exclusion of methadone users); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 405 (a pre-employment test).
76. The Court requires only identification of the "practice," and does not specify that
the criterion must be isolated. The Court supported the identification requirement on the
authority of Teal, which involved a two-step selection process. In that case, the first screen-
ing had an adverse impact, but the second step compensated for the adverse impact. The
Court applied impact analysis separately to the first step. So in such a system, it is clearly
important to focus on a rationally separate and discrete step in the total process. Beyond
that, the Watson opinion does not say how specific the identification must be.
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since that impact is amenable to objective measurement. 7 7 The plaintiff
would be able to identify, and therefore would be expected to identify,
which of the three components adversely impacted a protected group,
since the final formula assigning numerical values and weights to each
component would allow that impact to be tracked. The plaintiff could
theoretically even assess the impact of each subjective criterion, if the
subjective assessment of each were separately ranked. However, if the
criteria were not separately ranked, a plaintiff could not identify which
criteria had adverse impact. 78 If the relative weight of each component
practice (degree requirement, reference check, and interview) is not
identified, a plaintiff could not identify which component had adverse
impact. The difficulty is evident. An employer could insulate a selection
procedure from disparate impact challenge by making the procedure
completely subjective 79 or simply by refraining from memorializing the
decision-making process by ranking the subjective judgments and
weighting the components. Certainly this method of preventing a dispa-
rate impact challenge would be far easier than using quotas and there-
fore, a far more real danger to the ultimate viability of the proof model.
The degree of specificity possible will vary widely from case to case.
In a two-step selection device, it is certainly possible to identify the ob-
jectionable step. 80 In a case involving multiple subjective criteria, the
plaintiff could never prove which subjective criterion was associated in
the employer's mind with a Title VII protected group unless the practice
included sufficient ranking and record-keeping procedures. In such a
case, it would certainly be inappropriate to require the plaintiff to iden-
tify which criterion produced the disparate impact.
Such a construction would sound the death knell of impact analysis
in the subjective criteria context, which the Court recognizes would ef-
fectively end the efficacy of impact analysis in the objective criteria con-
text as well. 8 1 This is precisely what the Watson decision refused to
allow, so the requirement of specific identification must be circum-
scribed with an appropriate rule of reason, to accomplish the primary
goal of the decision-the preservation of a viable disparate impact
model.
77. A degree requirement is analogous to the test requirement in Teal, id. Where
either criteria is an absolute requirement, its impact can be assessed. Where either is sim-
ply a factor to be considered along with other criteria, its impact can not be assessed ab-
sent a ranking system or formula which prescribes and memorializes the decision-making
process.
78. Ironically, that is particularly true where subjective criteria are involved, as the
Court has recognized that it is subconscious stereotyping that causes such subjective crite-
ria to produce unlawful disparate impact. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786. The plaintiff cannot
reasonably be required to identify which subjective criteria are associated in the em-
ployer's mind with an unfair stereotype. The only way to prove such an association would
be if the same decision-maker evaluated the employment pool multiple times, excluding
one criteria each time in order to produce a statistical basis for analysis.
79. Le., by simply using an intuitive decision-making procedure, relying totally on un-
bridled discretion.
80. See Teal, supra note 75.
81. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
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The best reading appears to be that the degree of required specific-
ity must be determined on a case by case basis, depending primarily on
how specific it is possible to be. It is never sufficient for the plaintiff to
merely allege a statistical imbalance in the employer's workforce.8 2 The
plaintiff must make some showing that the defendant's practices have
caused this imbalance,8 3 and the identification of the offending practice
will be more or less specific depending on the nature of the challenged
practice. The identified practice will often be the inverse of the alterna-
tive practice which the plaintiff must offerin stage three of the case. A
plaintiff proposing a set of objective criteria in stage three would argue
in stage one that the failure to circumscribe employment decisions with
such criteria is the offending practice. A plaintiff who accepts the need
for subjective criteria for the job involved might argue that appropriate
training of the decision-maker would avoid disparate impact, so the fail-
ure to provide such training would be the offending practice. Similarly,
a plaintiff might challenge the employer's failure to screen its decision-
maker for racial or sexual bias, or for the failure to require an independ-
ent review of subjective decisions as a guard against illicit bias. These
examples demonstrate that a reasoned construction of the identification
requirement will not prove an undue burden for plaintiffs. Even in
those cases where the offensiveness of the practice is cloaked in the prac-
tice's amorphous character, the burden is really no greater than what
has always been imposed by stage three of the proof model-proof of
the existence of non-discriminatory alternatives.
3. The Causation Requirement
The plurality stated that plaintiffs must prove a causal link between
the challenged practice and the disparate impact.8 4 At first glance, this
might seem to be a difficult burden in the context of subjective practices.
However, the plurality explained that such proof is largely a matter of
showing a statistical disparity "sufficiently substantial ... [to] raise such
an inference of causation." 8 5 The Court elaborated on this element of
proof by reiterating the well-established principles governing the statis-
tical analysis of the case. "[S]mall or incomplete data sets and inade-
quate statistical techniques" will not prove causation. Statistics must be
based on the applicant pool exclusive of applicants lacking minimal job
qualifications.8 6 The plurality was articulating in terms of causation the
same requirements which earlier opinions have articulated in terms of
defining a disparate impact.
8 7
The more significant question relates to the degree to which plain-
82. Id. at 2788.
83. See infra Part 111(3).
84. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89.
85. Id. at 2789.
86. Id. at 2790.
87. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (insufficiency
of statistics to show impact of exclusion of methadone users); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977) (sufficiency of statistics to show impact of height/weight requirement).
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tiffs must, for purposes of a prima facie case, prove the lack of other
causes for the statistical imbalance. The plurality was clearly concerned
that:
It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimina-
tion is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and
employers in accord with the laws of chance. It would be
equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or
discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may
lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces.
88
The Watson plurality thus emphasized that the disparate impact proof
model does not require an employer to prove causes for statistical im-
balance other than the challenged employment practice.
It is important to note that the Griggs/Albemarle articulation has
never required an employer to prove the lack of causation. When de-
fendants have offered causation proof, it has always been as rebuttal to
the plaintiff's causation proof in the prima facie case. The burden of
proof on causation has never shifted to the Title VII defendant.
The Watson plurality opinion may stand for the proposition that,
where a plaintiff's statistical analysis of the impact of the challenged
practice is not otherwise sufficient to prove causation, a plaintiff may be
required to disprove other possible causes. However Justice
O'Connor's primary point on causation is simply that the burden of
proof does not shift to the defendant, but remains with the plaintiff
through all stages of the proof model.8 9
Therefore, the plurality's discussion of causation did not create a
new standard. Rather, the opinion emphasized that statistical proof
must be sufficient to show causation, and that the employer is never re-
quired to shoulder the burden of proof on causation. Both principles
were already a part of the pre-Watson model.
4. Legitimate Business Reasons
In order to rebut a primafacie case of disparate impact, an employer
has traditionally been required to defend the challenged practice by a
showing of "a manifest relationship to the employment in question" 90
or a "genuine business need." 9 ' The Watson plurality referred approv-
ingly to the Griggs/Albemarle "business necessity or job relatedness" de-
fense 92 as one of the constraints on disparate impact, which insures that
employers will not have to use quotas or preferential treatment.
9 3
88. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787 (citation omitted).
89. It is also important not to confuse the plurality's discussion of causation with the
issue of proper allocation of burden of proof on job relatedness. Infra at Part 111(5).
90. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
91. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 434.
92. The two terms have traditionally been used interchangeably. Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at
1329-30.
93. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791.
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Hence, it would appear that the "business necessity" standard ofjustifi-
cation was reaffirmed.
9 4
But the viability of that standard was then called into question
within the same paragraph by the plurality's odd use of disparate treat-
ment language to introduce its discussion of stage three:
[Wihen the defendant has met its burden of producing evi-
dence that its employment practices are based on legitimate busi-
ness reasons .... 95
The term "legitimate business reasons" was not defined or explained in
the opinion. Nor was the phrase supported by a citation to precedent
which would clarify its meaning in this context. This language, taken at
face value, might indicate a lowering of the traditional "business neces-
sity" standard.9 6 However, a better reading is that the plurality was not
really deviating from the pre-Watson standard. If "legitimate business
reasons" were construed as a lower standard, the opinion would be in-
coherent, as it also affirmed the "business necessity standard." In the
sentence preceding the "legitimate business reasons" clause, the plural-
ity expressly reaffirmed the more specific articulation of this burden.
The term "legitimate business reasons" was used only in an introduc-
tory clause for another element of the proof model. The standard which
the court clearly articulated for stage two is "manifest job relatedness,"
citing Griggs with approval. 9 7 So the plurality opinion should not be
read as diminishing this burden.
5. Burden Of Production
The same subordinate clause which introduced the "legitimate
business reasons" terminology also spoke of the defendant as having a
"burden of producing evidence" to rebut the prima facie case. At this
stage of the case, the pre-Watson proof model required the defendant to
prove manifest job relatedness-not merely to produce evidence. 9 8 The
issue is whether the plurality was actually purporting to modify this stan-
dard to a mere burden of production. In disparate treatment cases,
which use the "legitimate business reasons" language, the employer
does has only a burden of production, so there is some reason to believe
94. In the specific context of subjective criteria, the use of such criteria will usually be
justifiable for those upper echelon positions from which women and minorities are still
being excluded. Id. However, the plaintiff may effectively challenge the manner in which
such criteria are measured. For example, it might be argued that some "subjective" traits
are actually measurable by psychological testing, that training of the decision-maker could
minimize the unfair stereotyping which causes disparate impact, that screening of deci-
sion-makers to avoid illicit bias could lessen disparate impact, or that independent review
of employment decisions could counteract the effect of such bias. Cases challenging sub-
jective decision-making per se will be viable only for those jobs where objective perform-
ance tests are feasible. Most subjective practice cases will turn on the employment
procedures rather than the criteria being used.
95. Id. at 2790 (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 29.
97. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
98. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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that the Watson plurality articulated a new and lowered standard for dis-
parate impact.
However, there are also reasons to conclude that the defendant's
burden is still the same. The plurality never suggested that it was chang-
ing the burden, but purported to be articulating well-settled standards.
The sentence containing the "burden of production" language cited
with approval Albemarle Paper Co. which holds that the employer has the
burden of proving job relatedness. 99 The previous sentence stated that
"an employer has the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question," cit-
ing Griggs which also places such a burden of proof on the defendant.10 0
The better reading is that the Watson plurality acknowledged that
the defendant has this burden of proof, and merely stressed that the
burden of proving the fact that discrimination (that is, disparate impact)
has been caused by a particular practice never shifts. The plurality opin-
ion states:
Although we have said that an employer has "the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question," . . . such a formula-
tion should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate
burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the con-
trary, the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination
against a protected group has been caused by a specific em-
ployment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.' 0 '
The issue on which the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff is the
causation issue. This does not deviate from settled precedent, and does
not necessitate lessening the defendant's burden on the issue of job
relatedness.
The plurality articulated no intent to change the burden and offered
no articulated reason for varying from that burden in subjective practice
cases. In fact, the Court observed that the employer will often find it
easier in the context of subjective practices to show job relatedness than
in the context of objective practices. 10 2 So the extension of the proof
model to subjective cases provides no reason to lighten the job related-
ness burden.
Moreover, the plurality's passing use of the word "producing" does
not rise to the level of a coherently defined burden of production. True
burdens of production should state the quantum of evidence to be pro-
duced, since those quanta may be of varying degrees. A party may face a
burden to produce a scintilla of evidence, significant evidence, substan-
tial evidence, or any other quantum the court may prescribe. If the Wat-
son language prescribed a burden of production, it created a problem for
lower courts by failing to prescribe the quantum of evidence required.
99. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
100. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
101. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting from Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
102. Id. at 2791.
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Still, footnote two of Justice O'Connor's opinion implied that the
plurality intended to change some of the evidentiary standards. The
plurality stated that "each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to
describe the evidentiary standards" in disparate impact cases may not
"automatically apply" in light of Watson. The difference between "busi-
ness necessity" and "legitimate business reasons" may be a mere differ-
ence in verbal formulation. However, the difference between a burden
of proof and burden of production is certainly more than a mere differ-
ence in "verbal formulation." Considering the case as a whole, the bet-
ter view is that the employer still has the burden of proof on the issue of
job relatedness. However, the opinion is far from clear, and one would
hope that the Court will resolve this issue at its earliest opportunity.1
0 3
6. Validation Studies
In addition to raising questions as to the quantum of evidence re-
quired to rebut a prima facie impact case, the plurality opinion left open
the question of the kind of evidence which the employer must produce.
The job relatedness of most objective criteria is measurable by valida-
tion studies. However, the Bank in Watson contended that subjective
practices are not amenable to such validation studies. The plurality
opinion was again somewhat inconsistent in its discussion of this issue.
It began by noting that "[s]tandardized tests and criteria, like those at
issue in our previous disparate impact cases, can often be justified
through formal 'validation studies,' which seek to determine whether
discrete selection criteria predict actual on-the-job performance."
' 10 4
Yet the plurality went on to acknowledge the employer's concern that
the defense of subjective criteria with formal validation studies would
often be impossible, or at least so expensive as to be impracticable. The
plurality responded to this concern by stating that formal validation
studies have never been absolutely required, even in the objective prac-
tice context.' 0 5 In terms of the subjective cases, the opinion proceeded:
In the context of subjective or discretionary employment
decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case
of standardized tests to produce evidence of a "manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question." It is self-evident that
many jobs, for example those involving managerial responsibil-
ities, require personal qualities that have never been consid-
ered amenable to standardized testing.
10 6
Thus, the plurality opinion resolved the defendant's concern that formal
validation studies would be unduly expensive by clarifying that such vali-
103. It is possible that the Court will resolve this issue more clearly in Atonio v. Ward's
Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988), dur-
ing the Spring term of 1989. However, the employers in Alonio have not directly argued
that a Title VII defendant does not have the burden of proof on job relatedness. Atonio
may turn instead on the lower court's ruling as to a shifting of burden of proof on
causation.
104. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
105. Id. at 2790-91.
106. Id. at 2791.
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dation studies are not always required. Beyond that, however, the plu-
rality opinion gave the lower courts little guidance as to what kinds of
evidence may be adequate to validate employment practices. The plu-
rality recognized the availability of formal validation studies to measure
the job relatedness of a practice. It implicitly recognized and affirmed
the use of such validation studies in appropriate contexts, citing Al-
bemarle Paper Co. with approval. 10 7 It is clear that such evidence is still
appropriate. On the other hand, the plurality contemplated that some
subjective practices (or at least some subjective criteria) will be so mani-
festly job related that job relatedness is "self-evident."' 0 8 This implies
that little or no evidence will be needed to justify the employer's prac-
tice. 10 9 In the absence of more specific guidance from the Court, it
seems that the lower courts are left to resolve on a case-by-case basis the
questions of the degree and manner of proof required to establish mani-
fest job relatedness. 110
The plurality has not so much articulated a new standard governing
the kind of evidence required for the rebuttal case as it has recited the
flexibility of the pre-Watson standard, and extended that flexibility even
further in light of the extension of the proof model into new and even
more varied employment practices. Some practices, and particularly
some criteria, may be easily justified without formal validation studies,
but some subjective practices may be subject to more scientific valida-
tion procedures."I ' The plurality decision could be read as holding
that scientific proof is not required even when available. 1 12 However, it
is not reasonable to construe the plurality opinion as relieving defend-
ants of the responsibility to produce whatever evidence of job related-
ness is reasonably available and probative.
7. Alternative Practices
If the employer succeeds in validating its employment practice, the
107. Id. at 2787.
108. Id. at 2791.
109. The kind of practice falling between these two ends of the continuum, and the
kind of evidence required to validate such a practice is an open question.
110. Lower courts will need to consider the specific practice which is being challenged
in deciding the kind of evidence which will defend it. While certain subjective criteria may
be self-evidently and manifestly related to a managerial job, the method of measuring the
employee against that criteria may be the subject of challenge. The Court has given no
guidance as to what kind of evidence will be required to validate the application aspect of
the practice, as distinguished from the criteria aspect. Since the criteria aspect will ordina-
rily be so easy for the employer to defend, it is likely that most of these cases will focus on
the application aspect.
11. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795. The brief of the American Psychological Association,
submitted as amicus curiae in Watson, sets out methods for what it calls "scientific valida-
tion" of subjective devices such as job interviews. Brief of American Psychological Ass'n at
4-22, Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (No. 86-6139). See also
Bartholet, supra note 6, at 987-88.
112. Such a reading of Watson would have little practical effect if the defendant's bur-
den on the issue of job relatedness remains one of persuasion. If the plaintiff produces
competent scientific evidence of invalidity of a practice, the defendant will probably need
competent scientific evidence to counter it, even in the absence of a rigid rule requiring
formal validation as an element of the rebuttal case.
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burden falls on the plaintiff to offer a non-discriminatory alternative
practice which the employer could have used. The questions unan-
swered by the Watson plurality opinion are: (a) how much less discrimi-
natory must the alternative practice be, (b) what kind of evidence will
support that practice, in light of the fact that the practice was not used
and both the employer's practice and the suggested alternative will often
be at least partly subjective, and (c) how adequately must the alternative
practice address the employer's legitimate business interests?
As for the degree to which the alternative practice must diminish
the disparate impact, the Court was silent. Presumably, this issue is left
to be resolved on the same case-by-case basis which the plurality has
prescribed for evaluating the disparity of impact in the prima facie
case.' 1 3 With regard to the nature of proof on this inherently specula-
tive question, the only way to preserve the validity of the impact model
is to allow the plaintiff a good deal of latitude. The plaintiff challenging
a subjective practice will usually be challenging the procedure rather
than the criteria, 1 14 and the plaintiff will usually be forced to rely, in
stage three, on expert testimony that certain types of procedures usually
have less adverse impact than the procedures used by the defendant. Of
course, the defendant will seek to produce opposing expert testimony.
However, all of this evidence will, of necessity, be relatively speculative.
The issue on which the language of the plurality opinion is most
confusing is that of how adequate the alternative practice must be from
the standpoint of the employer's legitimate interest. Initially, the plural-
ity stated, "the plaintiff must show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship." "15
However, in the next sentence the plurality recited factors pertinent
to "determining whether [the alternative practice] would be equally as effec-
tive as the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate busi-
ness goals."11 6 While this language could be read as a holding that even
a de minimis difference in cost, convenience, or efficiency could justify a
severely discriminatory practice notwithstanding the availability of sub-
stantially adequate and non-discriminatory alternatives, this reading is
certainly not a reasoned approach. Proof of equal effectiveness, if
strictly and narrowly construed, would rarely be possible. Further, this
reading of Watson would elevate the most trivial interest of the employer
above the plaintiff's and society's interests in equal employment oppor-
113. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
114. See supra Part 111(5).
115. Watson, 108 S. Ct. 2790 (emphasis added) (citing with approval Albemarle, 422 U.S.
at 425).
116. Id. (emphasis added). The next sentence states that those factors would be perti-
nent to determining whether the challenged practice is "thefunctional equivalent of pretext for
discriminatory treatment." Id. The standard and function of stage three is further compli-
cated by this disparate treatment language, again blurring the two models and harkening
back to intent. See infra note 135.
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tunity, and that cannot be the intent of a decision extending the dispa-
rate impact model beyond its prior scope. Nor does the plurality
opinion state that strict equality of effectiveness is the test. Rather the
Albemarle Paper Co. standard is affirmed.
The question must remain one of reasonableness. Such factors as
the cost, convenience, and efficiency of the competing practices must be
balanced against the difference in the degree of disparate impact af-
fected by the competing practices in order to determine whether the use
of the challenged practice was discriminatory.17
D. Precedential Value and Scope of Application of the New Disparate Impact
Articulation
The fact that Watson is a plurality decision calls into question its
precedential value."18 It is well settled that affirmances by an equally
divided Court do not bind lower courts as to principles of law."1 9 But
the precedential value of decisions where no single rationale is em-
braced by a majority of the Court presents a more difficult issue. The
"holding" of the Court, in such cases, is defined as "the position taken
by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds."' 20 Just what constitutes the "narrowest grounds" is unclear.
Some have suggested that the narrowest opinion is that which, because
it does not enunciate broad rules of law, renders the decision applicable
to the fewest number of cases.121 Under this definition, Justice Stevens'
concurrence in Watson would be the holding of the case since he
postpones the enunciation of evidentiary standards for another day. An-
other approach is to view the narrowest opinion as the one which de-
parts least from the status quo.' 2 2 Under this standard, the opinion of
Justice Blackmun could be considered the holding, since it merely re-
peats the evidentiary standards in earlier disparate impact cases.
Not only is the precedential value of the plurality unclear, but the
scope of its application is also unclear. The opinion avoided the issue
as to whether its redefinition of disparate impact was intended to apply
only to subjective criteria cases, or to all cases of facially neutral employ-
ment practices.
The express reason for the rearticulation was clearly occasioned by
117. This notion of balancing has not been explicitly discussed by the Court, but it has
sometimes been implicit in earlier opinions. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335
(1977) (balancing strength of evidence on business necessity with consequences of incor-
rect decision).
118. Further, the plurality's discussion of the evidentiary standards applicable to dispa-
rate impact analysis is dicta.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S.
205 (1910).
120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). See also Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 193 (1977).
121. Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
756, 763 (1980).
122. Id. at 764.
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the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
practices. Justice O'Connor stated in footnote two:
[W]e believe that this step [of extension to subjective employ-
ment practices] requires us to provide the lower courts with ap-
propriate evidentiary guidelines, as we have previously done
for disparate treatment cases. Moreover, we do not believe that
each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to describe the
evidentiary standards in disparate impact cases is automatically
applicable in light of today's decision. . . . This congressional
mandate [against preferential treatment and quotas] requires in
our view that a decision to extend the reach of disparate impact
theory be accompanied by safeguards against the result that
Congress clearly said it did not intend.
123
This language emphasizes that the evidentiary guidelines are in-
tended to minimize the risk that extension of the proof model to subjec-
tive practice cases would force employers using subjective practices to
adopt secret quotas. The use of the word "automatically" indicates that
the pre-Watson evidentiary standards may still be viable in some cases,
but may not apply in others. Thus, the pre-Watson standards may still
apply in the objective criteria context but not in the subjective criteria
context.
Justice O'Connor also introduced the rearticulation by stating:
We recognize, however, that today's extension of that theory
into the context of subjective selection practices could increase
the risk that employers will be given incentives to adopt quotas
or to engage in preferential treatment. Because Congress has
so clearly and emphatically expressed its intent that Title VII
not lead to this result, we think it imperative to explain in some
detail why the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases
should serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that
Congress recognized.
12 4
The antecedent to "these cases" may well be "subjective selection pro-
cedures," another indication that the new standards are required only
because of the particular dangers of application to subjective criteria.125
It is noteworthy that Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion seems
to understand the plurality's new articulation of the evidentiary stan-
dards as applying only to subjective employment practices. He stated:
In so doing, [extending disparate impact analysis to subjective
practices] the plurality projects an application of disparate im-
pact analysis to subjective employment practices that I find to
be inconsistent with the proper evidentiary standards and with
the central purpose of Title VII.1
26
He then went on to call for the traditional statement of disparate impact
123. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 n.2.
124. Id. at 2788 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
125. The ambiguity as to the scope of the applicability of the Watson standard is noted
in Note, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 308, 316
(1988).
126. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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evidentiary standards to subjective criteria cases. 127 Even more intrigu-
ing is Justice O'Connor's citation to Justice Blackmun's concurrence:
Moreover, we do not believe that each verbal formulation used
in prior opinions to describe the evidentiary standards in dispa-
rate impact cases is automatically applicable in light of today's
decision. Cf. post, at 2791, (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).1
2 8
Justice O'Connor's use of the signal "Cf," generally used to introduce
authority which is sufficiently similar to the author's proposition that the
cited authority lends support to the author's proposition, may indicate
agreement between the plurality and Justice Blackmun's concurrence on
the question of the scope of application of the plurality's standards.
Finally, the specific changes in the evidentiary standards appear to
be adaptations designed to address the unique problems presented by
subjective employment practices, and seem to be unwarranted in the
context of objective practices. The Court recognized that objective cri-
teria can be evaluated by formal validation studies. However, subjective
criteria may not be so scientifically verifiable. Hence, the Court re-ar-
ticulated and arguably relaxed the validation element of the defendant's
rebuttal case.129 This relaxation is clearly intended for subjective crite-
ria cases, and the Court's recognition of the availability of better evi-
dence regarding objective criteria belies any claim that these new
evidentiary standards are meant to apply in the objective criteria con-
text. Also, the plurality expressly required that in cases of mixed subjec-
tive and objective criteria, the specific objectionable practice must be
isolated.' 3 0 The Court did not explain this particular need for specific
identification,13' but it may be surmised that the need to isolate the spe-
cific component is especially necessary in this context because somewhat
different evidentiary standards will apply to different practices depend-
ing on whether they are subjective or objective.
Yet, there are also indications that the new standards are applicable
to all disparate impact cases. The Court recognized that subjective and
objective practices are conceptually similar in that they are facially neu-
tral but may adversely impact a protected class. 132 And the plurality's
discussion of the newly articulated standards referred to "the standards
of proof in disparate impact cases," without limiting the scope of this
phrase to subjective practices. 133 The practical difficulties of distin-
guishing between subjective and objective criteria (particularly in a
multi-component system) and applying two different versions of the
proof model may simply be unworkable.
127. Id. at 2792-97.
128. Id. at 2788 n.2.
129. Id. at 2790.
130. Id. at 2788.
131. Watson was not a case of mixed subjective and objective criteria. It challenged
only subjective criteria.
132. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
133. Id. at 2791.
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In the final analysis, it is most likely that the Court has simply not
decided which, if any, of the newly articulated standards will apply to all
disparate impact cases. And if the plurality is itself divided, or at least
undecided, on the application of its own new standards, this is perhaps
the clearest indication that the Court is in disarray in its approach to
disparate impact.
IV. CONCLUSION
The split of the Watson court and the importance of the Watson is-
sues virtually ensure that the Court will have another occasion to deal
with the disparate impact of subjective criteria.' 3 4 One would hope that
the Court will take the opportunity to deal with the problems raised by
Watson's approach and clarify its ambiguities. The Court should clarify
the following issues: (1) that while a plaintiff must specifically identify
the challenged practice, the entire procedure can be challenged if the
effects of its component parts cannot be separately analyzed; (2)
whether the defendant's burden is one of persuasion or production, and
if production, what quantity of evidence is required; (3) that while vali-
dation studies are not always required, they are the preferred evidence
and should be produced where the challenged practice is amenable to
validation study at reasonable cost; (4) that in stage three, the adequacy
of an alternate practice is determined by balancing the degree of less-
ened impact of the alternative procedure with the degree to which the
alternative procedure would also serve the employer's legitimate needs;
and (5) that the plaintiff need not prove that the alternative procedure
would serve the employer equally as well as the challenged procedure,
so long as it would serve reasonably well.
Until the Court addresses these areas, the language of the plurality
opinion will almost certainly invite inconsistent results in the lower
courts. The three-Justice concurring opinion authored by Justice Black-
mun pinpointed the source of the confusion, as the plurality frequently
affirmed traditional impact standards, then elaborated on those stan-
dards using language drawn from disparate treatment cases.1 3 5 Recon-
ciling these inconsistencies will be a challenging task for the lower
courts. The key to sound interpretation of this plurality opinion is to
look beyond a superficial reading of any single phrase, especially one
which is contradicted by another phrase or by the plurality's favorable
134. Atonio v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 2896 (1988) now pending before the Court, provides one such opportunity. How-
ever, if the Court confines itself to the issues directly presented, many of the issues raised
by Watson will remain open.
135. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791-93. It is argued in Note, Title VII - Disparate Impact
Challenges to Subjective Employment Decisions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 308, 317-20 (1988), that the
plurality is attempting to reframe its basic doctrine of disparate impact analysis; i.e., view-
ing disparate impact as evidence of invidious intent rather than as a prohibited effect with-
out regard to intent. There are hints to that effect in the plurality decision. However, the
language of the plurality and its comprehensive rationale are simply too contradictory and
ambiguous to support a conclusion that Watson has so fundamentally altered disparate
impact doctrine.
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citation of traditional impact cases, to consider the chief object of the
opinion. The plurality is preserving and extending the impact model.
Reading in evidentiary standards which would effectively eviscerate the
model is not consistent with preserving it. However, standards which
are reasonable for objective practices, but impracticable for subjective
practices, may need to be relaxed. The plurality has not specifically de-
fined how this tailoring of the impact model is to be done. That task
now falls to the lower courts, guided by reason and a recognition of the
continuing importance of equal employment opportunity.

DEFENDING MINING CLAIMS AND MINERAL LEASES




A recent development in environmental lawsuits is threatening fed-
eral mining claimants' and federal mineral lessees' interests in federal
public lands. Environmental groups are challenging decisions by the
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and Forest Service that create
property interests or development rights. In a worst case scenario,
courts could find that claimants and lessees never had valid property
interests.
The suits jeopardize the title of thousands of mining claims and
mineral leases. The cases presenting the most striking examples are Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. Burford,I Connor v. Burford,
2 Sierra Club v. Watt, 3
and Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt. 4 From the claimants' and lessees' point
of view, these decisions granted environmental groups sweeping,
though somewhat ill-defined, relief. For example, hundreds of federal
land management decisions have been enjoined in a single action.5
* Attorney, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Denver, Colorado.
1. 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985),preliminary injunction aff'd, 835 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir.
1987), dismissed, No. 85-2238, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-5397
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1988). This suit challenges Federal Land Policy and Management Act
and National Environmental Policy Act procedural compliance for withdrawal revocations
and classification terminations made after January 1, 1981. A preliminary injunction was
issued on February 10, 1986 and affirmed by the court of appeals on December 11, 1987,
barring the government from approving surface disturbing work. The injunction was dis-
solved and the case dismissed for want of standing on November 4, 1988. The merits of
the case have yet to be addressed. For other comment on the case see Lusting, Recent
Struggles for Control of the Public Lands: Shall We "Deliver it up to the Wild Beasts?", 57 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 593, 612-16 (1986) (National Wildlife Federation attorney discusses early develop-
ments in case).
2. 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988),petition for
cert. filed sub nom. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Conner, Nov. 25, 1988. Because an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") was not done for oil and gas lease issuance, the
court set aside the administrative actions that were precursors to lease issuance, placing
the leases in jeopardy. The court of appeals reduced the leases to "rights of first refusal."
848 F.2d at 1447 n.16.
3. 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985). This case set aside the decision of the Secre-
tary of the Interior to remove certain lands from wilderness study. The complaint was
filed in federal district court on January 13, 1983 and decided on April 18, 1985. For
other comment on this case see Lustig, supra note 2.
4. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, 685 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Mont. 1986), af'd, Bob
Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Kohlman v. Bob Marshall Alliance, Nov. 29, 1988. This case is similar to Conner v. Burford,
except there is no issue ofjoinder of absent lessees.
5. Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985) (711 oil and gas leases
affected); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. at 321 ("Hundreds .... perhaps thousands of
varying interests"); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
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The challenges by environmental groups are based on statutes
designed to bring environmental considerations before federal decision-
makers. The National Environmental Policy Act6 ("NEPA") and Federal
Land Policy and Management Act 7 ("FLPMA") sections at issue merely
dictate decision process, and are not intended to mandate land manage-
ment decisions favoring environmentalists.8 The primary interest of en-
vironmental groups such as the Sierra Club 9 and the National Wildlife
Federation' is not procedure. These groups are interested in what is
happening on the land, specifically, whether mineral extraction is de-
grading environmental values. But since a court will more closely re-
view an agency's deviation from mandated procedure than the substance
of the decision itself, the statutes are a potent weapon in the environ-
mental lawyer's arsenal.I' The claimants and lessees are caught in the
middle of the exchange between environmentalists and federal agencies.
Lawsuits that indirectly challenge leases and claims are unlike envi-
ronmental challenges to fixed projects such as highways or dams. Those
affected often times do not know exactly what is at stake. When the chal-
lenge is indirect, unexplored, or partially explored, proper ties have
only speculative value and the claimants and lessees are often unwilling
or unable to engage in a fight with well-heeled environmental public
interest law firms. While the federal government has defended the suits,
their interests and those of the claimants and lessees may diverge. In-
dustry oriented public interest law firms-in particular, Mountain States
Legal Foundation-have represented the claimants and lessees.' 2 But
since the principal parties are public interest firms and the government,
the cases are often argued on a public policy level without concern for a
given piece of private property.
In the context of the four cases mentioned above, this paper ad-
dresses the rights and remedies of claimants and lessees before, during
and after environmental procedural suits that indirectly challenge fed-
eral mining claims and mineral leases.
(7000 claims and 1000 leases affected by 814 agency actions revoking withdrawals or ter-
minating classifications). See also Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466
(9th Cir. 1986) and Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska 1987) (both cases
halting numerous mining operations).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
8. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
9. Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund represents the plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Watt,
608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska
1987); Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, 685 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Mont. 1986); and Northern
Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. The National Wildlife Federation represents the plaintiff in National Wildlife Fed-
eration v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp.
107 (D. Mont. 1985).
11. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
12. Mountain States Legal Foundation represents claimants and lessees in Sierra Club
v. Watt, Connor, National Wildlife Federation, and Bob Marshall Alliance. Pacific Legal Founda-
tion of Sacramento, California, represents the Alaska Miners Association in Northern Alaska
Environmental Center and Sierra Club v. Penfold.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND MINERAL PROPERTY
INTERESTS IN PUBLIC LANDS
Mining claims and mineral leases are at risk in environmental law-
suits against the government because the suits attack the administrative
decisions that created the development rights or property title. An un-
derstanding of how the administrative procedures at issue apply to pub-
lic land decisions is necessary to understand the position of the
claimants and lessees.
A. Administrative Discretion in Creation of Mineral Interests in Public Lands
Public attitudes and political processes combined with vested eco-
nomic interests shaped the nature and means of acquiring mineral inter-
ests in public lands.' 3 In the nineteenth century, the public perceived
the resources of the public lands to be virtually inexhaustible. Because
there was no perceived need for administrative control, mining claim
locators could acquire mineral resources, with the exception of coal,
under the General Mining Law of 1872 by being the first to make a valid
discovery. 14 By today's standards, patents were issued with relative
ease.
In recent years public attitudes have changed; the public and envi-
ronmental groups now demand vigilant administrative control over ex-
traction of resources from public lands. 15 It is now known these
resources are no longer inexhaustible. The law subjects agencies to sub-
stantive and procedural constraints.16 If a procedurally deficient discre-
tionary decision adversely affects members of the public, then they may
sue to have the decision "set aside." The suit may jeopardize a mineral
lease or mining claim based on the underlying decision.
In the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,17 Congress provided the Secre-
tary of the Interior with "discretion" to lease oil, gas and several other
minerals. Today, the Secretary must consider environmental concerns.
The government may place three types of environmental controls on
mineral leases at the lease issuance stage. First, the agency may reject
the lease offer for environmental reasons.18 Second, it may add lease
13. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND ix, 1 (1970); P. GATES, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT chs. I &
XXII (1968); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING ch.4 (2d ed. 1986).
14. General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1982). See generally 1 AMERICAN
LAw OF MINING § 4.08-. 11 (2d ed. 1986) (describes early application of the General Mining
Law).
15. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND ch. 7
(1970).
16. Id.; see Lustig, supra note 1.
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982). In addition to oil and gas the Mineral Leasing Act
covers oil shale, sodium, sulfur and potash. The Acquired Lands Leasing Act of 1947, 30
U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1982), extended the 1920 Act authority to lands acquired by the federal
government.
18. The discretion of the Secretary to reject leases may be limited by FLPMA. See
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980) (holding
that non-action on leases is a defacto withdrawal in violation of FLPMA § 204, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714 (1982), and that FLPMA § 310, 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982) requires that standards for
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stipulations to protect environmental values and require reclamation.19
Third, Congress may restrict or preclude leasing by specific acts 20 or by
riders to appropriations bills which preclude expenditures for lease
processing.
2 '
After a lease is issued, permits are necessary for any kind of surface-
disturbing exploration or development work. 22 For example, oil and
gas leases require approval of an application for a permit to drill
("APD") for any exploratory or development drilling.23 Although a
land manager may be without the discretion to deny a permit, depend-
ing on the lease stipulations, 24 the permit is always subject to terms
which are formulated with the exercise of administrative discretion.
2 5
That exercise of discretion introduces the possibility of environmental
litigation based on environmental and land management procedural
statutes.
Metallic and other "hardrock" minerals continue to be available for
lease rejection be placed in regulations); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 852
F.2d 1223 (D. Wyo. 1988) (same issue). See also Comment, Mining and Mineral Leasing on
Bureau of Land Management Lands During Wilderness Review, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 297 (1982)
(case comment on Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979)); RMOGA v. Andrus,
500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980) (prior to reversal on appeal); and Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980)). See infra notes 226-32 and
accompanying text.
19. See Muys, Shepherd and Smith, Environmental Considerations in Public Lands Mineral
Leasing and Development II, 1-5, 10-14, 19-20, in Proceedings, Public Lands Mineral Leasing;
Issues and Directions, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
Law (June 10-11, 1985) (discussing stipulations); Axline, Private Rights to Public Oil and Gas,
19 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 519-51 (1983) (discussing the validity of environmental protection
stipulations in federal oil and gas leases); Noble, Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands: NEPA
Gets Lost in the Shuffle, 6 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 117, 133-39 (1982) (discussion enforceability
of stipulations); Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and Other
Specially Managed Federal Lands in the United States, 29 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37 (1983)
(good practical overview); Martin, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the
Wilderness Act and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVrL. L. 363,
411-20 (1982) (criticizing use of stipulations). Use of restrictive stipulations must bejusti-
fied by the record before the agency. James M. Chudnow, 76 I.B.L.A. 167, GFS (O&G)
289 (1983). See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying test. In national forests the Secretary
of Agriculture is responsible for surface resources, while the Secretary of Interior has au-
thority over subsurface resources. While the issuance of leases is nominally the responsi-
bility of the Secretary of the Interior, a 1987 amendment to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
gives the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to veto leases on national forest lands. 30
U.S.C. § 226(h) (1982).
20. E.g., The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982) (precludes leasing in des-
ignated wilderness areas after Dec. 31, 1983).
21. E.g., Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 308, 98 Stat. 1871 (1985).
22. FLPMA § 302(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982); 43 C.F.R. pt. 3045 (1986). See also 1
LAw OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 16.05[2], 16.05[4], 17.05 (1986) (geophysical
activities and bond requirements). Permits to do surface disturbing work on national for-
est lands are covered by 36 C.F.R. § 251.50-251.64 (1986) and FOREST SERVICE MANUAL
§ 2820.
23. 43 C.F.R. subpt. 3162 (1986). See generally 1 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
§ 16.07[l][c] (1986).
24. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stipulations giving
authority to deny later activity approved); Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915 (D.
Wyo. 1985) (stipulations giving authority to deny later activity approved).
25. E.g., 614 F. Supp. at 915.
[Vol. 66:2
MINING CLAIMS AND MINERAL LEASES
location under the General Mining Law of 1872.26 A claimant benefits
from the location system because the discretion of administrators is se-
verely limited. Until the 1960's, a claimant could locate a claim, make a
discovery, and proceed to patent without encountering a discretionary
decision by a land manager.27 Without the exercise of administrative
discretion the environmental procedures could not apply.
2 8
More recently, agencies have been given limited authority to exer-
cise discretion over activities conducted under the Mining Law. The
substantive mandates of the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897,29 Sur-
face Resources Act of 1955,30 and FLPMA3 1 are examples. Under these
acts, Forest Service and BLM administrators may exercise a limited, but
significant, amount of discretion to prevent "undue degradation" or
damage of surface resources. Regulations now require a "plan of opera-
tions" for most surface-disturbing work on unpatented federal mining
claims. The agency reviews the "plan," and in its discretionary power,
imposes conditions to prevent unacceptable surface damage.3 2 While
normally a land manager may not totally deny operations on mining
claims,3 3 any conditions imposed on the plan involve administrative dis-
cretion and the consequent procedural restrictions, including the possi-
bility of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") under NEPA.
3 4
26. 30 U.S.C. § 22-54 (1982). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING tit. IV (2d ed.
1986) (comprehensive discussion of requirement of current location system).
27. See Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, 227 (1904) (valid
claim segregates property from public domain and makes it the property of the locator
through patent).
28. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 714 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
822 (1980) (patent issuance is a ministerial act). South Dakota v. Andrus is being challenged,
at least indirectly, in a current suit by the State of Colorado. Lamm v. Hodel, No. 87-F-
190 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 4, 1987).
29. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34-36 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 475-82, 551 (1982)). Discretionary administration was introduced with the promulga-
tion of regulations by the Forest Service in 1974.
30. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1982). See United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Surface Use Act of 1955 does not restrict activity reasonably incident to min-
ing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1982) (department shall take action necessary to prevent
unnecessary and undue degradation of lands). Regulations interpreting this provision for
activity conducted pursuant to the General Mining Law are found at 36 C.F.R. pt. 228 and
43 C.F.R. subpts. 3802 & 3809. See generally Kimball, Impact of BLM Surface Management
Regulations on Exploration and Mining Operations, 28 RocKY MTN. L. INST. 509, 563-70 (1982).
32. Forest Service regulations are found at 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4, 228.8 (1986). BLM
regulations are found at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802.1, 3809.1-3809.2 (1986).
33. Opinion of Solicitor Coldiron, 88 I.D. 909 (October 5, 1981); United States v.
Weiss, 642 F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1980) (regulations based on Organic Act of 1897 must
be reasonable). FLPMA §§ 302(b), 601(f) & 603, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732(b), 1781(f), & 1782
(1982), provide for amendment to the General Mining Law. Of these, section 603 will
have the most significant impact on a plan of operations. See, e.g., Keith R. Kummerfeld,
74 I.B.L.A. 106, GFS (Min) 165 (1983).
34. See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-6(a)(2) (1986) (BLM lands); 36 C.F.R. § 228.5(a)(3) (1986)
(Forest Service lands).
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B. Procedural Constraints on the Exercise of Administrative Discretion
1. The Administrative Procedure Act and Standards of Review
To date, judicial review authorized by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), section 10(3),3 5 has been the sole means of obtaining judi-
cial relief for violations of environmental and land management proce-
dure.3 6 For example, if a plaintiff alleges an agency violation of NEPA,
then the plaintiff must prove that the agency action fails to comply with
NEPA when judged by the standards of review found in the APA. If the
agency's action does not meet the APA review standards, then the APA
authorizes the court to "set aside" the action.
3 7
Under the traditional standard, judicial review is limited. A court
may "set aside" discretionary agency actions only where they are "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."'3 8 The decision will stand unless it is a clear error of judg-
ment, did not consider the relevant factors, or was made in reliance on
prohibited considerations.3 9 The "arbitrary and capricious" standard
normally applies to adjudications of decisions to execute an agency ac-
tion or judgment of factual determinations by agencies.
40
For procedural violations, the APA provides that a court may set
aside an agency action for failure to comply with "procedure required by
law."' 4 1 In the absence of a statutorily prescribed standard of review, the
courts have upheld agency actions if the procedural compliance is
"reasonable."
4 2
It is unclear which standard should apply to review of compliance
with procedural statutes like NEPA. In preparation of NEPA docu-
ments, such as environmental assessments ("EA") or EISs, an agency
must exercise its discretion in many substantive ways. For example, it
must explain the facts of environmental impact, decide the scope of the
proposal, and decide how to contact the public. Yet the entire effort is
"procedural."'43 The result of this mix of substance and procedure is a
35. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
36. See 5 B. MEZINES,J. STEIN,J. BRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 4502 (1985) (APA only
grants right to judicial review; jurisdiction depends on an outside statutory source).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
39. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
40. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlan, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
APA review may have a substantive impact on cases. For example, in Sierra Club v. Watt,
the court overturned Secretary Watt's decision to exclude tracts of less than 5,000 acres
from wilderness study because the record reflected that Watt relied on an incorrect inter-
pretation of section 603 of FLPMA. 608 F. Supp. 305, 342 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See Lustig,
Recent Struggles for Control of Public Lands: Shall We "Deliver it up to the Wild Beasts?", 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 593, 616-22 (1986) (National Wildlife Federation attorney discusses the
decision in Sierra Club v. Watt).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982).
42. Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d
1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982); Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st
Cir. 1979); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
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split in the circuits on which standard of review should apply.
Some circuits judge the threshold decision on whether to prepare
an EIS, and even some factual disputes involving EAs or EISs, by the
reasonableness standard. Other circuits use the more narrow arbitrary
and capricious standard. 44 The use of different standards for similar
procedural statutes within the same circuit, plus the application of an
additional "hard look" standard in environmental cases, compounds the
problem. 4 5 In many cases, the result of this apparent split is unclear:
But it does appear that courts in the "reasonableness" circuits have
more discretion to overturn agency decisions and thus create uncer-
tainty for claimants and lessees.
2. The Environmental Statutes
NEPA is foremost among the environmental statutes that affect
mineral property interests in public lands. The purpose of NEPA's EIS
requirements is to fully inform federal decision-makers of the relevant
environmental concerns4 6 attendant to discretionary administrative de-
cisions. The EIS is merely a procedure, which, if properly done, does
not affect the agency's discretion as to the substance of the ultimate
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc).
44. See Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985) (White,J., dissenting), denying cert. to Gee v.
Hudson, 746 F.2d 1471 (4th Cir. 1984) (describes split in circuits on whether arbitrary and
capricious standard should be applied to NEPA questions). See also Shea, The Judicial Stan-
dard of Review for Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decision, 9 B.C. ENV'rL. AFF. L. REV.
63 (1980); Comment, Shall We Be Arbitrary of Reasonable: Standards of Review for Agency
Threshold Decisions Under NEPA, 19 AKRON L. REV. 685 (1986). An agency will be given
deference for decisions involving technical and scientific matters. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983); Friends of Endan-
gered Species v.Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985). In application, there may be
little difference between the two standards.
45. For example, the Ninth Circuit applies a reasonableness standard to most, if not
all, NEPA related decisions. E.g., Friends of Endangered Species v.Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
985 (9th Cir. 1985) (reasonableness standard purportedly applied but cases from circuits
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard cited); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep
v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982) (reasonableness
standard applied). At the same time the Ninth Circuit has chosen to use the arbitrary and
capricious standard in judging the equally procedural consultation requirements of ESA.
Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 611 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court
addressed review of the scrutiny an agency has given to considerations mandated by envi-
ronmental procedural statutes in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402
(1971). The "hard look" requirement was first applied in Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and later used or mentioned in Supreme Court decisions.
See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97-100
(1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). The "hard look" has be-
come a judicial standard of review for environmental cases, but it has received some criti-
cism. See McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look: A New Standard for Judicial Review, 2 NATURAL
RESOURCES & ENV'T 32, 68 (1986) (courts should take a less intrusive role); Wald, Making
"Informed" Decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982) (D.C.
Circuit judge argues that because it is impossible for courts to become adequately in-
formed, they should not substitute theirjudgment for that of the agencies). See generally D.
MANDELKER, NEPA: LAW AND LrrIGATION § 3:07 (1984).
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) ("NEPA procedures must insure that environmental in-
formation is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made").
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decision. 4 7
The actual wording of NEPA's EIS requirement is deceptively sim-
ple. The statute requires an EIS to accompany any proposal for a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.4 8 Past disputes have most often involved the following: what
constitutes a "proposal;" what is the required scope of that proposal;
and whether an impact is "significant."
Because an EIS is a time consuming, expensive, and politically risky
undertaking, there is tremendous incentive to avoid producing one.
Consequently, if it is not readily apparent to an agency that the impact
of an action is "significant," then it will be inclined to do an EA. In
theory, an EA's purpose is to determine whether the action is significant
and requires an EIS. 4 9 If the EA discloses that the proposed action is
insignificant, as it usually does, then the agency will make a Finding of
No Significant Impact5 ° ("FONSI"). If a type of action is almost always
insignificant, then the agency may avoid the obligation to do an EA by
use of a "categorical exclusion." 5' To meet the requirements of NEPA
and the regulations, an agency must rely on either an EIS, an EA and
FONSI, or a "categorical exclusion."
'52
The NEPA counts in the suits discussed in the paper have ques-
tioned the agency's determination how many future or related actions
should be included in the NEPA review. The issue is the "scope of the
action."' 5 3 In each case, the agency chose to consider a scope of action
that did not, by the agency's interpretation, reach the threshold "signifi-
cant" level. In each case, environmental groups argued that the NEPA
review should have considered other actions, either possible future ac-
tions or other actions in the area, and therefore, an EIS, a programmatic
EIS, or a regional EIS was required.
5 4
A number of more specialized statutes have adapted the informa-
47. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978). See Pollock, Reimaging NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists, 9 HARV. ENv-rL.
L. REV. 359, 392-95 (1985) (because review is primarily procedural rather than substan-
tive, the effect of NEPA will be primarily delay); but see Weinstein, Substantive Review under
NEPA after Vermont Yankee IV, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 937 (1985) (argues the Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), will support a significant
aspect of substantive review attributable to NEPA).
48. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1986).
51. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)(2), 1508.4, 1507.3(b)(2)(ii) (1986). Even a categorically
excluded action may be subject to the EA or EIS requirements if it has an impact that
warrants such considerations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986).
52. See Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827-29 (9th Cir. 1986) (requirement of rea-
soned explanation not met for actions falling outside of categorical exclusion, but not
having an EA or EIS).
53. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1986) (regulations define scope). See generally R.
MANDELKER, supra note 45, at ch. 9 (discusses scope of NEPA review). See infra notes 83-90
and accompanying text.
54. For example, in National Wildlife Federation, Northern Alaska Environmental Center and
Penfold, the plaintiffs argued that a programmatic or regional EIS was required to consider
cumulative impacts. In Bob Marshall Alliance and Connor, plaintiffs argued, and the court
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tion procedural style of NEPA. For example, section 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act 55 ("ESA") requires that when agencies make
decisions affecting threatened or endangered species, the agency must
consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The ESA dif-
fers from NEPA since separate provisions mandate that if actions place
threatened or endangered species at risk, then the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice must issue a jeopardy decision and the agency must mitigate the
consequences or halt the project. 56 If there is no risk to threatened or
endangered species, then the Fish and Wildlife Service will issue a "no
jeopardy" opinion and the project may proceed. Another example is
section 810 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
57
("ANILCA") which requires that federal agencies review impacts on
subsistence hunting and fishing prior to making land management deci-
sions in Alaska. 58
Because each of these statutes may be viewed as requiring a special-
ized type of environmental impact statement, the courts and parties in
environmental procedural suits have applied arguments and analysis de-
veloped in consideration of the NEPA claims. 59 Perhaps as a conse-
quence, the briefs of the parties and the opinions of the courts have
treated ESA consolation and ANILCA section 810 claims as secondary
or subsidiary to NEPA claims. Another reason ESA claims are subsidi-
ary to NEPA claims is because the heightened "reasonableness" stan-
dard of review has not been applied in ESA cases.60
3. The Land Management Statutes
Because the National Forest Management Act 6i and FLPMA6 2 con-
agreed, that the scope of review should have included full field development with lease
issuance. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
55. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 93 Stat. 1225 (1973) (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1549 (1982)) (section 7 codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)). See
Martin, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Endan-
gered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVrL. L. 363, 390-96 (1982) (discusses
the intent of the Endangered Species Act and court decisions interpreting that act in the
context of the Mineral Leasing Act).
56. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (highest priority is ac-
corded protection of endangered species).
57. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982)) (section 810 codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 3120). The importance of section 810 was apparently overlooked in commentary on
ANILCA shortly after it was passed.
58. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Kunaknana v. Clark,
742 F.2d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 1984). While section 810's procedural requirement of in-
forming the decision maker is similar to NEPA's, there are important substantive differ-
ences between the general environmental concerns of NEPA and the substantive concerns
of section 810. Consequently, one will not substitute for the other.
The relationship of section 810 and NEPA may be of critical importance in interpret-
ing the Supreme Court's Village of Gambell decision. That decision invalidated a Ninth Cir-
cuit standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction that had been applied to both
ANILCA and NEPA.
59. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. See, e.g., Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1984) ("nor-
mal" arbitrary and capricious standard applies).
61. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949
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tain numerous procedural requirements for discretionary land manage-
ment decisions, they also provide numerous bases for environmental
procedural suits. 6 3 One of the pending suits, National Wildlife Federa-
tion,64 involves the following FLPMA provisions: (1) the requirement
that agencies set forth standards for land management decisions in regu-
lations;6 5 (2) the requirement that the agencies provide, in regulations,
the opportunity for public participation; 6 6 (3) the provisions governing
withdrawal revocation procedure; 67 (4) the provisions governing classifi-
cation termination procedure; 68 and (5) the concept of "multiple
use." 69 Although National Wildlife Federation contains a sampling of the
potential problem areas of FLPMA, it is not exhaustive. Parts of
FLPMA, including the withdrawal revocation provision at issue in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, are very complex, and confusing.
70
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 71 ("OCSLA") is important
because many of the issues in the onshore environmental procedural
suits have already been litigated for offshore lease sales. 72 Nevertheless,
the Connor7 3 court rejected the application of offshore precedents
thereby allowing staged review under both NEPA and ESA to onshore
situation.74 Application of offshore precedent would have allowed sepa-
(1976), Forest and Rangeland Resource Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-378, 88 Stat. 477
(1974) (codified together at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982)).
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982).
63. E.g., Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (notice and
hearing requirements for withdrawals, FLPMA § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1982)); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (withdrawal revocation and
classification termination procedure). See also Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus,
499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980) (lessees base suit on failure of withdrawal proce-
dure, see supra note 18).
64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
65. Section 310, 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982).
66. Section 309, 43 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982).
67. Sections 204(a), (i) & (1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a)(i)(1) (1982).
68. Section 202(d), 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982).
69. Sections 103(c), 302(a), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1732(a) (1982). The concept of
"multiple use" is a substantive mandate of FLPMA rather than a procedural one.
70. In light of the National Vildlife Federation suit, the most apparent example of this is
the withdrawal "termination" provisions of section 204(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1) (1982). A
very plausible reading of this twisted section seems to indicate that all terminations or
revocations, no matter how small, must be submitted by Congress. This puts section
204(1) in conflict with sections 204(a) and (i), 43 U.S.C. § 17 14(a) & (i) (1982), which seem
to provide other means of "revocation" of withdrawals for routine administration of the
public lands. See Opinion of Associate Solicitor, Scope of Withdrawal Review Provisions of
FLPMA § 204(1) (Oct. 30, 1980). Further examination of the legislative history of
FLPMA, including predecessor bills, indicates that Congress only intended that major ter-
minations be sent to Congress. See H.R. Rep. 92-1306, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1972).
Perhaps because of its complicated and tenuous nature, the legislative history arguments
have not been fully considered in National Wildlife Federation.
71. 43 U.S.C. §§ 331-1356 (1982).
72. E.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531(1987) (addressing stan-
dards for preliminary injunctions in NEPA and ANILCA suits); Village of False Pass v.
Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984) (addressing ESA standard of review and EIS content
for staged review); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (staged
review under ESA).
73. Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd 848 F.2d 1441 (9th
Cir. 1988).
74. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1456-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
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rate NEPA consideration of exploration and would have been a profita-
ble victory for the government. A principle reason for rejecting
application of offshore precedent is that the Minerals Management Ser-
vice retains the authority to cancel leases for environmental reasons
7 5
and compensate the lessees by returning unrecovered payments up to
the amount of the lessee's bonus and rental payments.
76
C. Summary
The rights of claimants and lessees to develop minerals on the fed-
eral lands has been increasingly restricted by the discretion of federal
land administrators. Those administrators are bound by numerous pro-
cedures which may serve as the bases of suits by groups or individuals
unhappy with the substance of the agencies' decisions. The claimant or
lessee is placed in a position of relying on the regularity of the decisions
of federal land administrators to be assured of his property interest.
III. THE MERITS: DEFENDING AGENCY COMPLIANCE
The central issues in the environmental procedural suits are
whether the agencies complied with required procedure. Accordingly,
claimants and lessees are forced to evaluate the sufficiency of agency
procedural compliance when they accept approval of a lease or mining
plan of operations. If an environmental group alleges that an agency
has failed to comply with mandated procedure, then claimants and les-
sees must defend the government. A few of the more troublesome
points affecting the cases discussed in this paper are addressed below.
A. Program or Regional Compliance Versus Project Compliance
The type of procedural failure that is the most sweeping and hard-
est for the lessees and claimants to detect is a failure of programmatic or
regional environmental compliance. Such failure may jeopardize the
most regular appearing agency action.7 7 For example, in National Wild-
life Federation, the plaintiff argues that because the agency had no
programmatic regulations 78 and no programmatic EIS, 79 hundreds of
75. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982), 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1986). See also 2 LAW OF FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASES § 25.06[4] (1986) (discussing cancellation provisions for offshore
leases). Another distinction between onshore and offshore situations is that an EIS is done
at each stage of leasing, exploration, or development under OCSLA. At least one com-
mentator thinks this may be a requirement of the Act. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 45,
§ 2:23 (arguing that an EIS is required). See also Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464
U.S. 312, 335-40 (1984) (describes OCSLA review stages).
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(c) (1982).
77. For general information on NEPA programmatic EIS requirements, see D.
MANDELKER, supra note 45, § 9:02-08; Barney, The Programmatic Environmental Impact State-
ment and the National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1981).
The Council on Environmental Quality regulations provide guidance for programmatic
statements at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(b), 1508.18(b)(3) (1986).
78. Amended Complaint, Count V, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271, (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction afftd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
79. Id., Count IV.
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withdrawal revocations and classification terminations done by the BLM
over a four and one-half year period were invalid. This was despite the
fact that the important actions had site specific NEPA documentation
and public participation.
8 0
NEPA contains no specific programmatic or regional EIS require-
ments. The requirements merely serve as part of the review of a single
action's cumulative impact. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court
stated that project review which covered all of the relevant concerns
would suffice, even if a required regional EIS had not been done.8 1 In
light of recent decisions, this principal has not been recognized, and
mineral lessees or claimants should not rely on it. 82 A failure of
programmatic rulemaking requirements of FLPMA may have a similar
effect.
8 3
B. Scope of NEPA Consideration
The courts have taken two approaches to the question of how much
future development the agencies must consider in NEPA review of min-
eral exploration. First, for mining exploration 84 and oil and gas explo-
ration in the Tenth Circuit, 85 the agency may restrict the scope of the
action to the proposal itself and need not consider later stages such as
development and production.
The argument that persuaded courts in the above situations was
that subsequent stages of development are so speculative as to fall
outside of the ambit of NEPA. For example, in the overthrust belt areas
that were considered in the oil and gas leasing cases, lessees drill wildcat
wells on only about twenty-five percent of the leases, and only about two
80. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12-41, id. (describes general compliance and gives detail for one
area where the plaintiff alleged specific injury).
The two level nature of procedural compliance is dramatically illustrated by the
Northland dredging case. Tulkisarmute Native Community v. Conquerwood, No. 85-604
CIV (D. Alaska). Environmental groups unsuccessfully challenged the NEPA compliance
for a plan of operations of a remote Alaskan placer mining operation in an action before
the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA"). Tulkisarmute Native Community Council,
et. al., 88 I.B.L.A. 210, GFS (Min) 125 (1985). They then appealed the IBLA decision to
the federal district court. In the meantime, another environmental group challenged all
approvals of placer mining in Alaska based on the failure of state-wide NEPA procedures
to mandate an EIS. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska 1987).' For a time,
Northland was faced with the prospect of losing its right to operate in two different simul-
taneous court actions challenging compliance with the same statute.
81. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 407 n.16, 414 n.26 (1976).
82. E.g., National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club v. Penford, and Northern Alaska Envtl.
Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (all involve allegations of programmatic
failure without examination of site-specific compliance).
83. See Order of December 4, 1985, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238) (failure to make rules for public participation in manage-
ment of public lands is basis for preliminary injunction).
84. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff'd, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
85. Park County Resource Council v. United States Dept. of Agric., 817 F.2d 609,
622-24 (10th Cir. 1987).
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to three percent of the leases are ever developed.8 6 Odds of actual de-
velopment are even less for mining leases.
In the second approach, adopted by the District of Columbia and
Ninth Circuits for oil and gas leases, if the agency retains discretion to
preclude significant impacts caused by later stages of development, then
NEPA review need not consider these stages. An agency may retain dis-
cretion by use of stipulations, by regulatory provisions, or by statute.
Conditional No Surface Occupancy ("CNSO") or contingent right stipu-
lations may allow for preclusion of surface disturbing activity or for out-
right cancellation of a lease for environmental reasons. 8 7 Conner and
Sierra Club v. Peterson specifically approved the use of CNSO stipulations
to obviate the need for NEPA review of anything more than leasing at
the lease issuance stage.8 8 Offshore leasing cases already rely on this
rationale to permit staged or tiered NEPA review since the regulations
and OCSLA give the agency the authority to cancel leases for environ-
mental reasons. 8 9 An EIS must be done before surface disturbing activi-
ties are allowed. 90
This "early application" makes sense in theory, but as a practical
matter, it would have little effect other than to increase paperwork.
Surely, if pre-exploration decisions contemplate the environmental dis-
turbance of full field development, then they must also contemplate the
benefits of petroleum reserves; otherwise the decisions will be arbitrary
and capricious. The value of such reserves would be a sound basis for
the agency decision in all conceivable instances. Hence the full field EIS
would be little more than an expensive formality, and one that was use-
less in the ninety-eight percent of leases that never produce.
This application of NEPA has another, potentially more significant,
effect. In the past, multiple use mandates for public lands presumed
that all land was open to mineral development unless the agencies had
taken specific action to withdraw it.a ' Now, by application of NEPA pro-
cess, including consideration of a "no action" alternative, the lands are
effectively considered closed, and may be opened to exploration at the
discretion of administrators.
86. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, OIL AND GAS GUIDE, NORTHERN REGION 16 (2d
ed. 1981).
87. See Muys, Shepherd and Smith, supra note 19 (excellent general discussion of stip-
ulations including CNSO stipulations); Edelson, The Management of Oil and Gas Leasing on
Federal Wilderness Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 905, 940-50 (1983) (discusses CNSO
stipulation and the district court ruling in Sierra Club v. Peterson prior to reversal by the
court of appeals). Leases that originally contained a CNSO stipulation were not appealed
by the Sierra Club, and consequently were not technically at issue. Sierra Club v. Peter-
son, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The circuit court stated that an EIS or a bind-
ing stipulation was required to meet the requirements of NEPA. Id. at 1415. See infra
notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
88. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Peter-
son, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
89. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
90. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446.
91. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980).
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C. Rulemaking and Public Participation under FLPMA and NFMA
Both FLPMA and NFMA contain requirements for public participa-
tion. Section 309(e) of FLPMA92 is the most confusing. If the merits of
the National Wildlife Federation case are ever decided and the interpreta-
tion of the district court is upheld, then an administrator may have to
solicit public comment, through regulation, on "execution" of the small-
est of agency actions if the actions involve "management of public
lands." Despite the fact that the important withdrawal revocations and
classification terminations at issue in National Wildlife Federation were ac-
companied by public participation in the local area of the land action,
the court was unaware of that public participation and enjoined the ac-
tions for failure of public participation. 9 3 Section 309 mandates public
participation by procedures established in regulations, and there were
no such regulations. Consequently, the court had no trouble in finding,
without examination of specific BLM case files, that there was evidence
of probable success on the merits sufficient to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion.9 4 The court enjoined actions as diverse as removal of overlapping
withdrawals within national parks and the opening of land to mineral
entry.9 5 Apparently, to the court, this is the type of programmatic fail-
ure which no amount of local compliance will cure.
Section 310 of FLPMA 96 states that "[the Secretary, with respect to
the public lands, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Section 310 came into play in National Wildlife
Federation when the plaintiffs argued that the BLM should have incorpo-
rated procedures for withdrawal review into regulations. 9 7 The alleged
requirement was not at all apparent to the BLM. In 1978, the Legisla-
tive and Regulatory Management Division of BLM rejected draft regula-
tions governing withdrawal review because they were instructions to the
92. In exercising his authorities under this Act, the Secretary, by regulation, shall
establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give the
Federal, State and local governments and the public adequate notice and an op-
portunity to comment upon the formulation of standards and criteria for, and to
participate in, the preparation and execution of plans and programs for, and the
management of, the public lands.
43 U.S.C. § 1739(e) (1982).
NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a), contains slightly less encompassing public participation
language which has yet to be at issue in any litigation.
93. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12-45, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271
(D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing public participation process generally and in the General Mountain Pass, Wyo-
ming area).
94. Memorandum and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction December 4, 1985 at
17-18. Id. It should be noted thatJudge Williams took strong exception to this finding in
his dissent to the court of appeal's opinion upholding the preliminary injunction. 835
F.2d at 327. It is not inconceivable that the district court could have been swayed by this
strong opinion.
95. Affidavit of Joseph Martyak, Exhibit to Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay [of
order of Feb. 10, 1986] Pending Appeal, id.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982).
97. Amended Complaint, Count V, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238).
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agency rather than the public, and thus belonged in the BLM Manual
rather than the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 The courts have yet to
decide the validity of this argument, but it is not entirely without merit
since the BLM may reasonably intend some manual provisions to imple-
ment the purposes of FLPMA.
The strict interpretation of the rulemaking requirement advanced
by the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation is not in harmony with the
general principals of administrative law or past court interpretations of
FLPMA. Normally, there is no obligation that regulations duplicate, or
unnecessarily elaborate, on standards expressed in statutes.9 9 The Si-
erra Club v. Watt court's finding of a lack of necessity for rules to imple-
ment Section 603 of FLPMA is an example.10 0 The problem will remain
until the courts have settled the rulemaking and public participation
requirements.
IV. PROCEDURAL DEFENSES OF MINERAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
IN PUBLIC LANDS
If mineral lessees and claimants wish to protect their rights, then
they must go beyond arguing the adequacy of the agency's compliance
and take advantage of any procedural defenses. Often these are among
the most effective ways to protect property in public policy suits. Les-
sees and claimants should not assume they will be necessary parties or
be notified of pending litigation.' 0 1 Furthermore, if they do not partici-
pate, then they may lose their rights without ever having those rights
defended in court.
Where claimants' or lessees' property rights are at stake, a court will
normally grant their petition for intervention.' 0 2 In general, neither the
government nor environmental groups will oppose intervention so long
as the claimants or lessees petition to intervene prior to judgment.'
0 3
98. Affidavit I B of Frank Edwards at 5, Accompanying Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id. The draft proposed regu-
lations interpreting FLPMA § 204(l), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(i) (1982).
99. 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN &J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 1510 (1985).
100. 608 F. Supp. 305, 330 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See also Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel,
790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (no insistence on strict formal FLPMA hearing procedures in
designation of birds of prey conservation area). It is not inconceivable that there will be
another standard for mineral extractors.
101. Lessees in Connor found out about the suit after judgment. In National Wildlife
Federation, the plaintiff argued that Federal Register notice was inadequate notice to pro-
tect their interest, despite the fact that they read and commented regularly on Federal
Register notices. Ironically, the court agreed and then ordered its preliminary injunction
to be publicized through the Federal Register. In general, if a preliminary injunction is
issued, then a claimant or lessee will be informed of the suit and injunction when they
apply for any kind of permit or plan approval. Leases may be suspended. If there is no
injunction then operations may be permitted and no notice given.
102. See generally 70 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 1906-23 (2d ed. 1986).
103. There was no opposition to intervention by Mountain States Legal Foundation in
National Wildlife Federation or Sierra Club v. Watt, or to Placid Oil Company when they ac-
quired a lease in the area affected by the Bob Marshall Alliance suit. The plaintiffs in Connor
did object to intervention by lessees and Mountain States. ASARCO, Inc. was denied in-
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Once in the case, the claimants or lessees should take advantage of pro-




A defendant in any public policy environmental suit should first
consider questioning the standing of the plaintiff to bring the suit.
These suits approach the nature of generalized grievances that the
standing requirement is supposed to keep out of the courts.
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to "cases or controversies," and the courts have formulated a se-
ries ofjudicial tests to determine whether a plaintiff's grievance rises to
the level necessary for standing.' 0 5 The requirements are: (1) "injury
in fact;"' 10 6 (2) "fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct;"' 0 7 (3) redressability of the injury by
the relief sought;' 0 8 and (4) the claim must fall into the "zone of inter-
est" protected by the statute in question.' 0 9 These requirements must
be supported by more than mere allegations in the pleadings, and must
be provable at trial."10
The high point of standing in environmental cases was United States
v. SCRAP."' 1 The Supreme Court allowed a group of law students to
claim standing for an attenuated series of possibilities which the stu-
dents argued would mean that an increase in rail freight rates would
raise the prices students paid and thereby cause them injury. 1 2 Be-
cause SCRAP was decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the Court did not question the seemingly far-fetched scenario. It did set
tervention in National Wildlife Federation in July 1988. Apparently the court believed that
the suit had progressed so far that ASARCO's application was untimely.
104. Those defenses will be different for each claimant or lessee depending on his situ-
ation. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3531. to 3531.16 (2d ed. 1984). The Interior Board of
Land Appeals will also apply a standing requirement. See Mark A. Altman, 983 I.B.L.A.
265, GFS (O&G) 95 (1986) (rejecting standing for generalized grievance).
106. "The injury alleged must be, for example, 'distinct and palpable,' Gladstone Real-
tors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
501), and not 'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. [95], [101] (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974))." Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Injury in fact is also required to be personal injury. Purely
associational injury in the situation, without an allegation of personal injury by an agency
action, was rejected in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972). Associational
standing has almost crept back into the case law. See Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc.
v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985) (implying in dicta that a larger, better organ-
ized organization might have standing). Any such development would work to National
Wildlife Federation's benefit, but would be unlikely to stand up to more thorough
argument.
107. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978).
108. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
109. This requirement exists when a challenge is brought under a particular statute.
Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
110. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 678-80.
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forth a process by which defendants in future cases could raise the issue
of fallacious allegations of standing. The process included motion for
more definite statement, discovery of standing facts, and motion for
summary judgment if the facts contained in amended pleadings and dis-
covery do not meet the requirements of the judicial test."
5s
Since judicial review under the APA is limited to review of "agency
actions,"' 14 each action should constitute a claim for which the plaintiff
must independently plead and prove standing. Standing for one claim
will not give standing for another.' '5
Single agency actions do not present a complicated standing prob-
lem. There is no question that the decision of an administrator to issue
an oil and gas lease, as in Bob Marshall Alliance, is an "agency action" and
a claim subject to challenge under APA. If that action injures a plaintiff,
then there will be standing. The decision of Secretary Watt contested in
Sierra Club v. Watt 116 seems to fall easily into the definition of an order,
and is consequently a challengeable "agency action." Injury from this
order could take place at many sites across the country.
In cases where the only line between different agency actions is the
same or similar procedure or program, a more difficult problem, and a
possible defense, is presented. If an agency takes two actions using the
same deficient procedure, then will injury by one action give standing to
challenge the other? For example, in National Wildlife Federation, if a pro-
cedurally deficient withdrawal revocation in Florida injures the plaintiff,
does he have standing to challenge a withdrawal revocation in Alaska
where he has never been?
The Supreme Court's recent standing case, Allen v. Wright, t I7 ad-
dressed a situation analogous to the programmatic challenges in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation. The Court denied standing to black parents who
claimed that IRS procedures for granting tax exemptions to segregated
private schools were deficient."18 Although the Court characterized the
alleged injury as serious, it rejected standing on the ground that the
injury was not traceable to individual plaintiffs.' '9 The Court further
reasoned that because the injury depended on the actions of third par-
ties and was otherwise speculative, the causation was too attenuated and
the "fairly traceable" element was further weakened. 120 None of the
plaintiffs could claim personal injury. The Court used analysis of con-
siderations, such as separation of powers, that had formerly been pru-
113. Id. at 689 n.15.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982).
115. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 746 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984)
(standing must be proven for each claim); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (standing must be proven for each claim), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
933 (1976).
116. 608 F. Supp. 305, 311-13 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
117. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
118. Id. at 741-45.
119. Id. at 753-56.
120. 468 U.S. 737, 758-59 (1984).
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
dential considerations, in interpreting the fairly traceable element. 12 '
The Court found that standing issues in challenges to agency programs
are "rarely if ever appropriate for federal court adjudication."' 
2 2
The analogy between Allen and National Wildlife Federation is particu-
larly pronounced. In National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff, on the ba-
sis of programmatic failure, asked the court to set aside virtually all
agency actions revoking withdrawals or terminating classifications over
the previous four and one-half year period. There were 814 specific
agency actions listed in the complaint.' 23 Because the various agencies
involved intended many of the actions to enhance environmental val-
ues, 12 4 these actions would seem, as a matter of common sense, to fail
the case or controversy requirement of article III.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals, in upholding the preliminary in-
junction, found that injury need not be shown for all 814 actions.
12 5
The court seemed to be relying on the programmatic challenge. Ac-
cordingly, the tough standard of Allen should apply.
In dismissing the National Wildlife Federation case for failure to prove
standing, the district court did not find it necessary to apply the height-
ened standard for programmatic standing set forth in Allen. Instead, the
district court relied on a recent analogous District of Columbia circuit
case involving public land actions over huge areas of Alaska.
In Wilderness Society v. Griles,12 6 the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia set forth a standard to prove standing where an environ-
mental plaintiff claims injury by the actions of third parties on public
lands. The purpose of the test in Wilderness Society is to determine
"whether the plaintiff's future conduct will occur at the same location as
the [mineral developer's] response to the challenged government ac-
tion."' 12 7 It must show: (1) where the land subject to the challenged
land actions are located; (2) that third parties will take actions on that
land; and, (3) that the plaintiff or its members use that land and will thus
be injured there.1
2 8
The district court found that the cursory "boilerplate"-like affidavits
121. Id. at 759-61. This development has been criticized as somehow making the con-
cept of standing more irrational. See Nichol, Abusing Standings. A Comment on Allen v. Wright,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (criticizing the addition of separation of powers doctrine to
standing); Note, Muddying the Unclear Waters of Standing, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (1985)
(court should not have used separation of powers to explain "fairly traceable" element).
The criticism seems unjustified in environmental policy suits which, in many respects, may
be more the province of Congress anyway.
122. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984).
123. Exhibit A to Amended Complaint, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238),preliminary injunction aff d. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
124. See Affidavit ofJoseph Martyak, Exhibit to Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay [of
order of Feb. 10, 1986] Pending Appeal, id.
125. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
126. 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 12.
128. National Wildlife Federation, 835 F.2d at 329 (Williams, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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submitted by the Wildlife Federation were not adequate to meet the test
of Wilderness Society.' 29 The district court's dismissal on summary judg-
ment was not a complete surprise since the court of appeals had found
the Wildlife Federation's standing proof to be minimally sufficient to de-
fend against a motion to dismiss where all presumptions are accorded
the plaintiff.' 3 0 The district court had also requested supplemental
briefing on standing. The court of appeals later rejected the Wildlife
Federation's requests for summary reversal and for reinstatement of the
injunction pending appeal.13'
While there is a slight possibility that the Wildlife Federation could
prevail on appeal or refile the case with better standing proof, the mo-
mentum of this case has shifted to the government and the claimants
and lessees. Even if the case is reinstated, the injunction will probably
not be reimposed. As in Wilderness Society, standing proved to be an ef-
fective defense.
B. Joinder
Joinder is an example of a procedural defense that should specifi-
cally protect claimants and lessees. Several environmental procedural
public land suits have addressed the issue ofjoinder of absent claimants
or lessees under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 2
Nevertheless, this defense has been ineffective so far.
1. The Interest Protected by Rule 19
The first step in the joinder analysis is to determine whether the
interest sought to be defended rises to a level that justifies protection
under Rule 19. In Sierra Club v. Watt 133 and Northern Alaska Environmental
Center v. Hodel,1 4 the Sierra Club sued to set aside administrative deci-
sions which set the standards by which the Department would approve
mining plans of operation.13 5 The suits did not challenge the standards
themselves, but procedure used in making decisions that allowed appli-
cation of the standards.' 3 6 In each case, mining claimants argued that
they were necessary parties under Rule 19 and, without their joinder,
the court should dismiss the case. 13 7 The mining claimants contended
129. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, No. 85-2238, slip op. at 9-13 (D.D.C.
Nov. 4, 1988). One affidavit alleged that one Federation member used an area of
5,000,000 acres, while another alleged use of 2,000,000 acres. A third alleged "informa-
tional" injury for any public land action with allegedly deficient environmental documen-
tation anywhere in the nation.
130. 835 F.2d at 313. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. National Wildlife Fed, v. Burford, No. 88-5397 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 1988) (order).
132. Those cases are Sierra Club v. Watt, Conner, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Si-
erra Club v. Penfold, and National Wildlife Federation. See generally 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 1601-24 (2d ed. 1986) (general reference on
joinder).
133. 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
134. 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. 608 F. Supp. at 322.
136. 608 F. Supp. at 318, 321 n.27; 803 F.2d at 468-69.
137. 608 F. Supp. at 318; see 803 F.2d at 468-69.
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that if the Sierra Club prevailed in having protection of wilderness val-
ues included in the standards, then they would be precluded from devel-
oping their properties. 138 The court agreed with the Sierra Club, and
ignoring the property at stake, stated that a possible change in manage-
ment standards was not an interest protected by Rule 19.139 In Northern
Alaska Environmental Center, the Ninth Circuit cited Sierra Club v. Watt to
reach the same conclusion on the rights at stake in that case.
140
In National Wildlife Federation, the District of Columbia Circuit fur-
ther limited claimants' and lessees' rights under Rule 19. National Wild-
life Federation, like Sierra Club v. Watt, involved hundreds or thousands of
mining claimants and mineral lessees, many of them outside the jurisdic-
tion of the court. The potential effect of National Wildlife Federation was
much greater-the claimants could have lost their entire interest in the
event of an adverse decision. 14 1 Still, the court of appeals found that
claimants and lessees had only an expectancy, and no right to future
government approvals necessary to develop their claim or leases; there-
fore, they had no right protected by Rule 19. While the decision seems
to restrict this holding to issuance of a preliminary injunction, logical
extension to other situations could emasculate any rights of claimants
and lessees under the Mining Law and Mineral Leasing Act. The com-
parison of this holding with the Conner holding is ironic. In Conner, the
court found that an EIS was required because the lessee had an absolute
right to develop the lease.
Based on the cases decided thus far, a claimant or lessee could con-
clude that there is no private interest in public lands that rises to the
level protected by Rule 19. Either these cases portend a significant
change in mineral development on the public lands, or they will eventu-
ally be overruled as an excess of pro-environmental courts.
138. Section 603 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982), is a substantive amendment of
the General Mining Law. FLPMA § 302(b) 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). The valid and ex-
isting rights protected under section 603 are only those rights actually being exercised as
of the passage of FLPMA. FLPMA § 701 (h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 n.(h) (1982). If a claimant
was not actually mining as of October 21, 1976, he had no right to establish an operation
subsequently unless he met the stringent wilderness preservation standards. While the
Sierra Club v. Watt court found a right to operate, this is not necessarily so for rights ac-
quired after the passage of FLPMA. See Opinion of Solicitor Coldiron, 88 I.D. 909 (Oct. 5,
1981). See also Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and other Spe-
cially Managed Federal Lands in the United States, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37 (1983);
Leshy, Wilderness and Its Discontents-Wilderness Review Comes to the Public Lands, 1981 AM. ST.
L.J. 361 (argues for very restrictive or no mineral development under existing law); see
generally 1 AMERICAN LAW oF MINING § 15.03[2][b][i] (2d ed. 1984). The Mining in the
Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1902-12 (1982), also supposedly protects valid and existing right,
see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF MINING § 17.02[l] (2d ed. 1984), but a similar restrictive result for
mining may be expected. See Novak, Mining and the National Park System, 2 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 165 (1982).
139. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 322 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
140. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing 3AJ. MOORE, W. TAGGERT &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.07[2.-0]
(2d ed. 1985)).
141. See infra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
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3. The "Public Rights" Exception toJoinder
The Supreme Court, in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 1 4 2 recognized
an exception to the necessity ofjoinder under Rule 19 where the plain-
tiff seeks to vindicate purely public rights. The Court held that individ-
ual employees were not necessary parties in an action by the NLRB
against their employer, despite the fact that the action could affect the
employer's ability to perform a contract.1 43 In so holding, the Court
amended the NLRB's order to state that the employees could still en-
force any rights against the employer that the contract specified while,
on the other hand, the employer could not enforce the contract against
the employees. 14 4 Unlike Rule 19, the exception seems to apply without
regard to the feasibility ofjoinder, though defendants could argue that
Rule 19(b) had displaced the public rights exception and thus made fea-
sibility ofjoinder a requirement.
The courts in Sierra Club v. Watt, and Northern Alaska Environmental
Center determined that those cases met the requirements of National Lico-
rice and held that the public rights exception was an alternative basis for
their holding in each case. The Connor court apparently relied solely on
National Licorice to find joinder of lessees unnecessary. 14 5 As the other
courts have done, the Ninth Circuit described the interests of lessees as
minimal and suggested that if the lessees ever did lose any of the legally
protected interests, then they may have damage claims against the
government.'
4 6
In each of the above cases, claimants' and lessees' arguments for
dismissal on procedural points have forced the court to deny what had
been perceived as a valid environmental claim. The reaction of courts
has been to deny the property rights of claimants and lessees, rather
than to deny the environmental claims. Claimants and lessees may do
better if they avoid framing the joinder issues as an "either/or"
proposition.
While defendants have advanced the joinder issue and public rights
exception as determined on the merits, the most important impact of
the exception may be on the limit it placed on the remedies available to
plaintiffs who use it. 14 7 The Court in National Licorice specifically modi-
fied the order of the NLRB to delete the language that stated that em-
ployee contracts were void. Connor seems to recognize this principle,
but negates its effect by assuming a suit for damages against the govern-
ment is practical.148 This is a mistake no lease purchaser would make.
If the lessees had advanced a proposal on how the plaintiff's remedy
should be limited, then the outcome may have been different.
142. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
143. Id. at 366.
144. Id. at 364-65, 367.
145. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1458-62 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. 848 F.2d at 1461.
147. Remedies are discussed below. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
148. 848 F.2d at 1461.
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C. Exhaustion
Normally, an individual affected by an agency action cannot appeal
it to a federal court until the plaintiff has exhausted his or her adminis-
trative remedies.' 4 9 Exhaustion of remedies simply means that where
an agency action can be appealed within the agency, the individual must
first go through the agency appeals process, thus exhausting his admin-
istrative remedies before the courts will hear the case. Because adminis-
trative appeals have relatively short limitation periods, regulations may
preclude belated agency appeal if a court decides that exhaustion is
necessary.15
0
Among the policies and considerations for application of the ex-
haustion doctrine set out by the Supreme Court in McKart v. United
States, are: (1) whether a factual record, developed at the agency level, is
important; (2) whether the agency action involves expertise or discre-
tion; and (3) whether a lack of exhaustion affects administrative effi-
ciency. 15  Exceptions to exhaustion include situations where
administrative appeal would be futile, the outcome is predetermined,
there is no notice of the administrative action, or the plaintiff's chal-
lenge is to the validity of a statute. 152 Because of the number of excep-
tions and the fact that lack of exhaustion does not affect jurisdiction, the
ultimate decision whether to require exhaustion rests with the discretion
of the court. At least one commentator has suggested that the courts
will apply a "flexible balancing test" in determining whether exhaustion
should apply in NEPA cases.1
53
In National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff never attempted to be-
come involved in the formal administrative process. 154 The court of ap-
peals advanced several reasons for not requiring exhaustion. First,
exhaustion was in the discretion of the trial court; second, exhaustion
would be futile; third, claimants and lessees rather than the government
had advance the defense; fourth, a factual record was unimportant to the
court; 1 5 5 and fifth, by implication, exhaustion was for those who fol-
lowed issues at the local level, not those who chose challenges on a na-
tional scale. '
5 6
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Park County I, that exhaustion was
149. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969). Secretarial actions and
actions of the Chief of the Forest Service and the Interior Board of Land Appeals are final
agency actions that are appealable to the courts. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 502-19 (2d ed. 1984) (exhaustion and appealability).
150. E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1986) (general appeals of BLM decisions must be made
within 30 days).
151. 395 U.S. at 193-94.
152. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.31 (2d ed. 1984). See also Ecology Center
v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 865 (5th Cir. 1975) (notice required).
153. D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4:22.
154. The plaintiff regularly commented on similar items noticed in the Federal
Register.
155. Judge Williams, in his dissent, strongly disagreed. He viewed the relation be-
tween fact and law as critical. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 316-18.
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unnecessary, virtually eliminated any effective use of the doctrine in
10th Circuit NEPA cases. 15 7 The court found that although the plaintiff
had chosen to delay, and thereby ignore the available agency process to
correct NEPA deficiencies, exhaustion was inapplicable because the re-
quirements of NEPA were not truly requirements of the agency. In-
stead, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that because NEPA's mandate is
imposed from outside the agency, the courts are the appropriate forum
for initiation of NEPA challenges. 158 The holding is especially strong
because it found the district court had abused its discretion in applying
the exhaustion doctrine in this case.
159
While claimants' and lessees' recent experience with the exhaustion
doctrine has not been favorable, the argument is not without force.
There is no specific environmental exception to exhaustion, so those
opposing environmental suits should advance the argument whenever
possible. In the cases described in this paper, at least one judge has
been persuaded, 160 and there is potential that others will accept the
argument as well.
D. Laches
The equitable doctrine of laches will apply to bar a plaintiff's claim
where lack of diligence by the plaintiff results in a detrimental reliance
by the defendant. Generally, the courts will consider three factors: (1)
the length of delay, (2) the diligence of the plaintiff, and (3) the detri-
mental reliance of the defendant. As with exhaustion and standing,
there may be a relaxed application of the doctrine for environmental
plaintiffs.' 6 ' In NEPA cases, courts have often stated that the laches de-
fense is not favored. 16 2 Nevertheless, it has, on occasion, been success-
fully argued.' 6 3 The suits that are the subject of this paper contain
laches arguments both as a defense on the merits and in application of a
remedy.
National Wildlife Federation presents the best opportunity for use of
laches as a defense on the merits. 16 4 The withdrawal review program
had been in existence since 1956 and was mandated in FLPMA in
157. Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 619-20
(10th Cir. 1987).
158. Id. at 620.
159. Id.
160. Judge Williams in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford. 835 F.2d 305, 332 (D.C.Cir.
1987) (Williams, J., dissenting).
161. Save our Wetlands v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 549 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1977). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2946
(1973).
162. See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at §§ 4.26-4.28.
163. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1982)
(NEPA claim against Indian leases); Save Our Wetlands v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 549 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977) (real estate development); Lathan v. Volpe, 455
F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971) (highway).
164. Because laches was not argued until appeal of the injunction to the District of
Columbia circuit court, that court declined to address the issue. 835 F.2d at 318.
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1976.165 The specific agency actions challenged in the suit were as
much as four and one-half years old at the time the suit was filed.t 6 6 All
of the revocation actions were published in the Federal Register, ' 6 7 and
there was evidence of actual notice. 168 During the four and one-half
years, claimants and lessees have been acquiring interests in the affected
land and spending money on exploration and development. The doc-
trine should present a strong argument for older revocations but may
not apply to more recent ones.
The courts' bias against the use of laches in environmental suits was
recently underscored in Park County. The Tenth Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion in holding that an environmental
plaintiff's deliberate delay of nearly two years for tactical reasons while
defendants expended a million dollars was grounds for laches.16
9
E. Mootness
The doctrine of mootness, as applied to environmental procedural
suits, is similar to laches because it may depend on a plaintiff's lack of
diligence. 170 Where facilities have already been completed, the courts
have declared that the initial agency actions which allowed construction
are moot. In National Wildlife Federation, Conner, and Bob Marshall Alliance,
claimants and lessees argued that agency actions issuing leases, revoking
withdrawals, and terminating classifications had already occurred, were
not likely to be repeated, and consequently should be subject to the
mootness doctrine. All of the cases cited to support this proposition are
factually distinguishable from the public land cases because they deny
relief for NEPA claims on completed facilities, as opposed to administra-
tive actions. 17 1 In National Wildlife Federation it is possible that individual
165. FLPMA § 204(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1) (1982). Withdrawal review was instituted
by the BLM in 1956. It continued with greater and lesser effect through the time of the
PLLRC. See 2 C. WHEATLEY, JR., STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS ON PUBLIC
DOMAIN LANDS 420-25 (1969).
166. The National Wildlife Federation limited its challenge to those actions afterJanu-
ary 1, 1981. Amended Complaint to page 16, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction aff'd. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Numerous revocations occurred prior to this date.
167. The complaint included a list. Amended Complaint Exhibit A, id.
168. See Affidavit IA of Frank Edwards at 9-10, Accompanying Defendants' Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id. See supra note 100.
169. Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 617 (10th
Cir. 1987).
170. See, e.g., Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977). See gener-
ally D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4.25 (general discussion and listing of cases).
171. See, e.g., Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1983)
(spraying complete, but capable of repetition so mootness exception applies); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261,
1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ogunquit Village v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977) (with
stabilization of sand dune complete, NEPA does not require that "improvements" be re-
moved). Mootness has operated to preclude NEPA and FLPMA claims in two recent but
different suits. In TOSCO v. Hodel, 804 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1986), ruling on motion for
intervention from, 611 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Colo. 1985), the State of Colorado and the National
Wildlife Federation were precluded from bringing NEPA and FLPMA claims after settle-
ment between the government and claimant. The arguments were reintroduced in Lamm
v. Hodel, No. 87-F-190 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 4, 1987). In Northern Alaska Envil. Center v.
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claimants who had developed their properties prior to the suit could
present a credible defense on this point.
F. Statutes of Limitation
The Mineral Leasing Act states that "[n]o action contesting a deci-
sion of the Secretary involving any oil and gas lease shall be maintained
unless such action is commenced or taken within 90 days after the deci-
sion of the Secretary relating to such matter."'
7 2
Despite the apparent certainty of the statutory language, the Tenth
Circuit held in Park County that the limitation did not apply to NEPA
challenges. The court reasoned by analogy from a case applying a pro-
vision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act which limited judicial re-
view of terms and conditions of permits issued under that act, but did
not limit review of the actual issuance of the permit. The court simply
ignored the far broader language of the Mineral Leasing Act provision
and found it did not apply. 17 3 In light of the rule that NEPA does not
repeal any other statute by implication, this ruling seems to be
vulnerable.
If Park County is not followed, then National Wildlife Federation may
also present an opportunity for application of the statute of limitations.
Unless a revocation is void ab initio,174 there should be no remedy
against a lessee if a withdrawal revocation had been in place more than
ninety days prior to the suit.
G. Separate Consideration of Individual Claims
From an equity and policy perspective, if the environmental proce-
dure attendant to agency decisions underlying an individual mining
claim or mineral lease meets the substantive goals of the statutes in
question, then the title to that mineral property should be sound.
17 5
For example, an EA or an EIS may have adequately informed the deci-
sionmaker for some purposes but not others. In the context of Connor
and Bob Marshall Alliance, this could mean that leases on land without
wilderness values, or those whose leases contained CNSO stipulations,
may be more defensible.1
76
Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 at 469 (9th Cir. 1986), claimants' argument that NEPA compliance was
adequate was mooted by agreement of the Park Service to do an EIS.
172. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982).
173. 817 F.2d at 616-18. In order for the Park County court to reach the NEPA issue of
whether an EIS was required for lease issuance, it was necessary to find the laches, exhaus-
tion, and statute of limitations issues adverse to the interests of the lessee. Ultimately the
holding on the EIS issue was a victory for the Forest Service and the lessee.
174. If the revocation is void ab initio then the lease may be void ab initio as well. See
infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
175. See Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (FLPMA
procedures met by NEPA procedures); Friends of River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93, 107 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (FERC licensing hearing takes the place of NEPA procedure).
176. This is of theoretical concern only since the court of appeals in Conner apparently
described the whole of two national forests as "pristine wilderness." 836 F.2d 1521 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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Procedural defenses may apply differently to different claimants and
lessees as well. For example, a lessee affected by the National Wildlife
Federation suit may argue the Mineral Leasing Act statute of limitations
bars a challenge.' 77 Standing should apply independently to each revo-
cation in National Wildlife Federation. Laches and mootness will apply dif-
ferently depending on the amount of reliance.
178
A geothermal lessee's intervention in National Wildlife Federation
demonstrated the effectiveness of presenting individual claims. Inter-
venor California Energy stated several defenses to the plaintiff's argu-
ments, but received no opposition. 179 Ultimately, the court ruled that
the revocation in question was always open to geothermal leasing and
consequently there could be no remedy against the lessee.
180
Another way for a claimant or lessee to insure consideration of the
specific merits of an individual claim would be to bring a collateral suit.
Possible future continuation of National Wildlife Federation presents an
opportunity for such a suit because of its nationwide scope and egre-
gious facts. A claimant or lessee could challenge the authority of the
BLM to enforce any injunction. Such a suit would undoubtedly face a
venue challenge, and notions of judicial comity might force it back into
the district court in Washington, D.C. In any case, exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, including IBLA appeal, could take as long as two
years.
H. Conclusions Concerning Procedural Defenses
Despite the apparent power of procedural defenses, they will be of
little avail unless claimants or lessees can convince ajudge that the equi-
ties of the case support them. Often, dismissals or judgments based on
these defenses are a way out of complicated or difficult cases, or an alter-
native to resolution of the merits where a case involves separation of
177. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
179. The response of the National Wildlife Federation was to claim that the injunction
did not apply to the California Energy situation, and thus they effectively raised no opposi-
tion to release of the company from the injunction. This was despite potential surface
disturbance from the development of geothermal resources. California Energy raised a
standing defense in its answer. It might have been very difficult for the Wildlife Federa-
tion to prove injury since the geothermal site is on a military reservation that is closed to
the public. There is no reason to believe that the National Wildlife Federation would not
oppose release of an operation that was more accessible or more to their disliking. The
court effectively released California Energy from the suit by holding that the area in ques-
tion was always open to geothermal leasing. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, No. 85-
2238 (D.C.C. Dec. 31, 1987). If there was a full fledged defense in National Wildlife Federa-
tion, that is, one where all claimants or lessees actively pursued their interests as did Cali-
fornia Energy, the plaintiff and court would find themselves reviewing hundreds of
applications for relief from the suit. They would, in essence, take over some part of day-
to-day administration of the public lands. At this point, the wisdom ofJustice O'Connor's
separation of powers and standing argument would become more readily apparent to the
court. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
180. Id. (order of Dec. 31, 1986).
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powers problems.' 8 ' As mentioned above, National Wildlife Federation
was especially amenable for resolution on procedural bases, and a more
persuasive presentation of the equities of that case may have been one
reason behind the standing dismissal.
182
V. AFrER AN AGENCY Loss: Is A CLAIMANT'S OR
LESSEE'S INTEREST TERMINATED?
Even if the agency decision which forms the basis of the claimants'
or lessees' property interest is 'set aside,' an interest is still retained
which can be restored with proper effort. To facilitate this restoration,
participation and vigilance should not end upon the issuance of an ad-
verse judgment.
A. Remedies as Distinguished from Merits
Where courts have dealt with the actual disposition of property in-
terests affected by environmental procedural suits, they have done so
without the aid of argument on what remedy is appropriate.1 83 In some
cases, consideration of property interests has been considered by district
courts on remand.'
8 4
The Example of Remedies under NEPA
In NEPA cases, courts will normally remand to the agency with a
mandatory injunction to re-do NEPA procedure so as to comply with the
court's order. 18 5 Typically, the agency does not abandon a project or
facility, but instead work is enjoined while an EIS, or a better EIS, is
done.' 86 Later, the project continues, assuming there is still political
support after years of litigation. Where a court finds a NEPA violation,
but the project is already completed, the case may be moot and no relief
may be forthcoming. 18 7 In other situations the agency has proceeded
with an EIS, or agreed to do an EIS, after the trial court's initial finding
and the case has been determined moot while on appeal.1
88
Even where a court finds environmental or other procedures defi-
cient, it may not require remand to the agency. If the defect is technical
and further study would provide no useful information for the deci-
181. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 758-61 (1984) (separation of powers
as a basis of standing requirement).
182. It is the impression of some BLM employees that the justice department lawyers
who initially defended the .ational lWildlife Federation suit did not present a vigorous de-
fense on the merits. The attorneys were replaced and the defense improved, but perhaps
too late.
183. E.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d
786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
184. E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1413-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
185. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4:54 (scope of remedy).
186. This is the solution of the Ninth Circuit in Conner.
187. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
188. E.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986)
(National Park Service agrees to do cumulative EIS, thus meeting contest on that point).
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sionmaker, then there may be nothing for an agency to do.' 8 9 Since
especially thorough EAs may provide all of the useful information, the
preclusion of a remedy opens the possibility of a "substantial compli-
ance" argument.' 9 0 A court has applied a similar sort of "substantial
compliance" standard to hearing requirements under FLPMA. l9 '
B. Termination of Mineral Leases
In Sierra Club v. Peterson,19 2 an environmental group tried to invali-
date oil and gas leases issued with inadequate NEPA compliance. In an
earlier proceeding, the District of Columbia Circuit found NEPA com-
pliance for a decision to issue oil and gas leases deficient because the
Forest Service had issued leases with exploration rights and had not
done an EIS. The circuit court stated that either a Conditional No Sur-
face Occupancy ("CNSO") stipulation or an EIS could cure the problem
and remanded the case to the district court.193 On remand, the district
court, on the motion of the lessees and the agency, inserted the CNSO
stipulation into the leases. The district court rejected the Sierra Club's
contention that the leases were void. The Ninth Circuit followed this
remedy in Conner.
1. Contract Law as a Reason to Void Leases
Mineral leases are contracts between the federal government and
lessees, 19 4 and both contract law and administrative law govern their
execution. 19 5 On remand in Peterson, the Sierra Club presented argu-
ments involving both contract law and administrative authority as rea-
sons to void the leases.' 9 6 Because the district court decided, without
189. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.
1980) (study outside the formal ambit of NEPA supplants need for supplemental EIS);
Friends of River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (consideration of alterna-
tive at FERC licensing hearing obviates need for remand to supplement EIS).
190. This is to be distinguished from situations where environmental review has been
done outside the requirements of NEPA by agencies charged with protecting the environ-
ment, i.e., the Environmental Protection Agency. The courts have held that the procedure
of these agencies is "fundamentally equivalent" to the NEPA process. See Portland Ce-
ment Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ethyl Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 53 n.124 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977). Functional equivalence will not apply to the Forest Service or BLM because their
mandates include duties other than environmental protection. Seegenerally D. MANDELKER,
supra note 45, at § 5:15.'
191. See Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
192. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on remand, Sierra Club v.
Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984) (Order adding CNSO Stipulation), enforc-
ing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
193. 717 F.2d at 1415.
194. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. An-
drus, 667 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1982);John Bloyce Castle, 81 I.B.L.A. 53, GFS (O&G)
129 (1984). See generally 1 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES §§ 14.19-14.21 (1987).
195. 2 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES § 21.01 (1987).
196. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases, Sierra Club v.
Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984).
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opinion, in favor of the lessees, we are left to infer what the basis of that
decision might have been.
The primary argument advanced by the Sierra Club was that con-
tracts made in violation of the law or public policy are void, and there-
fore contracts made in violation of NEPA are void. To support this
proposition, they cited numerous cases outside of the NEPA context
which seem to make that point. t 9 7 The defendants responded by point-
ing out that, within the context of NEPA, there is no such consensus, nor
perhaps any authority for this proposition at all. 19 8 They also pointed
out that, outside of the NEPA context, the courts recognize many excep-
tions to the general rule advanced by the Sierra Club.' 9 9
The cases allowing contracts to remain effective despite NEPA vio-
lations are in themselves the strongest authority for the lessees. These
include the refusal of courts to void coal leases in Cady v. Morton2 0 0 and
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel20 1 and the continued recognition of
power contracts in Forelaws on Board v. Johnson202 and Port of Astoria v.
Hodel.20 3 In the coal leasing cases, the courts ordered the agencies to
reconsider lease issuance and enjoined new surface disturbing activity
while the NEPA review was conducted. 20 4 The courts did not enjoin
that work already underway.2 0 5 The power cases involved no particular
environmental disturbance, so the courts imposed no injunctions during
the time the EIS's were being completed. 20 6 In Astoria, the plaintiff's
197. A listing of the cases relied on by the Sierra Club is as follows: Lachman v.
Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1972); Northwest Airlines v.
Alaska Airlines, 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Ewert v.
Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922); Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85, 94 (1912); Con-
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe, 184 U.S. 540, 548 (1902); Jordan v. Axicom Systems, 351 F.
Supp. 1134, 1135 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
198. See Federal Defendants' Opposition to Sierra Club's Motion for Order Declaring
Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Can-
celling Said Leases, Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.C.Cir. April 11, 1984), enforc-
ing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
199. See Intervenors Maddox, et al., reply to Motion of Sierra Club for Order Declaring
Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Can-
celling Said Leases, id. The defendants might also have argued that there is substantial
doubt that the "transcendent rule" advanced by the Sierra Club even exists. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 178 (1979) (giving considerations or whether enforce-
ment of a contract is avoidable on public policy grounds). See generally A. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.5 (1984) (suggesting a court will look at legislative intent, policy considera-
tions, and perhaps malum prohibitum and malum in se).
200. 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
201. No. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB (Oct. 6, 1986), rev'don other grounds, 842 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1988).
202. 743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986).
203. 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979). See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States
Forest Serv., No. 83-1153-SO (memorandum and order of July 2, 1985) (preliminary in-
junction reported at 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984)) (NEPA is no basis for declaring
timber sales void ab initio); Sierra Club, et. al., 92 I.B.L.A. 290, GFS (Misc) 33 (1986) (court
will not void right-of-way grant for NEPA violations but will remand for additional
stipulations).
204. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, No. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB, slip op. at 6-7, (4th
Cir. Oct. 6, 1986).
205. Id. at 7; Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
206. Forelaws on Board v.Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1984); Port of Asto-
ria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1979).
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objection that if the court did not void the contracts, then the agency
would do a "grudging proforma compliance" with NEPA was overcome
by continued court supervision.
2 0 7
2. Lack of Administrative Authority as a Reason to Void Leases
In Peterson, the Sierra Club also advanced two arguments directed at
the authority of the administrators to issue the leases. First, they argued
that the law bound the Secretary to cancel leases issued without proper
authority. 20 8 The authority for this proposition comes from cases inter-
preting the Mineral Leasing Act. Where the Secretary is, by statute,
without power to issue a lease he must cancel it if challenged. 20 9 Can-
cellation for violation of the Mineral Leasing Act requires a positive act
on the part of the Secretary, and the lease is not void ab initio.
2 10
NEPA may be distinguished from the Mineral Leasing Act because a
NEPA violation does not directly affect the Secretary's authority, but
merely subjects his decision to the possibility of being set aside under
the APA. The Secretary still retains discretion on how to comply with
NEPA. Since the opinion of the circuit court had approved the use of a
CNSO stipulation, it made sense for the district court to allow the
agency to exercise its discretion and not constier the leases void ab initio.
Assuming the lessees consent, there was no reason why the Secretary
should not add the stipulations prior to taking the affirmative step of
cancelling the leases.
Second, the Sierra Club argued that a rider to the Department of
the Interior Appropriation Act 2 1' which prohibited expenditures for
lease processing also prohibited addition of the stipulations. 2 12 Because
the appropriation rider exempted leases that were already in existence,
this argument requires some independent reason for the leases to be
void. In the absence of such a reason, no restriction applies.
If the agency issued leases on improperly revoked withdrawals then
the problem is more serious. The revocations could be void ab initio in
which the case the agency must cancel the leases, though applications
207. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 480.
208. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases at 5-6, Sierra
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
209. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476 (1963) (authority of Secretary to cancel
improperly issued leases). See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians, 82 I.B.L.A. 387 GFS (O&G)
185 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued on Indian land cancelled); Robert Lyon, 78 I.B.L.A.
232 GFS (O&G) 54 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued in incorporated city limits cancelled);
Estate of Glenn F. Coy, Resource Service Inc., 88 I.D. 236, 52 I.B.L.A. 182 GFS (O&G) 28
(1981) (application transferred improperly so lease cancelled) (cited by Sierra Club).
210. 1 LAW OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES § 14.19[l] (1987).
211. Act of October 20, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-146 § 308, 97 Stat. 919 (similar prohibi-
tions of spending to process lease application in further planning areas where included in
later appropriations acts).
212. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases at 13-15, Sierra
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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may be able to keep their priority.2 13 Because mining claims would suf-
fer the same fate, the problem is discussed more thoroughly below.
2 14
C. Termination of Interests Acquired under the General Mining Law
Although a valid mining claim confers substantial rights against the
government, if claimants locate their claims on land closed to mineral
entry, then they are void ab initio.2 15 An agency loss on the merits in
National Wildlife Federation might imply that the land was in fact legally
closed to mineral entry, and the claims located on that land are void.
2 16
1. Are Withdrawal Revocations Void Ab Initio?
If withdrawal revocations and classification terminations in National
Wildlife Federation are void ab initio, then claims located on land closed to
mineral entry may be void ab initio as well; but if the revocations are
merely voidable, then the claims may have been located on land that was
open to mineral entry, albeit only temporarily, and the claims would be
valid. For the alleged NEPA violations, specifically the failure to con-
duct a programmatic EIS, there is no reason to believe that the rules for
revocations would be different from the lease and contract precedent
which do not mandate a void ab initio result.
2 1 7
The FLPMA violations present a more difficult problem. Because
the statute contains the authority of the agency the make revocations
and terminations, violations of the act could destroy that authority. If
the BLM must submit all withdrawal revocations to Congress, and must
only do classification terminations after completion of Resource Man-
agement Plans, as argued by the plaintiff, then there may be no authority
for the revocation and terminations. The revocations and terminations
would be nullities.
2 18
The Eighth Circuit addressed an analogous situation involving pro-
cedural violations of the Mineral Leasing Act in Arkla Exploration Co. v.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp.2 19 The government had failed to follow proper
procedures involving a known geologic structure ("KGS") determina-
213. Leases issued on land closed to mineral leasing must be cancelled. See Navajo
Tribe of Indians, 82 I.B.L.A. 387 GFS (O&G) 185 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued on In-
dian land cancelled); Robert Lyon, 78 I.B.L.A. 232 GFS (O&G) 54 (1984) (lease mistak-
enly issued in incorporated city limits cancelled); Estate of Glenn F. Coy, Resource Service
Inc., 88 I.D. 236, 52 I.B.L.A. 182 GFS (O&G) 28 (1981) (application transferred improp-
erly so lease cancelled) (cited by Sierra Club).
214. See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
215. David W. Harper, 74 I.D. 141, 80-1967-20 (Mining) (1967). 30 U.S.C. § 26
(1982). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 35.11-2 (1986).
216. Lease could suffer a similar fate since cancellation is mandatory for leases issued
by mistake on land closed to mineral leasing.
217. Contracts should only be voidable as opposed to void ab initio. See supra notes 193-
206 and accompanying text.
218. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 60-62, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271
(D.D.C. 1985), (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction af'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
219. 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1984).
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tion. 2 20 The district court had declared that the noncompetitive oil and
gas leases issued as a result of this determination were "invalid."1
22 1
The violation of procedural aspects of the Mineral Leasing Act may have
destroyed the authority to issue the leases.
Arkla may be distinguished from National Wildlife Federation because,
after the loss, the lessee was in the same position as immediately before
the suit-he had a lease application and priority.22 2 In National Wildlife
Federation, existing property rights which had been partially explored or
developed may be voided. To date, the courts have given considerable
deference to the agencies' interpretation of FLPMA and such a strin-
gent interpretation would be a significant departure.
2 23
The plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation argued that the suit would
not invalidate existing claims and leases. 224 The court seemingly
agreed 22 5 but, inconsistently, has enjoined operations on existing claims
and leases.2 2 6 Either the court is confused or there is a real threat to the
property interest that is not being forthrightly discussed.
D. Preservation and Restoration of the Mineral Property Interest
Once it has been determined that the lease or claim is not truly void
ab initio, lessees and claimants may take a number of steps to preserve
their property interest. Further actions before the agency and the dis-
trict court may be required.
1. Agency Obligation to Preserve Claimants' and Lessees' Rights
Where an added stipulation may cure a procedural defect, it may be
necessary to determine if the agency has an obligation to proceed with
the cure rather than cancel the lease. 22 7 Of course, the best and most
efficient course is to work with the agency, as the lessees did in Peterson,
220. Id. at 357-61.
221. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 1214, 1227 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
222. The suit was filed immediately after the issuance of the non-competitive leases.
Arkla, 734 F.2d at 349-50. See generally Ekberg, Federal Oil and Gas Leasing: Developments in
Selected Problems and Issues, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 589, 630-40 (1983) (discussing
Arkla and KGS issues).
223. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (substantial
compliance and harmless error applied in agency actions under FLPMA); Columbia Basin
Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1981) (agency inter-
pretation of FLPMA given deference).
224. Answer of Respondent National Wildlife Federation to the Petition for Writ of
Prohibition at 11, In re Mountain States Legal Found., No. 68-5353 (D.C. Cir.).
225. Opinion and order of December 4, 1985 at 3, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
676 F. Supp. 271, (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
226. Order of February 10, 1986, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d
305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
227. The BLM may require lessees to accept post lease stipulations that are required by
law. If lease stipulations may cure a defect as declared in court ruling that environmental
procedures had not been followed, then these stipulations may be interpreted as required
by law. In any case, the lessee will have the option of keeping the lease with the new
stipulations or refusing it. Cf Emery Energy, Inc., 67 I.B.L.A. 260, GFS (O&G) 252
(1982).
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to effect a favorable outcome.2 28
To date, no agency has taken the position thai they would cancel
leases where they could cure the defects. Nevertheless, if an agency
takes this position, then the lessee may find some support in precedent
for cancellation on other grounds. Outside of the NEPA and FLPMA
context considered here, the agency may not cancel a lease unless can-
cellation is mandated by statutes or regulations. 229 However, if lessees
push this argument to the extreme, then there would be no reservation
of agency discretion to reject the lease and there could be a conflict with
cases which hold the exercise of this discretion to be permissible. 23 0 An
agency may still not be able to assume discretion to cancel in the ab-
sence of a specific court order. If it did take this position, then the rules
limiting the exercise of discretion in the first instance should restrict its
actions. For example, the BLM may not refuse a lease application unless
it has considered the use of stipulations to meet the concerns of the
government, 23 ' and the record must support the conclusion that it is in
the public interest to reject the lease application.2 3 2 Consequently, the
claimant should be able to argue that cancellation, rather than cure, is
only reasonable in extreme cases.
23 3
2. Are Agencies or Plaintiffs Estopped from Voiding
Property Interests?
Because lessees and claimants have relied to their detriment on the
actions of the agency and, in some cases the actions or inactions of the
plaintiffs, they may be able to assert estoppel against a claim that leases
or claims are void. Estoppel against the government has been recog-
nized in the federal courts and is well established in the Ninth Circuit.
23 4
The necessary elements as set forth in Georgia-Pacific Co. v. United
States 23 5 are:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the party
to be estopped must intend that his conduct shall be acted on
or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right
to believe it is so intended; (3) the party seeking to estop the
latter must be ignorant of the facts; and (4) the party seeking to
estop must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
2 3 6
228. The Forest Service and the lessees agreed on the insertion of the CNSO stipula-
tion as presented and both argued the same points before the district court on remand.
See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
229. John Bloyce Castle, 81 I.B.L.A. 53, GFS (O&G) 129 (1984); Beverly M. Harris,
Aminoil, 78 I.B.L.A. 251, GFS (O&G) 57 (1984).
230. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975) (preserving lease but re-
serving discretion on reconsideration of issuance).
231. Robert G. Lynn, 76 I.B.L.A. 383 (1983) GFS (O&G) 10 (1984); Western Interstate
Energy Co., 71 I.B.L.A. 19, GFS (O&G) 94 (1983).
232. Eagle Exploration Co., 69 I.B.L.A. 96 (1982) GFS (O&G) 12 (1983).
233. See Horace H. Alvord IV, 80 I.B.L.A. 49 GFS (O&G) 97 (1984).
234. See generally Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the United States, 27
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41(1982).
235. 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970).
236. Id. at 96.
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The Ninth Circuit has broadened the requirement of knowledge on
the part of the government to include situations where an agency knew
or should have known the facts. 2 37 The courts will apply a balancing
test to determine if the interests of the United States outweigh those of
the private party. If they do not, then a court may allow estoppel.
2 38
National Wildlife Federation seems to meet all of the Georgia-Pacific cri-
teria. If the BLM loses on the merits in National Wildlife Federation, then it
will be apparent that they should have known the proper procedures for
revoking withdrawals and terminating classification. On the other hand,
it does not seem reasonable to expect a claimant or lessee relying on the
agency's regular and proper functioning to know of the procedural er-
rors. The agency's posting of Federal Register notices opening the land
to mineral entry clearly anticipated and invited reliance by claimants. 2 39
In cases such as Conner,24 0 where the lessees were never notified of
the suit or served with a notice of lis pendens, 24 1 lessees could argue that
the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that their leases are void. Not
only did the lessees rely on the indirect representation of the govern-
ment that their title was good,2 42 but they could also argue that they
relied on the duty of the plaintiffs to file a notice of lispendens, seek a stay
or an injunction, or otherwise notify them of the suit if plaintiff's claim
of the property interest was invalid. An environmental group filed a no-
tice of lis pendens in one other recent NEPA case where the title to prop-
erty was in question,2 43 and there seems to be no impediment to such a
filing in Conner. If the plaintiffs are to be estopped from claiming the
leases are void in Conner, then they must have intended that the defend-
ants rely on their actions or inactions. Since this is unlikely, the reliance
elements will have to come from a duty under the lis pendens statutes or
other law.
3. Laches, Mootness, and Joinder as Limits on Plaintiff's
Remedies
Even if the equitable defenses of laches and mootness are not
strong enough to bar the plaintiff's claims against the government, they
237. United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 412 (9th Cir. 1975).
238. Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 748 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975). See Parcel, supra
note 233, at 48-52. a proprietary-sovereign function distinction may enter into the analy-
sis of estoppel problems as well. Leases and environmental protection seem to fall into
both categories. See id. at 46-48.
239. The notices typically stated where and how much land would be open to mineral
entry. Specific provisions, such as time of opening, were provided in anticipation of com-
peting interests locating or filing on newly opened land.
240. The court of appeals decision in Conner avoids the cancellation problem by creat-
ing no surface occupancy leases. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir.
1988).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
242. The Forest Service continued to issue permits for seismic exploration in the Flat-
head and Gallatin National Forests while the suit was pending. Signal of Montana and
Geodata, Inc. invested several tens of millions of dollars in seismic work which they sold to
lessees.
243. See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1986) (Sierra Club
files notice of lis pendens in Alaska).
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may still be strong enough to limit any injunctive remedy, especially as it
affects claimants or lessees. Because such relief is equitable, the court
should consider these other equitable concepts.
If necessary parties are not joined, Rule 19(b) mandates that the
court consider limiting the scope of relief to avoid injuring absent par-
ties. 2 4 4 Since the court exercises discretion over any relief, those assert-
ing the interests of absent claimants and lessees should present a strong
argument that the court tailor the relief to preserve their interests.2 4 5 If
a court applies the "public rights" exception to joinder, even in the al-
ternative, then the allowed remedy should not alter the rights of claim-
ants or lessees. 246 To enforce this proposition and get an agency to
issue permits, it may be necessary to prevail in a collateral suit.24 7 Such
a suit would be extremely difficult to win but would force the courts to
face an inherent contradiction in the use of this doctrine if they enjoin
third party rights.
4. Suspension of Leases
When an agency loses a procedural suit, a lessee will want to pre-
serve the term of the lease and save on rental payments by accepting
suspension of the lease during appeal or compliance with environmental
procedural statutes.2 4 8 An injunction may cause the agency to initiate
steps to suspend a lease. In theory, suspension will not preclude seismic
or other surface geological or geophysical exploration, but it will pre-
clude issuance of an APD.
24 9
If the lessee initiates suspension, then the agency may take the op-
portunity to add onerous stipulations as a condition of suspension. 250
While it is possible that such stipulations could be favorable to the gov-
ernment's case, they may not be agreeable to the operator's needs and
perception of the case. It may be possible for a lessee to simply turn
down a requested suspension once it is offered with the onerous
stipulations.
2 5 1
244. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
246. The specific issue of limitation or relief when the "public rights" exception to
joinder is applied is discussed above. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
247. There was no specific injunction in Conner, see 605 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Mont.
1985), but there was in National Wildlife Federation. See Order of Feb. 10, 1986, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), aff'd 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also supra notes
176-79 and accompanying text (mentioning collateral suits).
248. 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1982) authorizes suspension for "conservation purposes." This
has been held to include conservation in the environmental sense as well as conservation
of oil and gas. Copper Valley Machine Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 600 (D.C. Cir.
1981). Regulations at 43 C.F.C. § 3103.4-2 (1986) interpret the statute. See generally Peter-
son, Extensions and Suspensions of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Paper 12, pp. 12-19 to
12-34, Overthrust Belt-Oil and Gas Legal and Land Issues (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fed'n
1980).
249. Drilling is a lease activity. 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (1986).
250. See Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915 (D. Wyo. 1985) (stipulation
added to give authority to deny later activity), afftg, Sierra Club, et al., 80 I.B.L.A. 251, 260
GFS (O&G) 119 (1984) (includes text of stipulation).
251. If the lease term is near its end, as it was in Getty, then this may not be an option.
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If a preliminary injunction denies access to a lease, then the Mineral
Leasing Act and the regulations recognize a mandatory suspension of
lease payments and the lease term despite any lack of paperwork by the
agency. 2 52 In this situation, a lessee may retroactively recover the pay-
ments and any lost lease term.253 Unfortunately, the problem of retro-
active recoupment of rentals and term is more difficult where there is no
preliminary injunction and the lessee instigates the suspension proceed-
ings. To date, the BLM has taken the position that it may only grant
suspensions as of the date of application. 2 54 However, if the court's or-
der is retroactive and the leases are void, then contract principals should
allow recovery.
5. Motion for Clarification or Amended Judgment
During the litigation of the merits, the parties may ignore or give
little consideration to arguments on the nature of the relief that the
court should grant if the environmental groups win.2 55 As a result, the
plaintiff's relief may be harsher than necessary and lessees or claimants
will want to move for amended judgment or clarification 2 56 to include
interim remedies, such as lease suspension, that may lessen the impact.
This is especially true if a court has declared leases or claims void. In
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, a Montana federal district court's initial
relief was to cancel several coal leases. On a motion to amend the judg-
ment, the court, citing Cady v. Morton,2 5 7 changed its decision and sus-
pended most of the leases pending NEPA compliance but allowed




Because of the incredibly broad scope of the National Wildlife Federa-
tion preliminary injunction, and the apparent complexity of the
problems, some of those affected have gone to Congress to get relief.
The 99th Congress passed several bills exempting specific actions or ar-
eas from the suit. 25 9 All of the congressionally exempted land actions
were for activities other than mineral development. Still, it is not incon-
252. See Copper Valley Mach. Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(mandatory suspension during time when lessee is denied access).
253. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.4-2(c) (1986). Copper Valley Machine, 653 F.2d at 603.
254. Paul Kohlman, a party and lessee in Bob Marshall Alliance, was denied retroactive
repayment of rentals.
255. E.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (relief as it effects claim-
ants not considered); Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, No. CV-82-015-GF (D. Mont. May 27,
1986) (relief as it effects lessees not considered until supplemental briefing after Conner
decision and then not mentioned in court's opinion).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
257. 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
258. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, No. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB, slip op. at 506
(Oct. 6, 1986) (amending order of May 28, 1985), rev'don other grounds, 842 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir. 1988).
259. Pub. L. No. 99-542 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-590 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-606 (1986);
Pub. L. No. 99-632 (1986).
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ceivable that a mineral development that had the support of a local com-
munity could receive similar treatment, with proper political effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
The procedures Congress has developed to govern the administra-
tion of the public lands unquestionably serve important public policy
objectives. Environmental studies, public participation, and expression
of administrative standards in regulations result in informed decision-
making which benefits both mineral developers and environmental
groups. Yet, when the procedures become the means to throw federal
land management into turmoil and cause the waste of millions of re-
source exploration dollars, the cost greatly outweighs the benefit. Be-
yond the waste of dollars, our nation will be less likely to develop
valuable public resources because of title uncertainties.
The courts have neither challenged the authority of the administra-
tors to make the land management decisions in Connor v. Burford, Bob
Marshall Alliance v. Watt, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford and Sierra
Club v. Watt, nor challenged the good faith of any parties involved. The
courts have simply held that the agencies made the decisions with the
wrong procedure. Yet, the agencies' decisions have been set aside at
great cost or risk to third party mining claimants and mineral lessees. It
seems that the process has overcome the substance of the decisions.
Claimants and lessees can protect themselves by working with the
administrative agencies. Under the current state of the law, to avoid ma-
jor environmental review of leasing or exploration, mineral lessees may
have to allow the agencies to reserve discretion to terminate their
projects for environmental concerns. This undoubtedly holds some
risk, but from a business perspective, that risk is much less than the risk
of not finding a valuable mineral deposit. To date, while the agencies
have insisted on environmental mitigation, they have not used restrictive
lease stipulations to stop projects.
In many respects the environmental suits discussed in this paper act
as a monkey wrench thrown into the public lands administrative machin-
ery. The National Wildlife Federation has stopped the machinery with
its suit, halting more conservation projects than any group of developers
could ever hope to stop. The courts can end this kind of obstruction by
giving deference to administrative decisions on what procedure is re-
quired, and by applying doctrines such as laches, mootness, standing,
exhaustion, joinder and the statute of limitations. In the pending ac-
tions, the courts have the opportunity to use these doctrines and place
the administration of the public lands back in the hands of the agencies,
where Congress always intended it to be. Congress should not have to
pass special legislation to facilitate minor land management decisions.
While the suits may affect federal administrative decision process,
their effect on the property interests of third parties is not at all certain.
The remedies accorded plaintiffs in these suits may not invalidate the
rights of claimants or lessees. If they appear to do so, then they may be
1989]
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beyond the power of the courts, especially if all of the leases and claim-
ants are not joined. But the holders of mineral interests cannot count
on the courts deciding in their favor if they are absent. Individual claim-
ants and lessees have to go into court and specifically argue why their
interests are not valid. If and when they do so, their chances of success
are good.
FELONY PLEA BARGAINING IN SIX COLORADO
JUDICIAL DISTRICTS: A LIMITED INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS
THOMAS A. GOLDSMITH*
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict
afterwards."'
"Breaking rocks in the hot, hot sun. I fought the law and the
law won."
2
"Brought up to believe that the soul of the American justice
system is based on the determination of truth, and the protec-




Most felony cases are resolved by a plea of guilty: Not necessarily a
plea to the crime actually charged, but rather an induced negotiated plea
to a charge that may, in some instances, be less serious than the crime
that was actually committed. 4 Although plea bargaining 5 has been con-
sistently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, 6 much of the
relevant literature implies that this practice is a pathological deviation
DistrictJudge, SeventhJudicial District, Gunnison, Colorado. B.A.,J.D., University of
Florida; Master of Judicial Studies 1989 (forthcoming) University of Nevada-Reno.
This article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master ofJudicial Stud-
ies degree program at the University of Nevada-Reno, in cooperation with the National
Judicial College.
The author thanks the clerks and court administrators who helped him gather infor-
mation from their files, the judges and lawyers who patiently answered his many questions,
and the individuals whose criticism and assistance helped make this a better article, includ-
ing: Professors Malcolm Feeley, James Richardson, James Berry and Pat Sterling; Judges
Charles McGee (Nevada), Jerry Lincoln, John Kuenhold, Charles Buss and Joseph Bel-
lipanni; and, research associate Marlene Thornton of the National Center for State Courts.
1. L. CARROLL, ALICES's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 122 (1966).
2. Sonny Curtis (1966).
3. Note, Plea Bargaining: The New Hampshire "Ban ", 9 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CON-
FINEMENT 387, 396 (1983).
4. Davis, Griffiths and Napoleon, Bargain-Basement Justice: Judicial Responsibility for the
Plea Bargaining System, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 319, 321 (1979).
5. In this article, the term "plea bargaining" will be used to mean any process by
which inducements are offered in exchange for any concession of criminal liability. This
broad definition which was borrowed from Weninger's, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A
Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987), has been used because
techniques such as deferred judgments and dismissals with restitution, which do not al-
ways produce formal determinations of guilt, were frequently observed.
6. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 29 (1974); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973); Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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from a proper course of events in the criminal justice system.7
Critics of plea bargaining often charge that its rise in popularity
represents the triumph of administrative and organizational interests
over justice. Collectively opponents believe that it commercializes a
normative process, perverts the attorney-client relationship, diminishes
the role of judges, and undercuts important legal doctrines. Further-
more, opponents feel that it promotes laziness, incompetence, and
favoritism by personal influence. Finally, adversaries allege that it en-
courages unwarranted leniency toward the guilty and conviction of the
innocent, and merges the tasks of adjudication and sentencing, thus al-
lowing the public to think that the guilty are getting away with
something.8
Plea bargaining does, however, have its supporters. 9 In a study of
six Colorado judicial districts, 10 fifty per-cent of the judges and a major-
ity of the lawyers interviewed believed that plea bargaining serves a use-
ful purpose when responsible people are involved." Some of those
interviewed commented that it can individualize justice and produce
more consistent results. Others commented that in the presence of
overcharging, a plea bargain can produce conviction for crimes actually
committed, and thereby produce appropriate sentences. Yet even those
judges and lawyers who supported it, expressed concern. As one judge
put it, "in the hands of the skilled it's a surgeon's scalpel. But in the
hands of the unskilled it's a butcher knife."
The purpose of this article is to present both surveyed and empiri-
cal information of felony plea bargaining practice in Colorado. This ar-
ticle will present the findings of a survey conducted of six Colorado
judicial districts. 12 The opinions of both judges and lawyers from each
of these districts address the growing concern over the Colorado plea
bargaining process. It is the author's hope that this article will en-
courage further investigation of the Colorado plea bargaining process,
and the development of guidelines for a uniform plea bargaining
system.
II. CONTRASTED VIEWS OF THE COLORADO LEGAL PROFESSION
Most of the judges interviewed felt that plea bargaining was forced
upon them. Yet, many felt that less bargaining was possible and that
they could agree to changes in current trial procedures if such changes
would reduce the overall occurrence of plea bargaining. Furthermore,
many felt that certain aspects of plea bargaining such as sentencing con-
7. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 199, 201 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 934 (1983). Many of the judges inter-
viewed in this study agreed. See infra Appendices A and B.
9. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 934.
10. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
11. The 27 judges whose cases were examined in this study were interviewed, as were
the six district attorneys, and the six lead public defenders in the districts studied.
12. See infra Appendices A and B.
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cessions should be eliminated. Finally, some expressed concern that
plea bargaining had taken them "out of the game," and many of those
who felt that they were still in the game were unclear about the proper
extent of their participation in the regulation of plea bargaining.
Generally, the lawyers interviewed like plea bargaining. Many be-
lieve that it works because it aids in producing justice in an overworked
system. Furthermore, lawyers were not particularly concerned that
rights may be lost in the process because the rights at risk are not that
valuable in practice. The lawyers interviewed think plea bargaining re-
flects the desire of many Americans for a deal, and that it will continue
to be utilized because of economic necessity, human nature, local poli-
tics, and a perceived need for intangible justice. Nevertheless, the law-
yers also expressed concern that the process may distort the traditional
lawyer-client relationship.
A number of the judges and lawyers interviewed did not agree that
plea bargaining responds to existing problems. These judges and law-
yers believe that it can produce or maintain some of the abuses it is
designed to correct. One question they raised was: Do prosecutors
overcharge because of plea bargaining or does plea bargaining exist, in
part, because of overcharging?
Some legal scholars feel that bargaining for justice is inappropriate
and view it with distaste. 13 A leading critic of plea bargaining, former
University of Colorado Law Professor Albert Alschuler, suggests that
plea bargaining may be distasteful to the public because it implies that
defendants are only half-guilty, which is a concept that most people with
a moralistic view of punishment find difficult to accept. To Alschuler, if
the criminal process works at all, it may be because it reinforces con-
cepts of moral responsibility and moral guilt that cannot be properly
compromised. 14 Nevertheless, the inevitability of plea bargaining is
now generally accepted,15 and many Colorado judges, district attorneys,
and lead public defenders that were interviewed agreed with this conclu-
sion. 16 The current trend, therefore, is for control, not abolition.'
7
Clearly, plea bargaining would not exist if advantage could not be
derived from it. One of the rationales given for its widespread use is
that it allows justice to be done. In a recent article discussing its use, it
was said that, "[m]andatory sentencing laws [have] induce[d] wholesale
circumvention and manipulation by judges, prosecutors and defense
13. M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 156, n.l I (1978);J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS 130 (1982).
14. See Alschuler, supra note 8.
15. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. Svs. J 338
(1982); butsee Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) (argu-
ing that it is not inevitable).
16. See infra Appendices A and B.
17. Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BuLL. 101
(1978). In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals proposed complete abolition of plea bargaining by 1978.
19891 245
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
counsel determined to prevent injustice in individual cases .... ,18
III. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
What are the advantages to negotiating a plea as opposed to going
to trial? What drives plea bargaining? These questions have been asked
and answered often without producing any meaningful change. 19
Therefore, it might be more useful to begin addressing questions such
as: Does the operation of the system by which felony cases are resolved
conform to the justice system's formal specifications? Does plea bar-
gaining, as practiced, comply with basic notions of how a just judicial
system ought to work? Are there differences between doctrine and
practice?
20
Similar to other state legislatures, the Colorado General Assembly
maintains an expensive and elaborate jury-trial system through which
felony cases may be regularly resolved. However, that jury-trial system
is rarely used. 2 1 Instead, most felony cases are resolved through plea
bargaining, a system that the General Assembly also maintains.
22
Therefore, since plea bargaining is the real felony resolution system, it
should be studied thoroughly to make it as effective as possible.
The Colorado General Assembly has mandated long prison
sentences in many cases, yet it also compels mitigation of sentences by
withholding the funds necessary to carry them out. 2 3 Perhaps then, as
has been suggested, it may be necessary to subvert the system to make
room in prisons for new offenders. 24 Similarly, if Colorado is unwilling
to provide the funds necessary to make jury trials effectively available to
all defendants, then plea bargaining and its discretion may be the only
way to resolve the many pending felony cases.
18. Morris & Tonry, Presiding in Criminal Court: An Introduction, 72 JUDICATURE 7, 10
(1988).
19. SeeJ. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS (1982).
20. The notion that a legal system may operate in a manner significantly different
from its formally stated specifications can be traced back to a single, seminal article written
by the influential Roscoe Pound in 1910. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.
U.L. REV. 12 (1910). Two years later he expanded on this notion saying that "the life of
the law is in its enforcement," and he advocated the study of the workings of the law so
that it could be made most effective. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 514 (1912). Pound's call for empirical research not only influ-
enced his own generation, but also future generations including our own. See, e.g., the
June/July 1988 symposium issue of JUDICATURE, vol. 72, on policy-relevant research.
21. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (1986).
23. It has been suggested that the public demands long prison sentences because it
does not support probation:
In an era . . . in which many public officials believe that the public demands
greater certainty and severity in the imposition of punishments, .... new interme-
diate sanctions must be more intrusive and punitive than nominal probation if
they are to be credible. In other words, pressures now exist that call for develop-
ment of new non-incarcerative sanctions that are less punitive than imprisonment
and more punitive than probation.
See Morris & Tonry, supra note 18, at 9.




What guides the exercise of the discretion inherent in plea bargain-
ing? Is it exercised in a consistent, equal and uniform manner? Is it
subject to meaningful regulation? Does it conform to basic notions of
how ajust judicial system ought to operate? These questions are impor-
tant because "[t]he fairness and consistency of the process by which fel-
ony disputes are handled [in the trial courts] goes to the heart of our
conceptions of justice."
25
This article, in presenting findings from a study of six Colorado ju-
dicial districts, addresses these important questions. This article began
as a general study of felony resolution practices, but quickly became a
specific study of plea bargaining practices after it became evident that
almost all of the cases examined had been resolved through negotiation
without trial, and that most of the defendants had plead guilty "or other-
wise admitted their guilt.
By admitting their guilt, these defendants had given up arguably
valuable constitutional rights such as the right to confront one's ac-
cuser(s) in a trial by jury,26 the right to remain silent at trial, 2 7 the right
to a presumption of innocence and the right to an acquittal after trial
unless all reasonable doubt about guilt had been eliminated.
2 8
While plea bargaining affects the exercise of these defendants'
rights, it also impacts public rights including the right to have the pun-
ishment fit the crime, and the right to observe the administration ofjus-
tice. Since the sentence was often determined before guilt had finally
been resolved, important constitutional questions of due process and
equal protection could have been involved if harsher sentences were im-
posed on those who went to trial than on those who plea bargained.
2 9
If the practice observed in the six judicial districts included in this
study reflects practice throughout Colorado,3 0 then plea bargaining is
25. Nardulli, Flemming & Eisenstein, Criminal Courts and Bureaucraticjustice: Concessions
and Consensus in the Guilty Plea Process, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1103, 1104 (1985). It
has been argued, though, that this concern for the loss of constitutional rights misses a
reality: that it was the development of those valuable rights that gave defendants the bar-
gaining power that in turn gave rise to plea bargaining. See Langbein, Understanding the
Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 261 (1979).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speech and public trial .... and ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... ").
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself....").
28. Parnas, Proposed Legislation Facilitating Discussions of Statutory Regulations of Plea Bar-
gaining, 13 AM.J. CRIM. L. 381, 331 (1986).
29. However, most of the judges interviewed said that they did not impose harsher
sentences on defendants who exercised their right to trial. See Bond, supra note 19.
30. The conclusions reached in this study may hold true throughout Colorado.
Rarely... does a [researcher] question all of the people in whose views or behav-
ior he or she is interested. Instead the researcher takes a subset or sample of the
larger population about which he or she wishes to make inferences. The critical
aspect of a sample is that it be representative of the population from which it is
drawn.
D. MONAHAN & P. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 58 (1985). This study involved an effort
to do empirical research on a subject that was difficult to control, under circumstances
hard to control. All data was collected by the author who had limited time and money
1989]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the standard means for the resolution of felony cases in Colorado.
IV. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY
The six districts studied were chosen for their diverseness and are
thought to be representative of current Colorado practice. The study
included districts from the eastern and western slope of the continental
divide, districts with different population densities,3 1 and districts with
discernible cultural elements such as city dwellers, farmers and ranch-
ers, ski area dwellers, and persons from diverse ethnic backgrounds.
The six districts studied were the third, seventh, eleventh, twelfth, twen-
tieth, and the twenty-first. 3 2 In each district, cases were examined in
both the ,district and county courts. The districts are highlighted on the
accompanying page in Diagram I.
A practical examination of hundreds of felony cases to determine
how they were resolved was considered appropriate because such hard
data can provide the most reliable basis for formulating proper re-
sponses to any perceived problems in the trial courts.33 All data was
collected during the first six months of 1988. Since this study was con-
available. Simple random sampling of cases could not be used because of the need to mix
rural and urban districts in the study. If only urban districts had been necessary then
important interdependent variables could have been more easily controlled such as the
number of case files to be examined, the time frame within which the activity was to be
observed, the types of crimes involved, and the identities of the parties involved. Because
rural districts had to be included an effort was made to balance these variables and strati-
fied random sampling was therefore used to promote the representativeness of the dis-
tricts and the cases examined. On the use of stratified random sampling, see generally W.
GOODE, METHODS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 221-25 (1952).
Since simple random subject selection could not be used it would be appropriate for
others to replicate this study before the results offered here are afforded statewide applica-
tion. For the importance of replication see H. BLALOCK & A. BLALOCK, METHODOLOGY IN
SOCIAL RESEARCH 13-18 (1968). However, replication as confirmation requires carefully
controlling significant variables which are not always possible outside a laboratory where
human choice is involved, as is the case here.
In the final analysis, studies such as the one presented here may have to be limited to
describing what has happened and not to infer what will happen, K. HAMMOND, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STATISTICAL METHOD 9 (1963); and to identify those principles and relation-
ships that survive across heterogeneous circumstances, see also W. CRANO, PRINCIPLES OF
RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1973).
31. According to 1980 census figures, about 190,000 persons live in the twentieth
Judicial District, about 81,500 in the twenty-first, about 62,000 in the seventh, about
49,000 in the eleventh, about 38,000 in the twelfth, and about 21,500 in the third. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE (1980).
32. The twentieth and the twenty-first districts are relatively well populated single-
county districts. Boulder is the principal city in the twentieth and Grand Junction is the
principal city in the twenty-first. The other four districts are rural, less populated, multi-
county districts. There are two counties in the third district: Las Animas and Huerfano;
four counties in the eleventh district: Chaffee, Fremont, Park and Sumter; and, six coun-
ties in the seventh and twelfth districts. The seventh district consists of Delta, Gunnison,
Hinsdale, Montrose, Ouray and San Miguel counties. The twelfth district includes the
counties of Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande and Saguache. Politically
significant communities in these districts include Alamosa, Boulder, Canon City, Creede,
Crested Butte, Delta, Grand Junction, Gunnison, Monte Vista, Montrose, Ouray, Salida,
Telluride, Trinidad and Walsenburg.
33. On the importance of "hard data" to the proper study of trial courts, see Nardulli,
Flemming & Eisenstein, Criminal Courts and Bureaucratic Justice: Concessions and Consensus in
the Guilty Plea Process, supra note 22, at 1113 (1985). A hands-on examination was also
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cerned with resolution practices, only closed files were included. Also,
since the study was concerned with observing a significant number of
cases, the time frame of activity that was observed varied. In the urban
districts, this meant only going back a few months; but, in the rural dis-
tricts, it often meant going back a year. Over one-hundred files were
examined in each district. 34 While it was easy to find recently closed
files in the more populous districts such as the twentieth, this was not
possible in the rural districts such as the third.
3 5
Only files that had been closed on their merits were included in the
study. Files that did not present a chance for plea bargaining were ex-
cluded, such as extradition cases or cases in which the defendant failed
to appear.
The author traveled to each of the courts involved in the study, and
in all instances personally examined each file to limit data gathering er-
rors. Similarly, each judge and lawyer was personally interviewed by the
author.
The process used to gather information from the files was straight
forward. Examination began with the most recently closed cases and
proceeded backward in time. In relatively busy communities such as
Boulder3 6 or Grand Junction 3 7 this required going back only a few
months, but in other districts it meant going back many months. There-
fore, it was sometimes necessary to examine all of the 1987 cases to ob-
tain an appreciable sample.3 8 As expected, the duration for closing
cases varied. 39 The district court cases that were examined were closed
during a span of twenty-four months, with most closed between July
1987 and March 1988. Closing activity was seen in all district courts
during a five month span between October 1987 and February 1988.
The county court cases that were examined were closed during a span of
sixteen months, with most closed between June 1987 and March 1988.
Closing activity was seen in all county courts during a three month span
between October 1987 and January 1988. Since all of the districts stud-
ied have more than one judge, cases were distributed among judges that
were serving on the bench at the time the examined cases were resolved.
necessary because the Colorado court system does not have and therefore cannot provide
the kind of information that is necessary to conduct a study of this type.
34. The exact number of cases was not reviewed in each district for a variety of rea-
sons including: field limitations such as constraints on the author's time and the time of
court personnel; geographic limitations (rural courts in multi-county districts were typi-
cally not "busy"); time frame restrictions on practice to be observed (going back into 1986
would skew results);judge-mix needs (apportionment of cases amongjudges involved dur-
ing the timeframe observed); and refinement needs (some cases had to be passed over
because they had not provided a chance for plea bargaining or had not yet been closed or
were missing from the files).
35. The Colorado court system reported by telephone on July 20, 1988, that felony
district court closings in 1987 were: Ninety closings in the third district; 189 closings in
the seventh district; 294 closings in the eleventh district; 100 closings in the twelfth dis-
trict; 793 closings in the twentieth district; and 363 closings in the twenty-first district.
36. The twentieth Judicial District.
37. The twenty-first Judicial District.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Appendices A and B.
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In addition to the file number, other data was also collected such as:
the original police charges, formal charges that were filed by the prose-
cution, any changes to those charges, and the method of resolution such
as dismissal, trial or plea. Furthermore, when available, an explanation
of the particular type of resolution chosen was included. This often in-
cludes the prosecutor's decision not to file felony charges, to dismiss
them or to reduce them to misdemeanors after filing. In addition, when
available, sentencing concessions, such as guarantees of probation or
agreements that limited the number of years that the defendant was to
serve were also noted.
Some judicial districts do not use written dispositional stipulations
or plea agreements. Thus, written explanations for a particular action
were often not found in the court file. In addition, not all judges follow
the American Bar Association's recommendation that court files should
speak for themselves. 40 Currently, Colorado has no uniform system of
plea bargain record-keeping.
V. BEHIND THE SCENES IN THE COLORADO COURT SYSTEM
A. Plea Bargaining in County Court
Two types of state trial courts exist in Colorado: county courts and
district courts. 4 1 A felony case usually starts off in a county court where
a county judge determines whether there is sufficient evidence to allow
the case to proceed. If there is sufficient evidence the case is then for-
warded to the district court for trial or other resolution. Often, how-
ever, rather than being forwarded, felony cases are resolved in the
county court through the activity that is commonly known as plea bar-
gaining. 4 2 In fact, a significant number of the felony cases examined ap-
pear to be resolved by plea bargaining.
Straightforward bargaining of felony cases in county courts involves
the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to one or more misdemeanors
in return for dismissal of all felony charges. However, other conduct,
suggestive of plea bargaining, was also seen, such as complete dismissal
of all charges with the defendant agreeing to pay restitution to the vic-
tim even though he had not admitted that he had committed a crime or
been found guilty of committing any crime.
As Table I indicates, the frequency of straight forward plea bargain-
ing in the county courts ranged from zero percent to twenty-six percent
with most county courts showing more than fifteen percent. However, a
focus on straightforward bargaining activity alone does not accurately
reflect the full extent of the bargaining-type activity that may take place
40. A.B.A., Guilty Plea Standards, NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS PROCEEDING 69 (1973).
41. Municipal courts in Colorado are not "state" courts.
42. Only one county judge reported an absence of felony bargaining activity, saying
that the district attorney did not want bargaining of felony cases to go on there. Another
county judge reported little felony bargaining because most felony cases were filed directly
into district court by order of his chiefjudge.
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in the county courts. In addition to straightforward bargaining, many
prosecutors also regularly dismissed cases and made other decisions
suggestive of plea bargaining. The frequency of such activity is also de-
scribed in Table I in the column labelled "Prosecution Dismissal."
Very few of the cases examined were dismissed for lack of evi-
dence. 43 When those cases along with the cases that had been for-
warded to the district courts for resolution were removed from
consideration, the percentage of felony cases left to be resolved in the
county courts ranged from twelve percent to fifty-two percent. 44 While
it cannot be said authoritatively that all of these cases were resolved
through bargaining-type activity because county court paper tracks are
not clear enough to say that it appears that prosecutors often decided to
dismiss them or lessen them following plea bargaining. As Table I indi-
cates, many felony cases were dismissed completely in the county courts
after formal charges had been filed which suggested that an agreement
akin to a deferred judgment had been reached, a common felony resolu-
tion practice used in the district courts. In some instances the files con-
tained statements to that effect, for example, that the defendant agreed
to pay restitution to his or her victim even though the charges were be-
ing dismissed. Therefore, based on the information collected in this
study, it appears that felony cases are often resolved in county courts
through bargaining-type activity.
43. In four of the six districts in this study there were no cases that had been dis-
missed for lack of evidence. In one district, one case had been dismissed for lack of evi-
dence and in another district two cases had been dismissed for that reason.
44. These percentages were derived by adding the sums of the columns in Table I
labelled: "Straightforward Bargain" (the number of instances in which the prosecution
had reduced felony charges to misdemeanors to which the defendant plead guilty); "Mis-
demeanor Charging" (the number of instances in which the prosecution charged a misde-
meanor even though the defendant had been arrested for a felony); and "Prosecution
Dismissal" (the number of instances in which the prosecution dismissed all charges after
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B. Plea Bargaining in District Court
Table II describes how often customary felony resolution tech-
niques used in district court were observed. These techniques include
voluntary dismissal by the prosecution, non-induced pleas of guilty from
defendants, straight forward bargaining, and trial. As Table II shows,
felony cases were often resolved through straightforward bargaining,
ranging from sixty-five percent in some districts to eighty-eight percent
in others. When the cases that were obviously bargained are added to
those that were voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution, as many as
ninety-five percent of the district court cases may have been resolved
through negotiated admissions of responsibility, which confirms na-
tional estimates.
52
The files of cases that were voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution
often reflected that some bargaining had occurred. In many instances,
defendants agreed to pay restitution to the victims even though the case
had been dismissed. Thus, it is appropriate to consider cases that were
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution along with the cases that were
obviously bargained.
In the Grand Junction district, 53 eighty-eight percent of the cases
were clearly resolved through bargaining and perhaps as many as
ninety-nine percent when the cases voluntarily dismissed by the prose-
cution are added. In the Boulder district,54 at least eighty-three percent
of the cases were resolved through bargaining and perhaps all of the
cases examined when those voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution are
added. In the Alamosa district, 55 at least eighty-one percent and per-
haps ninety-five percent of the cases examined were resolved through
plea bargaining. In the Canon City/Salida district,5 6 at least sixty-five
percent of the cases were resolved through bargaining and possibly
eighty-nine percent when those voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution
are added. In the Montrose/Gunnison/Telluride district,5 7 at least
eighty-two percent of the cases examined were resolved through plea
bargaining and perhaps ninety percent after those dismissed by the
prosecution are added. Finally, in the Trinidad/Walsenburg district,
5 8
at least seventy-five percent of the cases examined were resolved
through bargaining and possibly ninety-four percent when the cases vol-
untarily dismissed by the prosecution are added.
52. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE,
Task Force Report: The Courts 9 (1967).
53. The Twenty-first Judicial District.
54. The Twentieth Judicial District.
55. The Twelfth Judicial District.
56. The Eleventh Judicial District.
57. The Seventh Judicial District.
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VI. DiSCUSSION
Colorado plea bargaining practices are not uniform; they differ
from district to district, prosecutor to prosecutor, and judge to judge.
The techniques used and the results obtained depend on numerous vari-
ables such as the parties involved in the process, the location, as well as
the types of offenses being negotiated. Therefore, while it is true that
the vast majority of felony cases are resolved through negotiated admis-
sions of responsibility, it is important to note that the process, while
being pervasive, is also site specific. For example, some prosecutors re-
ported limits on plea bargaining while others reported different limits,
and some judges were willing to allow limits on their sentencing discre-
tion while others were not.
63
The effort undertaken by this study was to begin an empirical exam-
ination of the felony resolution practices in Colorado. In many in-
stances, the practice in a particular court pursuant to the local legal
culture may be predictable and local practice may produce justice in in-
dividual cases. Additional research is needed to distinguish between
bargaining techniques that reach the same end in all cases and tech-
niques that may lead to different results in the same type of cases. Addi-
tional research is needed to examine how the various plea bargaining
techniques are effected by factors such as the charges originally filed, the
defendant's prior record, and mitigating circumstances.
Some of the plea bargaining seemed tailored to a specific case while
other bargaining appeared routine and bureaucratic, bureaucratic in the
sense that it seemed to reflect administrative pressures to move cases
along rather than careful consideration of individual cases. Examples of
such bargaining include: regularly granting deferred judgments without
conviction of any offense to first-time felony offenders; regularly afford-
ing defendants dismissal-on-restitution if they were accused of crimes
just inside the felony range such as theft of property valued at $350; and
regularly granting sentencing concessions to serious offenders.
Plea bargaining's many forms suggest that care can be taken with
individual defendants and victims to fashion appropriate results. Never-
theless, its many forms also suggest a potential for justice to be adminis-
tered quite differently in arguably similar cases. Successful plea
bargaining usually involves the interplay of many resolution techniques
including deferred judgment,6 abandonment of charges, reduction of
charges, dismissal of charges, and sentencing concessions. As Table III
indicates, the instances in which these plea bargaining techniques were
used in each district varied. For example, the instances in which district
court felony cases were resolved by reducing charges ranged from four-
teen percent in the twentieth district to forty percent in the twelfth dis-
trict, and the instances in which district court felony cases were resolved
63. See infra Appendices A and B.
64. A deferred judgment involves a plea of guilty to the charge but not a conviction.
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through deferred judgments ranged from fifteen percent in the third
district to thirty-five percent in the twentieth district.
This varied use of plea bargaining techniques suggest a lack of or-
der and a lack of statewide policy. If plea bargaining practices were in
fact driven by statewide policy, then the differences between the ob-
served frequencies of use of specific plea bargaining techniques and the
expected frequencies of use should be small. In other words, one would
expect the frequencies of use of these techniques to be generally the
same across district lines. However, the opposite was observed. Indeed,
the frequencies of use of these techniques varied considerably from dis-
trict to district. Social scientists often use the statistic chi square to ana-
lyze this type of data. 66 We may hypothesize that a particular plea
bargaining technique will be seen a certain number of times, and then
state how many of a sample of cases should show use of that technique.
If the hypothesis is acceptable, the difference between observed and ex-
pected should be no larger than on the basis of chance. If the observed
difference is too large, not apt to arise from chance, the stated hypothe-
sis becomes suspect. Using the chi square analysis, the potential that
chance would produce the variety of use observed here is one in a thou-
sand.6 7 Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that each district employs
a unique policy, and that there is no cohesive statewide policy.
68
The varied use of techniques also suggests that the prosecutors and
judges involved did not have shared attitudes about the use of these
resolution techniques, which they often confirmed in their interviews. 6 9
Furthermore, the variety of use suggests that the locale of the prosecu-




In the six districts studied, plea bargaining appears to be site spe-
cific, which reflects, among other things, lack of agreement on its accept-
able features and on its proper limits. The absence of recognized,
statewide standards for judicial review of proposed plea bargains results
in a lack of uniform practice. 7 1 The absence of such standards explains
66. The "chi square" analysis is the sum of the squared differences between the ob-
served and expected frequencies, each divided by the expected frequencies.
67. See infra Appendix C.
68. For general discussion on the use of chi square, see G. MCNEMARA, PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATISTICs (3d ed. 1966).
69. See infra Appendix A.
70. Should the particular prosecutor, defense attorney or judge involved in a case
make a difference for bargaining purposes?
71. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.430-.460 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (recom-
mended prosecuting standards for charging and plea dispositions). Regarding any plea
disposition, the general standard in Washington State is that "a defendant ... [ius ex-
pected to plead guilty to the charge or charges which adequately describe the nature of his
or her criminal conduct or go to trial." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.450 (1988). The
statute goes on to describe a limited number of exceptions to this general rule and the
circumstances which give rise to their application. Also included in the statutory scheme
are specific guidelines regarding the decision to prosecute.
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why plea bargaining is personal, geographic and clubby, and why it does
not now appear to be subject to the rule of law.
7 2
The rule of law calls for decisions to be made through the applica-
tion of known principles with minimum intervention of discretion in
their application. While the american west has been described as having
traditionally minimized the role of the rule of law and granted prosecu-
tors legally questionable discretion, 7 3 too much discretion is recognized
as being dangerous to contemporary legal systems. The contemporary
philosopher John Rawls has warned that:
[i]f deviations from justice as regularity are too pervasive, a se-
rious question may arise whether a system of law exists as op-
posed to a collection of particular orders designed to advance
the interests of a dictator or the ideal of a benevolent des-
pot.... The Rule of Law ... implies the precept that similar
cases be treated similarly.
74
A. The Need for Legislative Action
Clearly, uniform equal criminal justice, is not being achieved
through uniform procedure. 7 5 If such uniformity is to occur it will likely
require legislative action. The form that such legislative action takes will
obviously be of great consequence to every individual who becomes in-
volved in plea bargaining.
Legislative action would likely reflect a desire to restrict, or at least
inhibit, current plea bargaining activities. For example, the Colorado
General Assembly could try to inhibit the current avoidance of its defacto
sentencing guidelines. Under current legislative policy, mandatory im-
prisonment and stiff prison sentences are required in many instances.
Yet these requirements are not followed when the prosecution agrees
not to file sentencing enhancement charges, or agrees to abandon such
charges after they are filed, or permit deferred judgments, or agrees to
grant sentencing concessions.
The General Assembly could also require that defendants accept
full responsibility for the crime(s) they actually commit. For example,
the General Assembly might try to inhibit the widespread use of de-
ferred judgment, a seductively disarming felony resolution technique.
When judgment is deferred in felony cases, the accused pleads guilty to
a serious crime, the prosecution "wins" another case, and the court is
able to move on to other pressing cases. However, built into this pro-
cess is an assumption on the part of accused felons that they will success-
72. For a definition of the "rule of law" see Black's Law Dictionary 712 (5th ed. 1979).
73. See supra note 24.
74. J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 237-38 (1971). For a general discussion of differing
notions about the rule of law in contemporary society, see R. WOLFF, THE RULE OF LAW
(1971).
75. Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justice Douglas stated that "[s]teadfast adherence to strict procedural
safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law." Id. at 179. See
also O'Conner, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of Procedural
Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 170 (1988).
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fully complete probationary-like terms that usually last two or more
years. If they do, then the prosecution will dismiss the on-hold felony
charges and the felony conviction will be avoided.
Many accused felons are willing to make the assumption that they
will successfully complete such probationary-like terms. Unfortunately,
it is an assumption that does not always prove to be true. Deferred judg-
ments are revoked and defendants then find themselves convicted of
felonies without the benefit of trial. Such defendants sometimes claim
they were pressured into admitting their guilt and claim that they have
been victimized by an oppressive system. When this happens, guilty
pleas and determinations of guilt lose their moral force and defendants
do not assume responsibility for the crime(s) they actually commit.
This does not mean that deferred judgment is inappropriate in
every case and that the General Assembly should prohibit it altogether.
Rather, these circumstances might impel the General Assembly to re-
quire more direct involvement of trial judges in the plea bargaining pro-
cess, and to require a fuller record in each case than is now required.
B. Guidelines to be Followed
Any statutory guidelines and requirements concerning plea bar-
gaining should balance the rights of the accused, the safety of the public,
and the economic reality of scarce judicial resources. Statutory guide-
lines and requirements should therefore describe:
1. The factors that the prosecution must consider in deter-
mining whether to decline to prosecute some or all of the pos-
sible charges that might lead to conviction, and whether to
agree to sentencing concessions.
2. The circumstances that the prosecution must show exist to
support the proposed plea bargain in each case.
3. The factors that the prosecution must show exist to warrant
avoidance of sentencing enhancement policies established by
the General Assembly.
4. The rights that similarly situated defendants have to equal
opportunities to resolve their criminal charges without trial.
5. The findings that trial judges must ordinarily make to war-
rant approval of the plea bargains proposed in each case.
6. The circumstances in which a guilty plea should not be ac-
cepted, including the circumstances, without limitation, in
which it should be found that the public interest would not be
served by a proposed plea bargain.
7. The trial judge's duty, if any, to ensure that evidence exists
to support a finding of guilt where the defendant pleads guilty
while asserting innocence.
8. The circumstances when it is appropriate to record the
terms of a plea bargain in chambers and not in open court.
76
76. For an example of a statute that might work in Colorado, see Parnas, Proposed




Additional factors relating specifically to current Colorado practice
that ought to be considered in the formulation of appropriate guidelines
include:
1. County judges are often involved in the plea bargained res-
olution of felony cases. Therefore, they are required by Colo-
rado criminal procedure to exercise the same "independent
judgment" over proposed plea bargains that district judges are
accustomed to exercising.7 7 Since all of Colorado's county
judges do not have to be full-time judges and do not always
have to be lawyers, clear standards enumerating a judge's du-
ties for plea bargains would probably greatly assist them.
2. Prosecutors and judges do not all agree on the appropriate
parameters of plea bargaining. Therefore, specific guidelines
should be set for statewide policies on issues such as:
(A) May all charges be dismissed because the de-
fendant has agreed to make or has made restitution?
(B) When is it appropriate that deferred judgment
be granted without conviction of any offense? Is it gener-
ally appropriate in any of the following instances: When it
is the defendant's first serious offense, or when the defend-
ant is young, or when the defendant has made or agreed to
make restitution?
(C) May sentence concessions routinely be a part of
plea bargains? If so, what are the proper parameters of
such concessions? Are restrictions on sentencing and
guarantees of probation appropriate? And if so, when?
(D) What rights do victims have to participate in or
be made aware of plea discussions? 78 Should the court be
made aware of the victim's concerns?
79
(E) Should plea bargains customarily be reduced to
writing and become part of the court file in each case?
(F) Should all district attorneys publish broad policy
guidelines on plea bargaining?
80
C. Propriety of Judicial Supervision of Plea Bargaining
Although procedural rules now exist in Colorado to regulate the
77. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(0(5).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-601 (1986) (recognizing a victim's right to be heard at
sentencing).
79. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 301 (1987) (arguing
that victims should have a limited right to be heard). See also Van den Haag, Limiting Plea
Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1984).
80. A.B.A., Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function, Standard 2.5 (Tentative Draft 1970). These guidelines
should be flexible enough to permit individual exercise of discretion, but specific enough
to make general policies known to the bar, the bench, and the public; policies that will
contribute to the fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of criminal law. The Boulder
County District Attorney's office has had written plea bargaining policies since 1982.
Eleven of the twelve lawyers interviewed said that they were aware of existing, unwritten
policies "published" by their local district attorney's offices. See also Bond, Plea Bargaining
in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 823, 834-36 (1976).
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acceptance of guilty pleas from defendants and to regulate requests
from prosecutors to dismiss pending cases, 8 1 the terms used in these
rules are inherently ambiguous
8 2 and incomplete.83
These rules suffer from other infirmities as well. They do not make
it possible to consider court determinations of guilt based on plea bar-
gains as reliable as determinations of guilt that follow trial. This is true
because the rules do not require that a judge determine that there is
sufficient evidence for a conviction based on a plea bargaining. Further-
more, a trial judge's ability to protect the public interest is limited be-
cause these rules do not describe when the reasons given for a proposed
plea bargain are to be deemed adequate or inadequate.
84
Although it may be difficult to develop and enforce standards spe-
cifically applicable to plea bargaining, such standards are necessary if
the system is to maintain its moral force.8 5 Fortunately, much of the
legal groundwork for the development of such standards already exists.
When the United States Supreme Court endorsed plea bargaining in
Santobello v. New York, 8 6 it declared that there was no absolute right to
plead guilty, and that a plea of guilty could be rejected in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.8 7 A respected observer commented that:
"[A] judge is expected to check the plea bargaining practices of prosecu-
tors and reject plea bargains that are not appropriate to the total circum-
stance ... ."88
A current member of the Colorado Supreme Court, formally its
chiefjustice, has suggested that while the trial judge must be sensitive to
the accused's rights, the trial judge must also avoid endorsing any effort
to secure leniency for its own sake, leniency that is not, for example,
requested in the presence of contrition, repentance or remorse. 89
Other respected observers, commenting on the importance of judicial
supervision, have noted that:
If. . . exchange or bargaining interactions dominate criminal
court operations, then the fears of those who cherish the ideals
of due process would be realized. The indiscriminate manipu-
lation of the powers entrusted to public officials to coerce de-
fendants into yielding important constitutional rights . . .
81. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
82. Pursuant to Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 1I, the court may not accept a
plea of guilty unless it is "voluntary." However, voluntary is not easy to define.
83. Pursuant to Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 48(a), a prosecutor cannot dis-
miss a pending case without court approval. While this rule requires that requests to dis-
miss be supported in writing by concisely stated reasons, the rule does not describe when
the reasons given are to be deemed adequate or inadequate, and neither does Colorado
case law.
84. See supra note 81.
85. See supra notes 5 & 75 (both expressing a concern that law maintain its moral
force).
86. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Colorado Supreme Court has also endorsed plea bar-
gaining. See People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 514 P.2d 69 (1973); People v. Dobbs, 175
Colo. 273, 486 P.2d 1053 (1971).
87. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257, 262.
88. R. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING 109 (1978).
89. Erickson, Finality of Pleas of Guilty, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 835, 841 (1973).
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breed(s) contempt and resentment instead of remorse and re-
solve . . . and undermines the justice system's credibility and
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.90
In Colorado, plea bargaining is an established institution expressly
permitted by statute, court rule, and case law. 9 ' However, specific stan-
dards for its regulation have not been adopted by the supreme court or
the General Assembly. Pursuant to the applicable American Bar Associ-
ation standard, a plea bargain should only be approved:
[w]hen consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity
of the offense, and the needs of the defendant, and when there
is substantial evidence to establish that: (i) the defendant is
genuinely contrite and has shown a willingness to assume re-
sponsibility for his or her conduct; (ii) the concessions will
make possible (more appropriate) correctional measures ... or
will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the conviction,
or (iii) the defendant ... has demonstrated genuine considera-
tion for the victim(s) . . . by desiring either to make restitution
or to prevent unseemingly public scrutiny or embarrassment to
them; or (iv) the defendant has (or will) cooperate . . . in the
successful prosecution of other(s) .... 92
In short, before accepting a negotiated plea, a trial judge should be able
to find from the record that the plea serves the public interest.
Colorado's trial judges are required to subject proposed plea bar-
gains to their independent judgment.9 3 To what extent they may, or
should, interpose themselves into the plea bargaining process, however,
is unclear.
In most states,94 the prosecution may not dismiss charges without
judicial approval, 9 5 and, in most states, trial judges may, and often do,
participate in plea discussions. 9 6 By contrast, at the federal level, trial
judges are not expected to participate in plea discussions despite the
fact that they do possess some limited power to regulate the process.
9 7
The Colorado Supreme Court, while ostensibly following the restrictive
federal rule, has consistently backed trial judges who rejected proposed
plea bargains. In so doing, however, it has offered little direction for
90. See supra note 25.
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (1986); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(f(5); People v. Mac-
rander, 756 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1988); People v. Lucero, 714 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1985); People v.
McGhee, 667 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1983); People v. Wright, 38 Colo. 271, 559 P.2d 249 (1976),
aff'd, 194 Colo. 448, 573 P.2d 551 (1978).
92. A.B.A. Standards, Plea of Guilty, § 1.8 (1968).
93. COLO. R. CRIM. P. II(f(5).
94. Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 186, 207 n.73 (1976).
95. Note,Judicial Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas, 63 GEO. L.J. 241, 255 n.93 (1974).
96. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1); U.S. v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. U.S. v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Com-
binatie Voor Chemische Indus., 75 F.R.D. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); U.S. v. Cowan, 524 F.2d
504 (5th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It should be noted
though that federal authority is shaky because in Cowan and Ammidown, denial of the prose-
cution's request to dismiss was deemed an abuse of discretion. In Perate, denial was af-
firmed on procedural grounds peculiar to that case, and in N. V Nederlandsche Combinatie
Voor Chemische Industries, denial was accepted and not appealed.
19891
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
future conduct.9 8
VIII. ANALYSIS
In general, the criminal justice system is becoming more adminis-
trative and less adversary.9 9 Consequently, judges and other court offi-
cials are in danger of becoming mere figureheads. 0 0 Most cases today
are resolved through the process of plea bargaining, a process that many
observers believe is premised not on strict adherence to any consistent
constitutional ideology, but on strict adherence to a bureaucratic rou-
tine grounded on pragmatic concerns.101
This process has its own unwritten rules embedded in the social and
cultural experience of the courtroom.' 0 2 Over a period of time, the law-
yers and judges involved in this process have developed shared notions
of what is fair, both generally and specifically.
10 3
While we may have, as citizens, chosen to place considerable faith in
the criminal justice system's ability to produce just results through such
a cultural system, 10 4 the system's players, its lawyers and judges, have
never had unfettered discretion to arrive at whatever results they think
are fair, free from public accountability. Lawyers and judges have al-
ways been expected to be accountable to the law and to society's needs.
However, in the context of plea bargaining, lawyers and judges do not
appear to be involved in a publicly accountable process because plea
bargaining has low visibility with little public ceremony.' 0 5 It is a rela-
tively private activity, subject only in reality to a local legal culture. If
acceptable standards governing the process can be developed, however,
the criminal justice system will be better equipped to deliver statewide,
uniform, equal justice without having to depend on a local legal culture.
Such standards might also help to facilitate the emergence of profes-
sional and public scrutiny of the process which is essential to a properly
functioning criminal justice system.1
0 6
Our criminal justice system is adversarial in nature 107 and produces
98. People v. Lucero, 714 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1985); People v. McGhee, 667 P.2d 419
(Colo. 1983); People v. 10th Dist. Court, 586 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1978).
99. J. Bond, Plea Bargaining in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REv. 823, 836 (1976).
100. Alschuler, Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 931, 933 (1983). About
half the judges interviewed agreed; the remainder said that judges were not figureheads if
they properly exercised the independent judgment required by Colorado Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 11(f)(5). See infra Appendix A.
101. See supra note 25, at 1129-31.
102. See L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAIN OR TRIAL, 2 (1979); see also Dear, Adversary Review, 57
DEN. U.L. REV. 401, 403 (1980).
103. R. RosETr, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 90 (1976).
104. See supra note 14, at 104 (faith in our criminal justice system is questioned).
105. It has been previously recognized that because of plea bargaining's closed nature,
Colorado courts are only superficially able to observe counsel's performance and deter-
mine whether it meets constitutional standards. See Dear, supra note 99, at 403.
106. See McDonald,Judicial Supervision of the Guilty Plea Process: A Study of SixJurisdictions,
70 JUDICATURE 203 (1987) (noting that the trial judge is the key actor in efforts to "tame
the dragon").
107. See Colquitt,Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 52, 69
n.174 (1988) (whether it can remain so continues to concern thoughtful judges).
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legal principles and articulates legal rights in contested cases only. The
plea bargaining process, however, is designed to produce consensus or
concession. 10 8 This emphasis on settlement materially inhibits the oc-
currence of appellate review, the process through which legal principles
and rights are routinely developed. Appellate review minimizes the bal-
kanization of the legal system into separate fiefdoms by developing uni-
form policies to be evenly applied regardless of locale or local legal
culture. Furthermore, it has promoted respect for the rule of law.
These benefits, traditionally derived from the adversarial system, ought
to be preserved and can be maintained through properly articulated and
enforced plea bargaining standards. Therefore, without such standards
the public may continue to perceive the administration of justice as a
backroom process which is significantly affected by such factors as the
locale in which the case is heard and how much influence the parties
involved have. 10 9
X. CONCLUSION
This hands-on study of approximately one thousand recently closed
felony cases has established that felony cases are customarily resolved
through plea bargaining, a process that produces a negotiated admis-
sion of guilt or responsibility for a crime which may be less serious than
the crime actually committed, or for a crime that did not occur. Further-
more, plea bargaining is pervasive. Accused felons rarely exercise their
constitutional right to have unanimous juries of twelve determine that
guilt has been established beyond any reasonable doubt.
Plea bargaining is currently subject to a local legal culture, there-
108. A respected commentator has argued that our criminal justice system has been
altered from one that was adjudicatory to one that is now concessionary because proce-
dural safeguards have rendered regular trials unworkable. As a consequence, he argues,
the system now "condemns without adjudication." He says that our system is now similar
to the medieval european system which, also due to procedural safeguards, came to use
torture to insure that confessions were reliable. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1978). Others argue that an adjudicatory system is still possible if more
expeditious procedures are used, such as smaller juries non-unanimous verdicts, or trials
without juries in some felony cases. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984); Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 931 (1983). While the Supreme Court has
sanctioned state use of six person juries and state use of non-unanimous verdicts, see
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), present social science studies have questioned the
reliability of decisions by six as compared to twelve persons, and of decisions by non-
unanimous juries. HANS & VIDMER,JUDGING THEJURIES (1986). Many of thejudges inter-
viewed said they could accept changes in trial procedures if it would reduce plea bargain-
ing. Former University of Colorado law professor Albert Alschuler, a proponent of less
plea bargaining, was quoted as having said: "Trials could be simpler. We created this
elaborate trial mechanism, and then we decided we cannot afford to give it to the over-
whelming majority of the people accused of crimes, so we snooker most of them into fore-
going any kind of trial at all." Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 20, 1987 at 24, col. 3. See supra
note 25.
109. The Colorado Bar and Denver Bar Association commissioned a survey of six hun-
dred Colorado residents in which it was reported that 63 percent of those surveyed
thought that plea bargaining was wrong. 16 CoLo. LAw. 3 Bar Notes (Sept. 1987). See also
Bailey & Gerhardt, The Law Machine, The Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 13, 1987, at 32.
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fore, any result obtainable through the process depends upon the geo-
graphic locale and the participants involved. While most judges do
exercise some degree of control over the process, many judges are un-
clear as to how much control they are required or entitled to exercise.
While the public may conceptually believe in the presumption of
innocence, the public may not understand that the presumption is effec-
tively lost in the current criminal justice ,system once formal felony
charges are filed because the system places considerable pressure on
most felony defendants to admit they are guilty of something."10 The
existing system is in need of more meaningful regulation to insure that
equality of treatment, due process of law, and adherence to the rule of
law is afforded to individual defendants and to society."' Therefore,
because the process, as it now exists, is not truly accountable to the pub-
lic, I propose the commission of a detailed empirical study of the plea
bargaining process with an eye towards enacting a comprehensive state-
wide plea bargaining guideline system.
110. More than one of the author's colleagues has vigorously questioned whether this
study supports this conclusion. These judges believe that defendants who bargain would
not give up their right to be presumed innocent if they did not believe they were guilty.
Varying inferences may be drawn from the data produced in this study. The substan-
tial number of accused felons who engaged in plea bargaining and then admitted they
were guilty of something suggests that plea bargaining had influenced them to give up the
presumption of innocence. Whether the presumption has indeed been effectively lost in
the present Colorado system must await further empirical research on questions such as:
would accused felons in Colorado give up the presumption as often as they do now if they
weren't offered the incentives they are now offered? How often would defendants admit
their guilt if prosecutors were perceived as having filed the correct charges and not
overcharged, and plea bargaining were not allowed?
111. Other questions appropriate for a study include: What effect does conflicting Col-
orado legislative policy have on plea bargaining? How is pervasive plea bargaining likely
to affect the continued viability of constitutional rights in Colorado? Will trial-related
rights wither away? How does plea bargaining affect the public's perception of the Rule of





The twenty-seven judges whose cases were studied were inter-
viewed by the author. Seventeen were district and ten were county
judges. Two of the county judges could not answer some of the ques-
tions because felony plea bargaining did not occur in their courts in con-
formance with local practice. Interviews were conducted by telephone
and each interview took about forty-five minutes. The questions set out
below were asked of each judge but not necessarily in the order
presented here.
B. Questions of Judges and Their Responses
QUESTION 1. Which of the following three statements
about plea bargaining appeals most to you?
a. That it is an economic necessity.
b. That it is not economically necessary
and should be sharply curtailed.







What do you think drives plea bargaining?
What is its engine?
Only six of the twenty-seven judges said that
plea bargaining should be sharply curtailed.
Twenty-one felt that it was economically and
psychologically necessary. Thirteen of the
twenty-one said that human nature was its
primary engine, citing most often a desire for
justice and certainty of result. A few felt it
was due to lazy prosecution. Seven of the
twenty-one felt that economics was its prima-
ry engine.
Could prosecutors bargain less if they wanted
to?
Every judge said that less plea bargaining was
possible.
By what standards do you measure proposed
plea bargains? How do you exercise your in-
dependent judgment?
1989]




QUESTIONS 6 & 7.
ANSWER:
QUESTION 8.
Most said that they did not get in the way of
proposed bargains unless the deal seemed
unconscionable. Words and phrases often
used included: Is it fair? equitable? shock-
ing? reasonable? Does it make sense? All
conveyed the message that they examined the
facts and engaged in a personal, subjective
assessment of the proposed bargain. A few
said they looked for real agreement, for ex-
ample: does the agreement resolve the case
to everyone's satisfaction?
How much do you, by your involvement,
maintain and thereby support plea bargain-
ing?
Twenty-two of the twenty-seven judges said
that they, by their behavior, supported plea
bargaining; three said some; and two said that
they only supported it a little.
Do you agree that the public believes that
plea bargains allow defendants to "get away
with something," even if that is a mistaken
belief?
How does that perception affect the public's
overall perception of the administration of
justice?
Most said that the public does believe that
plea bargaining allows defendants to get away
with something, and that this perception dis-
serves the courts. Some felt that the public
does not understand what plea bargaining is
all about and that there is a need for public
education.
Should the criminal justice system reinforce
moral notions of guilt and responsibility?
Does plea bargaining undermine that by in-










Although they varied as to its importance,
twenty-four judges said that the system
should reinforce notions of guilt and six of
those twenty-four said that plea bargaining
undermines it. Seventeen answered the ques-
tion about whether plea bargaining under-
mines notions of guilt with a "no" giving a
variety of reasons including that defendants
who plea bargain do admit that they are guilty
of something. A few thought that plea bar-
gaining served other important purposes
such as not putting victims through trial.
Some felt that plea bargains often produce
the same results that trials produce. Others
felt that trials do not produce the moral re-
sults desired anyway. Three judges felt that
most cases do not require that findings of
guilt be filled with moral content.
Do you agree that some rights are sufficiently
important to warrant restriction of plea bar-
gaining, such as the right to an official deter-
mination that the evidence could support a
finding of guilt beyond any reasonable doubt
and the right to have punishment fit the
crime?
More than two-thirds of the judges believe
that important rights do not require reduc-
tion of plea bargaining, probably because
most believe in it. "Plea bargaining protects
rights by getting at the truth." Severaljudges
said that, "plea bargaining works if the judge
does his/her job."
Could trials be made available to everyone if
existing resources were used more efficiently?
More than half the judges felt that trials could
be made available under the existing system:
fourteen said that the system would not be-
come clogged and eleven said that it would.
Would you object to changing trial proce-
dures if it reduced the need for plea bargain-
ing? Changes such as: limiting the size ofju-
ries and their availability; eliminating the
need for unanimous verdicts in all cases; and
further limiting the scope of the jury selection
process?
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Most of the judges would be willing to con-
sider changing current procedures to reduce
the economic need for plea bargaining:
twelve said that the proposed changes did not
bother them; eight said they might endorse
changes depending on what they were, and
five said they did not like the proposed
changes.
Do defendants have a right to know what
their sentences will be before they plead
guilty?
Only four judges said that defendants have a
right to know what their sentences will be
before they should be expected to plead
guilty. The rest do not feel that defendants
have such a right.
Does plea bargaining promote laziness, self-
interest, and incompetence among lawyers?
Most of the judges said that plea bargaining
can promote incompetence, etc., among law-
yers: Seventeen said yes it does; five said no;
and three said sometimes.
Does plea bargaining increase the risk that
cases will be resolved through favoritism and
personal influence?
Most said that plea bargaining can promote
favoritism and personal influence: Ten said
yes it does; seven said maybe; and eight said
no.
Does plea bargaining allow court personnel
to avoid legislative policy, for example, by
bargaining away sentencing enhancement
charges?
Most said that plea bargaining permits avoid-
ance of legislative policy: sixteen said that it
did; three said no; and six said not really be-
cause, "it's a rational disregard," or "the
General Assembly has given prosecutors dis-
cretion to amend conflicting legislative poli-
cies," or "what is the central legislative pur-
pose"?
Can plea bargaining promote:
a. inequality in the treatment of individu-
al defendants?











c. conviction of the innocent?
d. confusion of the functions of adjudica-
tion and sentencing?
More than half of the judges felt that plea
bargaining does not promote conviction of
the innocent. A little less than two-thirds felt
that it could promote inequality; over two-
thirds felt that it could promote leniency; and
more than half felt that it confused the func-
tions of adjudication and sentencing. In the
latter instance, several judges felt that these
functions could be confused only if the judge
allows sentencing concessions to be a part of
plea bargaining. Many judges stressed that
all of the above could happen but would not
if the judge does his/her job properly.
Do you have a personal investment in plea
bargaining? Do you obtain any benefit from
plea bargaining?
About half of the judges said they had a per-
sonal investment in plea bargaining, most be-
cause of the time it frees up to meet other re-
sponsibilities. A few indicated that they
would continue to support it until something
better comes along.
Do you impose harsher sentences on defend-
ants who go to trial?
Over two-thirds of the judges said that they
did not punish defendants for going to trial.
However, several judges said that stiffer
sentences do sometimes occur because more
information is often learned about the de-
fendant and the crime at the trial than at a
bargained plea.
Has plea bargaining taken judges out of the
game because they no longer have much to
say about the resolution of criminal cases?
More than half felt that judges were not "out
of the game." Eleven felt that judges were
out of it and fourteen said that judges could
still be players if they did their jobs properly.
But they were unclear as to how far they
could go in light of"prosecutorial discretion"
(which has something unclear to do with the
constitutional separation of powers).
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APPENDIX B
Questions to the District Attorneys and Lead Public Defenders in the Six Districts












If plea bargaining were eliminated or sharply
curtailed would there really be a substantial
need for more trials?
Nine of the twelve said yes; three said no.
Could plea bargaining be substantially
phased out without disabling the administra-
tion of justice?
Two said that it could be phased out; but ten
said no, usually giving one of the following
reasons: a) Plea bargaining works; it produc-
es justice by, for example, providing a means
to dampen legislative harshness; b) The sys-
tem would grind to a halt without it.
Is plea bargaining inevitable? Would it occur
through subtrafuge if it were eliminated or
sharply curtailed?
Ten said it was inevitable; two said it was not.
Does plea bargaining give defense attorneys
too much power to influence clients and
thereby distort the traditional attorney-client
relationship?
Nine said it did; two said that it did not; and
one said sometimes.
How willing are prosecutors to bargain away
sentencing enhancement charges, forego ag-
gravated sentencing, or to avoid other legisla-
tive policy?
Ten said, "quite willing." Most of the de-
fenders said that while prosecutors are willing
to bargain away enhancement charges, judges
usually are not willing to let them ignore ag-
gravated sentencing statutes. All the defend-
ers said that more habitual traffic offender
charges could be filed. Three defenders said
that prosecutors often appropriately avoid fil-
ing charges that would require aggravated
sentencing. One defender complained that
prosecutors do not treat similarly situated de-
fendants equally.
Does plea bargaining occur because it gives
defendants the impression that something is













Five of the six district attorneys and four of
the six defenders said yes. "We actually pro-
duce useful results through our plea bargain-
ing."
Do you agree that plea bargaining promotes
incompetence, laziness, favoritism and per-
sonal influence? Do some prosecutors plea
bargain because they are afraid to go to trial
or because they want to be liked or because
they are not philosophically committed to the
prosecutor's traditional role?
Most said no, a few answered yes, and one
prosecutor thought it did and three defend-
ers thought it did, sometimes.
Is plea bargaining a positive factor in the effi-
cient and just resolution of cases?
All answered yes saying that it individualizes
justice, avoids uncertainty, saves money,
speeds justice and promotes uniformity.
Does plea bargaining pressure clients into
giving up valuable rights in return for certain-
ty of result? Such as the right to vigorous and
zealous counsel, and the right to an official
determination that there is evidence that
could support a finding of guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt? Does it produce too much
leniency and thereby sacrifice some of socie-
ty's rights such as having the punishment fit
the crime?
Although six thought that rights could be lost
in the process, most of those six did not think
that it happened very often. One district at-
torney said that it was a defendant's free
choice to give up rights, and two defenders
said the rights were abstract and not that val-
uable in practice.
Does plea bargaining coerce the innocent or
possibly innocent to plead guilty because the
prosecution's offer may be too good to re-
fuse?
One defender thought it did; one thought it
did not; and the remaining four defenders
thought it sometimes did.
Do district attorneys get enough money to try
many of cases?
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Five district attorneys and four defenders
thought they did not get enough money; but
two thought they did.
Are you aware of existing plea bargaining
policies in your local district attorney's of-
fices? Policies that inhibit, constrain or pro-
hibit plea bargaining in certain situations.
Everyone except one defender said they were
aware of "published" policies.
How much of a role does politics play in the
continued maintenance of plea bargaining?
Could prosecutors move away from it if they
wanted to or does local politics maintain it?
Everyone except one district attorney
thought that local politics played a substantial






The table below presents a 6 X 6 array (six districts; six techniques)
that looks at the difference between expected and observed frequency of
use for each of the six plea bargaining techniques observed. If there
were random use of the techniques then X2= o. If there were cohesive
statewide policy in the use of techniques then X2 = 0. The table, how-
ever, displays that use of techniques was dependent on individual pref-
erence. LEGEND: "Expected" frequencies were derived by dividing the



























































































































VALUE OF THE CALCULATED CHI-SQUARE EQUALS 75.232
WITH 25 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. P = .001
HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A
SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATION
During the past decade, state governments have started to play an
active role in enacting legislation on behalf of the homeless. Increased
media attention, congressional hearings, and numerous studies and re-
ports have heightened concern for these people.' Until recently, all re-
lief was left to private sector service providers. The Reagan
Administration's position has been that caring for the homeless is pri-
marily the responsibility of private groups and local governments.
2
However, because of the increasing numbers of homeless people and
the complex nature of this problem, private sector response has proven
inadequate. In 1986, a survey of over 400 private and public sector
agencies involved in serving the homeless was conducted in sixty cities
across the country. Of the cities and localities surveyed, 84.7% indi-
cated that private donations were insufficient to help them meet the in-
creased needs of the homeless during winter.3 The federal government
recognized that more money and coordination of services for the home-
less was needed. On July 22, 1987, the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act ("Act") was enacted to provide funds for emergency
housing, nutrition, health care, and educational programs. 4 Recogniz-
ing that varying conditions across the country result in differing needs
for the homeless, the Act was intended to supplement existing local ef-
forts rather than establish new programs for the homeless. 5 State gov-
ernments must become active in response to homelessness. Only
through specific statutory provisions can the rights of the homeless be
protected and effective solutions realized. Part I of this paper will de-
scribe the problems facing the homeless and explore its causes. Part II
will examine federal and state government responses to homelessness.
This section will review federal programs for the homeless 6 as well as
state legislative enactments and explore why state governments must be-
come more active.
1. M. CuoMo, 1933-1983: NEVER AGAIN, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S As-
SOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE HOMELESS, 3 (1983). Few can profess ignorance of the
problem why in this land of conspicuous bounty Americans go hungry and homeless? Id.
2. R. SCHUSSHEIM, THE REAGAN 1987 BUDGET AND THE HOMELESS 8 (1986).
3. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR THE HOMELESS, BROKEN PROMISES/BROKEN LIVES: NA-
TIONAL GROWTH IN HOMELESSNESS-WINTER 1987 3, 8 (1987). See National Association of
State Mental Health, Program Directors Conference (1985) (homelessness is a generic social
problem of increasing magnitude which can be resolved only through the coordinated
efforts of governmental welfare, social, health, and mental health programs in conjunction
with the private sector). See also U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES: TEN CASE STUDIES (1984) [hereinafter HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S
CITIES].
4. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 481,
482 (1987).
5. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
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I. HOMELESSNESS
A. Complexity of the Problem
Today in America, more men, women, and children are homeless
than at any time since the Great Depression. In city after city, town after
town, record numbers of Americans lack even the basics: a bed to sleep
in and a meal to eat. Today, in the richest nation on earth, growing
numbers of Americans are engaged in a primitive struggle for survival.
7
1. The Number of Homeless
Estimates on the number of homeless 8 in this country vary any-
where from 250,000 to 2.2 million. Factors used to document the
number of homeless include: (1) requests for emergency shelter beds
and food; (2) services provided to applicants for public assistance who
list a shelter as their address or cannot furnish an address; (3) arrests
and observations by police; (4) personal observation of the number of
homeless on the streets; (5) actual efforts to count the homeless on the
streets in specific areas of a city.9 The transient nature of the population
and the lack of stable housing from which to calculate those who are
without adequate shelter give some indication as to why these numbers
vary. The homeless may include disaster victims, political refugees, and
migratory workers, all of whom are difficult to document in studies.' 0
They are increasing at a rate of anywhere from 19.6% to 25%. 12 Re-
gardless of the statistics used, a substantial number of citizens in every
state cannot afford decent housing.
2. Characteristics and Causes of Homelessness
13
The typical homeless were once considered to be older white males
7. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, NATIONAL NEGLECT/NATIONAL SHAME,
AMERICA'S HOMELESS: OuTLOOK-WINTER 1986-1987 (1986).
8. Many different definitions have been used to describe homelessness. The General
Accounting Office defines the homeless as "those persons who lack resources and commu-
nity ties necessary to provide for their own adequate shelter." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 5 (1985). The
National Governor's Association uses a restrictive definition of "persons or families who,
on one particular day or night, have neither friends, family, nor sufficient funds which will
provide for certain elementary resources they need to survive." M. CuoMo, supra note 1,
at 15. The Stewart B. McKinney Act defines homeless to mean "an individual who lacks a
fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence;, and [includes] an individual who has a
primary nighttime residence that is a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter
designed to provide temporary living accommodations .... " Stewart B. McKinney Home-
less Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, sec. 103, 101 Stat. 481, 485 (1987).
9. SCRUGGS, THE HOMELESS: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS 2 (1985).
10. Snow, Baker, Anderson & Martin, The Myth of Pervasive Mental Illness Among the
Homeless, 33 Soc. PROBS. 407, 408 (1986) [hereinafter Myth of Mental Illness].
11. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 3, at 6. See also Freeman & Hall,
Permanent Homelessness in America, 6 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 3 (1987) (which deter-
mined that even with economic recovery, the number of homeless continues to grow).
12. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 7, at 4.
13. These are characteristics based on national estimates which vary from region to
region. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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suffering from alcoholism or drug addiction. 14 This is no longer the
case.' 5 Unlike the skid row derelicts who comprised the stereotypical
street people in the 1960's, today's homeless population consists of
many diverse groups of people including the mentally ill, evicted fami-
lies, the elderly, alcoholics, drug addicts, minorities, veterans, and
abused or abandoned children. Today, homeless families make up
about one-third of the homeless population. 16 They are the fastest
growing segment of the population. 17 Approximately one-fourth of the
homeless are women. As many as one-third of the homeless population
have attended college. Minorities may comprise up to 50% of the total
homeless population. 18
Contemporary theories concerning the causes of homelessness have
developed throughout the last three decades.' 9 In the 1960's and
1970's, changes in the treatment of the mentally ill resulted in many
institutionalized people ending up on the streets of America. 20 It is esti-
mated that as many as 50% of the homeless are mentally ill. Much of
the blame for this large percentage has been directed at state mental
health policies which had shifted emphasis on the treatment of the men-
tally ill away from institutionalization by cutting budgets rather than
providing alternative living arrangements, and treatment of the mentally
ill involved the use of psychotropic medication. This concept, known as
deinstitutionalization, has contributed significantly to increased num-
bers of homeless people.
In the 1970's and 1980's, budget cuts in federal low-income hous-
ing assistance resulted in a scarcity of affordable housing. From 1977 to
1987, for example, federal housing assistance dropped from $28 billion
to $7.5 billion.2 ' Other factors have likewise contributed to the prob-
lem of homelessness-rising rents, utility cut-offs, the abandonment of
unprofitable buildings and gentrification, where higher-income profes-
14. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 7, at 2. See also SCHILLMOEL-
LER & SPAR, THE HOMELESS: OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 1
(1987).
15. A national survey determined that the average age of homeless single adults
dropped to 32.5 years. See supra note 3, at 11.
16. See Bassuk, Rubin & Lauriat, Characteristics of Sheltered Homeless Families, 76 J. PUB.
HEALTH 1097 (1986).
17. Bassuk, The Feminization of Homelessness: Families in Boston Shelters, 7 AM. J. Soc. PsY-
CHIATRY 19 (1987).
18. SCRUGGS, supra note 9, at 3.
19. M. CuoMo, supra note 1, at 30.
20. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON FEDERAL EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO THE SHELTER AND BA-
SIC LIVING NEEDS OF CHRONICALLY MENTALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS 3-4 (1985). A study in Aus-
tin, Texas indicated that only 16% of the homeless population were mentally ill. See Myth
of Mental Illness, supra note 10, at 413. See also Robertson, Mental Disorder Among Homeless
Persons in the United States: An Overview of Recent Empirical Literature, 14 ADMIN. MENTAL
HEALTH 14 (1986).
21. NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, URBAN RIGHTS PROJECT 10-11
(1986). See also Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 1988, at 3, col. 2 (where Congress
blames much of the current problem concerning the homeless on budget cuts in low-in-
come housing subsidies); Homelessness in America I Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing,
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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sional people replace older, lower-income people in previously deterio-
rated inner-city housing. Increases in unemployment over the past
twenty years have created more homeless families.2 2 Increasing divorce
rates suggest that single-parent families, left without the primary bread-
winner, are also facing homelessness.
23
As divorce rates climb, and the numbers of single mothers and teen-
age pregnancies increase, the homeless family population will continue
to grow. A large majority of female heads of households are untrained
and unskilled. When they are eligible for employment, they only qualify
forjobs that do not pay enough to support a family. The combination of
low income and exorbitant housing can make sustaining quality of life
impossible for many single women with children.
24
In the 1980's, there have been cuts in funding for Social Services
programs which have also contributed to this problem. 2 5 The complex-
ity of the homeless problem in this country suggests a need for effective
state-government oversight.
B. Local Variations of the Problem
A national study conducted by the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development in 1984, and a number of local studies have all em-
phasized the diversity of the homeless population.2 6 The highest per
capita concentration of homeless people is found in the West, which has
19% of the nation's population but one-third of the homeless popula-
tion. The South, on the other hand, has 33% of the nations population,
yet only 24% of the total homeless. 2 7 Several states which have enacted
legislation for the homeless have done so because they have found large
numbers of people in their jurisdictions without shelter either because
of a lack of affordable housing 28 or high levels of unemployment. 2 9 On
the other hand, the New Jersey legislature found the rise of homeless
22. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD PROGRAMS AND SERV-
ICES FOR THE HOMELESS UNDER THE STEWART B. McKINNEY HOMELESS ASSISTANCE ACT 1
(1987). See also M. CUOMO, supra note 1, at 30.
23. Homeless Families, A Neglected Crisis: Sixty Third Report by the Comm. on Government Op-
erations, Together with Dissenting and Additional Views, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Homeless Families]. One-third of homeless families had a personal crisis such as a
dissolved relationship, incidences of beatings, death or illness. These factors are direct
causes of their homelessness. Id.
24. Id.
25. M. CuoMo, supra note 1, at 30.
26. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 22, at 1. For ex-
ample, in St. Louis, the homeless are predominantly families and half of the homeless are
children. In 1983, 54% of the homeless households were single women with children.
Murray, The Homeless in the United States and in St. Louis, 4 PuB. L. F. 455,457 (1985). On the
other hand, families represent 80% of the homeless in Yonkers, New York, but only 40%
in Chicago and Boston. Homeless Families, supra note 23, at 8.
27. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 22, at 1.
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15290 (West Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 400 § 14
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:13c-1 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 41 (McKin-
ney 1987).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15290 (West Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 400 § 14
(1986).
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victims of domestic violence results in an ever present need for emer-
gency shelters.
30
Cities are showing the diversity of the homeless population as well.
For example, Boston, Chicago, Columbus, New York City, Salt Lake
City, San Francisco and Seattle all report significant increases in the
numbers of women and families with children. 3 ' Other cities indicate
that unemployment was the biggest characteristic of the population.3 2
Seattle and Salt Lake City, for example, identified lack of food and/or
poor nutrition as the most serious issues facing the homeless, while
Cleveland and Philadelphia identified problems relating to employment
as their primary issues.3 3 "To meet [these] goals . . .federal agencies,
state and local governments, and dedicated private non-profit institu-
tions will have to work together. By joining forces in public and private
partnerships, we may hope to achieve far more than any agency or the
public or private sectors of society could do alone."
3 4
II. PART TWO
A. The Federal Response: Requiring State Action
As indicated in Part I, homelessness is a pervasive problem with
many causes and much diversity. Because solutions are as complex as
the problem,3 5 homelessness must be approached at many levels.3 6 Re-
sponding to this heightened concern regarding the number of homeless,
and realizing that local governments and charitable organizations are
finding it difficult to meet the calls for assistance, the 100th Congress
approved major legislation to increase emergency services, housing,
30. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27c-24 (West 1986).
31. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HOMELESS FAMILIES IN
AMERICA'S CITIES: A 29-Crry SURVEY (1987).
32. For example, in Atlanta, 33% of the homeless are unemployed. HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES, supra note 3 at 6.
33. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 31, at 7.
34. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 22, at 1 (a message
from the Secretary, Samuel R. Pierce).
35. The National Coalition for the Homeless, for example, has developed a three
tiered approach. The first tier consists of short-term emergency services including beds,
food, and medical services. The second tier consists of transitional or intermediate serv-
ices, which provides living accomodations for individuals for up to six months while an
individualized plan for permanent housing is implemented. The third tier provides for
long-term permanent housing at low cost. Werner, On the Streets: Homelessness Causes and
Solutions, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 11, 15 (1984).
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15290 (West Supp. 1987). The California Legislature has rec-
ognized the complexity of the problem and the need for coordination in the various levels
of government and the private sector. Relevant subsections of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15290
include:
(b) Federal, state, local, and private efforts to assist these homeless persons are
not well coordinated and data concerning these shelterless persons are not kept
in a consistent manner. (c) Local and state efforts to help homeless persons have
not fixed overall coordination responsibility with individuals in either county or
state government. (d) Existing programs providing homeless services to un-
sheltered residents, especially clients such as the elderly, displaced workers,
juveniles, veterans, and the mentally ill do not adequately meet the needs of these
persons.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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medical services, educational aid, and job training by enacting the Stew-
art B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.s7 The purpose of the Act is
to fund programs to deal with the problem more effectively. 3 8 The lan-
guage of the Act requires effective state involvement.
The Act provides $443 million in aid for fiscal year 1987, and $616
million in fiscal year 1988. It includes nearly twenty different provisions
to address the needs of homeless people by providing for emergency
shelter, food, health care, housing, educational programs, job training,
and other services.3 9 These programs are to be administered by several
agencies which are monitored by the Interagency Council on the Home-
less. Member agencies include: the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"); the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD"); the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"); and the Department of Agriculture ("USDA").
40
The Emergency Shelter Grants Program, originally included in ap-
propriations to HUD in 1987, 4 1 was included in the Stewart B. McKin-
ney Act to make grants to states and local governments for the purpose
of renovation, major rehabilitation, or conversion of buildings to be
used as emergency shelters.4 2 States and cities must develop and have
approved a Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan ("CHAP") to par-
ticipate in this program. 43 States must also provide matching funds.
The Supportive Housing Demonstration Program provides funding
for transitional housing and supportive services for homeless persons
capable of moving into independent living arrangements, and funding
for permanent housing for homeless handicapped individuals. Funding
is available to private nonprofit organizations, states, and local agen-
cies.4 4 Matching funds are also required for this program.
4 5
The McKinney Act requires states to provide services to the home-
less mentally ill. The McKinney Act provides assistance to states for
37. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 481
(1987). See EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, THE HOMELESSNESS PROBLEM: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATION 1 (Updated Aug. 19,
1987).
38. The purpose of the Stewart B. McKinney Act is:
(1) to establish an Interagency Council on the Homeless, (2) to use public re-
sources and programs in a more coordinated manner to meet the critically urgent
needs of the homeless of the Nation, and (3) to provide funds for programs to
assist the homeless, with special emphasis on elderly persons, handicapped per-
sons, families with children, Native Americans, and veterans.
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, sec. 102(b), 100 Stat.
481, 484 (1987).
39. National Governors'Assn. Status of Programs Under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act and Related Legislation (April 2, 1988).
40. SCHILLMOELLER & SPAR, THE HOMELESS: OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE (CRS Report for Congress) (1987).
41. Provisions for this program were originally included in Supplemental Appropria-
tion Bills: Related Agencies Appropriation Act 1987, Pub. L. 99-500, 100 Stat. 3341
(1986).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 11373 (Supp. 1987).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 11361 (Supp. 1987).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 11381-94 (Supp. 1987).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 11385 (Supp. 1987).
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supportive and transitional housing for the homeless and mentally ill.
States must provide 25% of the funding and agree that the money will
be used to provide outreach and community mental health services for
care and treatment.4 6 The McKinney Act also requires the Department
of Health and Human Services to conduct a study on the extent to which
state deinstitutionalization policies have contributed to homelessness
and to report to Congress recommendations that can reduce the
number of chronically mentally ill persons who are homeless.
4 7
The Stewart B. McKinney Act provides substantial funding in an
effort to combat homelessness. The structure of the McKinney Act re-
quires local and state governments to become active in coordinating and
service providing capacities to ensure a comprehensive approach to
solving the problem of homelessness.
B. State Legislation
"We do not want this to be a bill that absolves the States from their
responsibilities, but we do want to be supportive to the work that they
are doing, in helping them I think this [Act] is a bridge, a transition kind
of program." '48 Federal money available from the McKinney Act is not
designed to free local and state governments from their critical respon-
sibility of meeting the needs of the homeless. Rather, the purpose of
federal funding is to help state resources go further.4 9 To date, fifteen
states have enacted legislation for the homeless. The greatest potential
for innovation in dealing with the problem rests with state legislatures.
50
Enforcing the rights of the homeless in the courts is a recent phe-
nomenon. Consequently, there are no significant precedents. 5 I Litiga-
tion to require a right to shelter has been successful in only three states:
New York; West Virginia; and New Jersey. 52 In all three cases, statutory
46. Pub. L. No. 100-77, sec. 611, 101 Stat. 481, 516 (1987).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (Supp. 1987).
48. 133 Cong. Rec. H5,922 (1987) (Statement of Mrs. Roukema, Co-sponsor of H.R.
558, the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act).
49. MIT CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING AND THE HOMELESS
(March 1988).
50. M. O'CONNOR, STATE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES FOR THE HOMELESS, (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures) (January, 1986).
51. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LEGAL SERVICES, INC., HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA,
A LITIGATION MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL SERVICES ADVOCATES (1986).
52. Langdon & Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for a Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 306 (1985). The right to shelter in New York was established in
Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1979). The court required the
city and state of New York to provide shelter to every homeless man who requested it.
The court found authority for this under article xvii, sec. I of the New York State Constitu-
tion, sec. 62(1), 131(1) and 131(3) of the New York Social Services Law, and sec. 604.1(b)
of the New York City Administrative Code. The New York State Constitution article xvii,
sec. 1 provides: "The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner and by such
means as the legislature may from time to time determine." See Dakin, Homelessness: The
Role of the Legal Profession in Finding Solutions Through Litigation, 21 FARN. L. Q. 93, 115
(1987). The right to shelter was later found to apply to women under equal protection
grounds Eldridge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960, revd on other grounds, 98
A.D.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1983).
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authority was the basis for the right to shelter. For example, in Hodge v.
Ginsberg,53 the court held that homeless persons were entitled to shelter
under a recently enacted chapter of the protective services laws. Maticka
v. Atlantic City, 54 held a right to shelter existed under that state's protec-
tive services laws. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to shel-
ter. What is needed is a large scale effort in the state legislature to
secure shelter entitlements.
5 5
This section will paint a picture of emerging legislative attempts
which have specifically provided for the needs of the homeless and have
begun to find solutions to homelessness through programs focusing on
prevention, emergency services, data collection, and comprehensive ap-
proach strategies.
1. Prevention
New Jersey and Massachusetts have enacted legislation specifically
focused on preventing homelessness. 56 The goal of the NewJersey Pre-
vention of Homelessness Act is to prevent displacement of persons who
face eviction and to establish less costly alternatives to the emergency
placement of homeless households in temporary accommodations.
Money from this program is provided to low-income families who are
facing imminent eviction.
5 7
2. Emergency Shelter and Other Services
States have enacted legislation for the homeless 58 primarily focus-
ing on the need for shelter. Fourteen states have enacted legislation for
the homeless which provide funding or regulate the habitability of emer-
gency shelters. 5 9 New Jersey has a program which makes the state re-
53. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
54. 216 N.J. Super. 434, 523 A.2d 416 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
55. Dakin, Homelessness: The Role of the Legal Profession in Finding Solutions Through Litiga-
tion, 21 FARN. L. Q. 93, 115 (1987).
56. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 450 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27c-24 (West
1984).
57. PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS IN NEWJERSEY: REPORT ON THE FIRST YEAR OF OPERA-
TION OF THE NEWJERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS HOMELESS PREVENTION PRO-
GRAM 25 (1985). NewJersey law provides:
(e) To provide rental assistance grants to persons of low or moderate income to
enable them to pay the fair market value for housing units; (f) To provide loans
and grants of temporary rental or other temporary housing assistance to persons
without housing or in imminent danger of losing housing as a result of having
insufficient income from other sources to allow payment of the rental or other
housing costs.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27c-24 (West 1984).
58. California defines "homeless person" as "an individual who lacks the financial
resources, mental capacity, or community ties needed to provide for his or her own ade-
quate shelter." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15292 (West Supp. 1987).
59. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 15296 (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83-1382
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 117, § 4 (West Supp. 1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4601-A (1986 Supp.); MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 400.14(a) (West
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53.13c (West 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 62 (Purdon 1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.185 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 31-18-3 (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 46.97 (West 1988).
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sponsible for insuring that these federal dollars, and all monies which
provide assistance for shelters, are given only to facilities which are li-
censed and inspected by the state. This insures that shelters are safe,
habitable and available to all residents of the state.
60
3. Data Collection
Two states have initiated pilot programs to more effectively study
the homeless problem in limited geographical areas. 6 1 California, for
example, has established the Homeless Relief Pilot Project, designed to
create a comprehensive plan for the coordinated delivery of existing
state services in San Diego County. 62 Funds allocated for this program
are for: (1) coordinating delivery of public and private sector services for
the homeless; (2) collecting information regarding the number of home-
less persons; and (3) ascertaining the unmet needs of the homeless.
Funds under this program also facilitate direct services such as delivery
of food, clothing, emergency shelter, and case management.6 3 In 1988,
the legislature was to receive a report on the status of this project and
make recommendations. 64 Programs such as this allow states to clearly
evaluate the extent of the unmet needs of the homeless within their
jurisdiction.
4. Coordination and Oversight
Private service providers are not in a position to adequately coordi-
nate their programs as effectively as states.6 5 In Maryland, for example,
the Department of Human Resources is responsible for policy determi-
nations in administering shelter and nutrition services for the homeless.
This state agency is also responsible for allocating federal and state
funds for the homeless to areas of the state in consideration of the un-
met needs and the number of homeless persons in those areas.
66
5. Comprehensive Programs
Several states offer comprehensive programs. Massachusetts, for
example, expanded its general relief assistance to the homeless. The
state has increased emergency assistance benefits to Aid to Families with
Dependant Children recipients by providing funds for up to thirty days
in temporary shelter for homeless families. 67 The emergency assistance
60. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 55 (West 1987).
61. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15291 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.38 (West 1987).
62. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 15293 (West 1987).
63. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15294 (West 1987).
64. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 15300 (West 1987).
65. A few states have established programs which coordinate services for the home-
less. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 15294 (West 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 12-4 para. 7 (Smith-
Hurd 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88a § 137 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-22-1 (1987).
66. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88a § 137 (1985). See also source cited supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
67. The Massachusetts Right to Housing Project is seeking to amend the Massachu-
setts Constitution by adding that all citizens have a right to occupy habitable and afforda-
ble non-transient housing.
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program of the state was expanded to provide money to those who are
at risk of being homeless. This includes funding for back rent, utility,
and fuel bills for families facing eviction. 6 8 Maryland also has a compre-
hensive shelter, nutrition, and service program for homeless individuals
which includes crisis and transitional shelter.69 New York has enacted
the Homeless Housing and Assistance Program which provides financial
assistance for projects which are deemed necessary for homeless per-
sons, and includes funding for social, medical and mental health serv-
ices. 70 The Homeless Housing and Assistance Act provides funding for
private non-profit and charitable organizations and public corporations
to become involved in supplying shelter and other services to the home-
less. Other provisions of the Homeless Housing and Assistance Act al-
low for contractual arrangements with private service providers in a
variety of areas. This includes acquiring residential leases for the pur-
pose of providing housing on an emergency basis to families with chil-
dren who are in need of public assistance and care. It is this grass roots
type of organization that gives states the flexibility needed to provide a
variety of services to needy persons.
California has instituted a program in which a contractor may utilize
funds allocated in the Assistance to Homeless Persons Act to provide
loans for the first and last month's rent to individuals placed in employ-
ment.7 1 New York has initiated legislation designed to increase the
availability of housing for homeless persons, 72 and also provides for
non-housing services such as dining, recreation, sanitary, social, and
mental health services.
III. CONCLUSION
Poverty forms a culture, an interdependent system. In case after
case, it has been documented that one cannot deal with the various com-
ponents of poverty in isolation, changing this or that condition but leav-
ing the basic structure intact. Consequently, a campaign against the
misery of the poor should be comprehensive. The campaign should not
be limited to a specific aspect of poverty but should strive to establish
new communication, or substite a human environment for the inhuman
one that now exists.
73
This article has described the homeless problem as it exists in
68. THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, SUMMARY OF
DUKAKIS ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS ON HOMELESS ACCOMPLISHMENTS (1987). The Execu-
tive Office of Communities and Development operates a program which provides counsel-
ing and assistance to landlords and tenants to help people stay in existing housing. Other
programs administered by the state include emergency services for the medically ill, sup-
port services including case management for the chronically mentally ill and permanent
housing services. Id.
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88a § 131 (1986).
70. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1987).
71. CAL. GOVT CODE § 15299 (West 1987).
72. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 312 (McKinney 1987).
73. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 168
(1964).
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America today. The homeless population is growing at a faster rate than
ever before. The faces of the homeless are changing. Private service
providers do not have the funding or the ability to attack the problem at
the various levels necessary to effectively reduce the number of home-
less people. What is needed is an integrated approach combining fed-
eral, state, and local governments with private service providers. Only
fourteen states have enacted legislation thus far. All states must take an
active role in the oversight and implementation of social policies regard-
ing homelessness.
Do people have a right to life simply by reason of their humanity or
citizenship? Put another way, shall we permit people to freeze to death
in the winter, to starve, to die from the effects of preventable disease,
merely because they are poor, insane, or addicted to drugs? In the long
run, the ways in which our society responds to that fundamental ques-
tion will determine far more than the plight of the homeless. It will de-
fine our civilization.74 State legislators must act to protect the rights of
the homeless to effectively solve this modern social problem.
Dave Furman
Mike McGurrin
74. Blasi, Litigation on Behalf of the Homeless: Systematic Approaches, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CoNTEM. L. 137 (1987).
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FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIANS, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
Public education in the United States is under concerted attack by
Fundamentalist Christians. The attacks range from attempts to remove
books from public school libraries and classrooms, to opposition to the
nature of the values and skills taught in the public schools, and even to
charges of witchcraft being levelled at individual teachers.' There is a
general perception among religious leaders, 2 educators, 3 and public in-
terest groups, 4 that all references to Judeo-Christian religion have been
removed from the curriculum of the public schools. An anecdotal illus-
tration of this sort of omission is the allegation that history textbooks
omit the quest for religious freedom from the list of reasons that the
Pilgrims came to the New World.
5
A federal case, initially brought in the Eastern District Court of
Tennessee, Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 6 raises first amend-
1. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn.
1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); EAGLE FORUM, THE STUDENT'S BILL OF
RIGHTS (n.d.) [hereinafter STUDENT'S BILL]; G. Asakawa, Closing the Book on Bennett, 10
Westword 13 (1987); Hechinger, What is Role for Education Department?, N.Y. Times, Apr.
29, 1986; LaHaye, Whose Ethics in the Government Schools?, 23 KAPPA DELTA Pi RECORD 72
(1987) [hereinafter LaHaye]; Jones, Fundamentalists Enliven School Board Race, Rocky Moun-
tain News, July 20, 1986, at 22; McGraw, Secular Humanism and the Schools, The Heritage
Foundation (1976); McGraw, Teacher's Practices Based on Occult, Educator Says, Denver Post,
Mar. 20, 1987, at 2B; Tinsley, Parents Found Guilty of Slandering Teacher, Rocky Mountain
News, Mar. 21, 1987, at 21.
2. Interview with Reverend Gilbert Horn, National Council of Churches (Apr. 10,
1987) [hereinafter Horn]; Interview with Ann Edelman, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith (Apr. 10, 1987).
3. P. Vitz, RELIGION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS (Na-
tional Institute of Education Study No. 6-84-0012, Project No. 2-0099, September, 1985)
[hereinafter NIE Study]; ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT,
RELIGION IN THE CURRICULUM (1987) [hereinafter ASCD REPORT]; Interview with Gail
Mertz, Boulder County Safeguard (May 15,1987) [hereinafter Mertz]. Boulder County
Safeguard is a branch of county government attached to the Boulder Valley School District
which presents law-related programs to both students and teachers. Its employees are
educators, not attorneys. Interview with Bruce Koranski, Staff Associate at the Center for
Teaching International Relations, University of Denver (May 5, 1987) [hereinafter Koran-
ski]. Interview with Barbara Miller, GinnieJones and Jackie Johnson, Social Science Con-
sortium, University of Colorado (April 27, 1987) [hereinafter Miller].
4. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, LOOKING AT HISTORY (1986) [hereinafter PAW
STUDY]; LaHaye, supra note 1. People for the American Way ("PAW") is a special interest
group opposed to conservative Christian challenges to public education.
5. Horn, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 3.
6. There are six opinions with the caption Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools. In
order to avoid confusion, each opinion will be consistently referred to in the following
short form: The first memorandum opinion is cited at 579 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) ("Memorandum Opinion I"); the second memorandum opinion is cited at 583 F. Supp.
201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) ("Memorandum Opinion It"); the first Sixth Circuit decision is cited at
765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Circuit Six I"); the case on remand is cited at 647 F. Supp.
1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) ("Remand Decision"); and the second opinion of the Sixth Circuit
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ment issues concerning establishment and free exercise of religion with
regard to education of Fundamentalist Christian children in public
schools. 7 In Mozert, the objections raised by the plaintiffs, Fundamental-
ist Christian parents and their children, highlight the concerns that Fun-
damentalist Christians have with the teaching of certain concepts, skills,
and values as in the public schools of this country. These concerns are
rooted in the sincere religious beliefs of the Fundamentalist Christians.
If the public school system attempts to accommodate their demands and
raise free exercise questions for reform, it must be aware of and avoid
the possibility of violating the establishment clause by "favoring"
religion. 8
In our increasingly diverse society, we are faced with the question of
whether there can be an adequate accommodation of the values-orienta-
tion held by every group with children enrolled in the public schools.
Many educators believe that the public school system in this country
teaches only such values as the need for timeliness, "good" work habits,
and social cooperation, while at the same time engaging in a process of
"values clarification" 9 which enables children to practice ethical prob-
lem-solving by applying values learned at home, in church, mosque, or
synagogue to hypothetical problems raised in classroom discussions re-
garding readings from textbooks, newspapers, and magazines. ' 0 On the
other hand, many professional educators believe that other values are
taught in the schools and that many of these values are inappropriate."
Members of Fundamentalist Christian groups 12 and the Reagan Admin-
istration's Department of Education13 believe that values education
Court of Appeals is cited at 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Circuit Six 11"). Certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court at 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
7. The religion clauses of the first amendment mandate: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Supreme Court precedent suggests that government in the United States, whether
federal, state or local, may neither favor nor oppose religion or non-religion. Governmen-
tal attempts to accommodate religious citizens' demands based on the Free Exercise
Clause often raise questions of legality under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Tushnet,
THE CONSTITrrTION OF RELIGION, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986); The Tension Between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 289 (1986)
[hereinafter Tension]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAW 812 (2d ed. 1978) [herein-
after TRIBE].
9. Values clarification is supposed to be a neutral means of helping students under-
stand their own values. Miller, supra note 3. For a full discussion of the methodology and
theory of values clarification see infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text.
10. Miller, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM AND MORAL EDUCATION (Giroux & Purpel ed.
1983) [hereinafter HIDDEN CURRICULUM]. See also infra notes 186-193 and accompanying
text.
12. See LaHaye, supra note 1; STUDENT'S BILL, supra note 1.
13. See CUNNINGHAM, BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON "GLOBAL EDUCATION" (n.d.) (report
prepared for Thomas G. Tancredo, Regional Representative, Region VIII, U.S. Dept. of
Education) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM]; Address by G.L. Bauer, Secretary of the United
States Deptartment of Education, Association of American Publishers Annual Meeting (Jan.
1986); Finn, Decentralize, Deregulate, Empower, POLICY REVIEW 58 (Summer 1986). Mr Finn
was Assistant Secretary for Research and Improvement, United States Department of Edu-
cation, at the time he wrote this article. Mr. Finn published a number of articles touting
the voucher system for funding education in the United States. This system would have
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should reflect more traditional "Judeo-Christian" viewpoints. One Fun-
damentalist Christian special-interest group, Concerned Women for
America (CWA), which represents the plaintiffs in the Mozert case, has
stated its goal:
Concerned Women for America hopes to educate Americans
on the pernicious philosophy and effects of Secular Humanism.
We would like to see Secular Humanism thrown out of the gov-
ernment schools and biblical morality restored. Meanwhile,
CWA will continue to defend the rights of parents and children
to opt out of classes offensive to their beliefs. It is clear that
secular humanism has only resulted in poor academic stan-
dards, a breakdown of decency, and total ignorance about the
Christian roots of America.14
This is not the first struggle over the religious content of curriculum
in the public schools. Such conflicts have occurred from the very begin-
nings of public education in the eighteenth century' 5 and from time to
time since then.16 Struggles over the public school curriculum are seen
by some as a process of adapting the fundamental tenets of an "Ameri-
can Civil Religion" to demands of religious groups for accommodation
of their beliefs. 17
The objective of this note is to examine the nature of the values
taught, the manner in which they are taught, and who shall determine
which values will be taught in the public school systems of the United
States. The Mozert case will serve as a focus for these issues. Further-
more, this note will trace the history of education and the values taught
in the public schools from colonial days, through the nineteenth century
which saw the inception of universal free public education, into the pres-
ent time. Lastly, this note will consider whether the Fundamentalist
Christian challenge is well-founded in light of the religion clauses of the
first amendment and Supreme Court precedent regarding both the
place of religion in the public schools and the relative roles of parents
and educators in determining the curriculum presented by the public
schools of this nation.
state and local governments issue vouchers to all parents with children of school age. The
vouchers would be used to finance the education of children in schools of their choice as
well as their parent's choice, whether those schools would be "public," private or paro-
chial. See Rosen, Voucher System Would Raise Quality in Our Public Schools, Denver Post, June
20, 1984; D. Lee, The Uncertain Prospects for Educational Vouchers, THE INTERCOLLEGIATE RE-
VIEW 29 (Spring 1986); J. McLaughry, Who Says Vouchers, REASON 24 (January, 1984); S.
Taichi, Supply-Side Competition for the School System, XI JAPAN ECHO 38 (1984); M. Lieberman,
MARKET SOLUTIONS To THE EDUCATION CRISIS (1986) (Policy Analysis No. 2, CATO Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C.). At least one Denver-area educator believes that the conservative
Christian challenges to the schools are brought with the goal of arousing enough dissatis-
faction with the public schools that the voucher system would be implemented.
14. LaHaye, supra note 1, at 74-75.
15. L. WRIGHT, CULTURE ON THE MOVING FRONTIER 60 (1955) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
16. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) Pierce involved the legality
of private education in Oregon, both secular and sectarian, in the face of a law providing
for compulsory attendance in public schools. The Court held that the state's interest in
educating its citizens could be fulfilled by such private education.
17. See infra notes 168-185 and accompanying text.
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MOZER T V. HA WKINS COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Tennessee's Educational Program
Determined to provide better education for its resident children,
Tennessee adopted a Better Schools Program in 1983. Tennessee has
committed to significant expenditure of state funds to implement this
program and for public education generally.18 An essential part of the
Better Schools Program is the Basic Skills First Program, which empha-
sizes certain skills in reading and mathematics which are to be taught
sequentially in an integrated curriculum from kindergarten through
eighth grade. The state of Tennessee considers the reading curriculum
to be the heart of both the Basic Skills First Program and elementary
education. Specific curriculum objectives are identified in this program
and all public schools in Tennessee are required by law to adopt it and
to achieve its objectives. 19
In Mozert, 20 the defendants, the Hawkins County Public Schools and
school officials, assert that critical reading is an important part of any
reading program. 2 ' It helps to develop higher order cognitive skills, en-
abling students to evaluate material they have read, to contrast ideas
presented, and to understand complex characters portrayed in reading
materials. Critical reading leads to critical thinking, a skill considered by
Tennessee to be essential to good citizenship. Tennessee "schools seek
to teach students to be autonomous individuals, who can make their own
judgments about moral questions."' 22 In order to develop autonomous
students, Tennessee, in its reading program, seeks to expose students to
"real life," morally ambiguous situations in which characters act both
acceptably and unacceptably in light of general societal standards. By
discussing the characters' actions, students can learn vicariously the re-
sults of inappropriate as well as appropriate values decisions.
Another goal of Tennessee's educational program is to teach appre-
ciation of the value of tolerance, an essential part of education in a plu-
ralistic society. To learn tolerance, defendants argue, it is necessary to
expose students to a broad range of religious and social beliefs. Contro-
versial contemporary topics, such as feminism and various personal and
family problems, are presented in order to help prepare students for
18. See Brief of Appellants, Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 827 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-6144, 86-6179 and 86-6180) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant
Schools]. The Brief for Appellant Schools sets out the goals of Tennessee's public educa-
tion program and the means it has chosen to accomplish them. Id. 1-8. The brief asserts
that Tennessee devotes more than half of its annual statewide expenditures to education.
Id. at 2.
19. Tenn. Admin. Reg. 0520-6-1, 0520-6-4 (1987).
20. Specifically, the plaintiffs are the Fundamentalist Christian parents and their chil-
dren whose attorneys subsequently drafted the "Brief of Appellees." The defendants,
whose attorneys subsequently drafted the "Brief of Appellants," are the Hawkins County
Public Schools and school officials, including the Commissioner of Education of the State
of Tennessee.
21. Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 3.
22. Id. at 4.
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dealing with similar problems, as well as public controversies, which may
at some time have an impact on their own lives.
Another educational technique claimed by defendants to be essen-
tial in implementing Tennessee's educational reform involves engaging
students in subject matter by presenting and discussing controversial is-
sues which are likely to pique their interest. Tennessee schools develop
students' imaginations through presentation of magic in classical chil-
dren's stories and through role-playing.
These important skills and values (i.e., critical thinking and toler-
ance) are taught in an integrated curriculum including courses in sci-
ence, social studies, history and literature, as well as in reading class.
The basal reader is considered to be a necessary part of the schools'
teaching tools because it helps to determine what skills are taught and
presents those skills in a sequence which facilitates learning. 23 Tennes-
see's overall goal in providing for a curriculum emphasizing develop-
ment of the skills and values discussed above is the development of
good citizens who can actively participate in modern society.
Tennessee requires all public schools to use textbooks selected
from a state-approved list. 24 In 1982, the State Textbook Commission,
after receiving advice from public school teachers, state educational con-
sultants and the general public, developed a list of books approved for
use in developmental reading classes. 2 5 The Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston basal reading series (the "Holt series") was selected from the state-
approved list by a committee of Hawkins County reading teachers in
1983, partly because it contains award winning literature which the
teachers believed would stimulate students' interest.
The goals, concepts, skills and values of Tennessee's public school
curriculum and the methods chosen to implement them are consistent
with current educational theories and practices. 26 Plaintiffs, who are
Fundamentalist Christians, challenged the authority of Tennessee to
mandate this curriculum because it allegedly violated their right to free
exercise of their religious beliefs.
Lines of Conflict Drawn
In late August, 1983, less than a month after the Holt series had
been introduced into the Hawkins County public schools, Rebecca
Frost, a sixth grader, asked her mother, Vicki Frost, for help with her
reading homework. The story Rebecca was reading dealt with mental
telepathy; Mrs. Frost had religious objections to mental telepathy.
2 7
23. Id. at 7. Basal reader series include not only a set of textbooks developed for use
in the elementary and middle grades but supplementary materials often introduced by
teachers. Id. at 7, n.36.
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-2206 (1983).
25. Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 8.
26. See infra notes 94-157 and accompanying text.
27. Brief for Appellee Parents at 3, Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 827
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-6144, 86-6179 and 86-6180) [hereinafter Brief for Ap-
pellee Parents].
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Mrs. Frost examined the Holt series further and then communicated her
concern about the readers to Hawkins County school officials and other
similarly minded parents.2 8 The parents' concern focused on concepts,
values, and teaching methods objectionable to them due to their reli-
gious beliefs. Plaintiff parents and their children belong to different
churches and their beliefs are personal, not derived from the stated doc-
trine of any of their congregations. The appellate brief submitted on
behalf of the parents and their children sets out their objections. 29 In
September, 1983, a group of Hawkins County residents, including most
of the plaintiffs, formed an organization which lobbied at regularly
scheduled school board meetings, objecting to the use of the Holt series
and seeking removal of those textbooks from the schools.3 0 During this
time, plaintiffs also requested that alternative reading programs be pro-
vided by the Hawkins County schools for their children.3 ' Such alterna-
tive programs were established at one middle school and two
elementary schools.
3 2
At a meeting held on November 10, 1983, the Hawkins County
School Board unanimously decided, without discussion according to
plaintiffs, to require teachers to use only textbooks adopted by the
Board of Education as regular classroom textbooks.3 3 Plaintiffs implic-
itly characterize the school board's decision as uninformed and close-
minded, citing statements by various members of the school board and
local "mainstream" clerics that the school board had evaluated the Holt
series in light of their own religious beliefs and had found no personal
objections to it. Plaintiffs further alleged that only one school board
member may have spoken with any school official before voting to cancel
the alternative reading programs. The appellate brief filed on behalf of
the parents asserted that the school board rejected every proposal made
for an alternative reading program and quotes testimony from the trial
on remand:
The board should have taken a harder line against [the par-
28. Id.; Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 10.
29. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 10-24. See infra notes 41-49 and ac-
companying text for further discussion of the parents' objections to the Holt series. The
objections include a familiar litany of problems that Fundamentalist or Conservative
Christians have with concepts and values taught in the public schools of this country. In
the ever increasingly diverse society in which we live, the question is whether there can be
an adequate accommodation of the values orientation of every group with children in the
schools. Many educators believe that the public school system in this country teaches only
neutral values while at the same time engaging in a process of "values clarification" to
reinforce values learned at home and in church. For a further discussion of these ideas see
infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
30. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
31. Id. See Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 17; Brief for Appellee Par-
ents, supra note 27, at 3.
32. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1196; Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18,
at 17-18; Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 3-4. Eight or nine children partici-
pated in these alternative programs which lasted approximately six weeks.
33. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1196; Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18,
at 18; Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 5. Appellants merely state that the
board rejected the alternative reading programs without addressing whether there had
been discussion of the topic at the meeting.
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ents]. If we had taken a hard nosed attitude to begin with, I
mean a real hard nosed attitude, it wouldn't have gone this far.
The case would have ended up in federal court, but the board
wouldn't have had to listen to these people for four or five
meetings. I listened patiently, I thought all they wanted was to
be heard. Everything they did had a purpose, they provoked
you to do what they wanted and then they cry wolf. If you give
them an inch, they want a mile.
3 4
Plaintiffs also cite the deposition of the Superintendent of the Hawkins
County Public Schools in 1983 as stating that "forcing the children to
read material that violated their religious beliefs would build character
and develop self-discipline." '3 5 This same Superintendent's beliefs
about the importance of the Holt series in the educational process is
quoted in the opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which re-
versed and remanded the District Court's holding.
3 6
The schools complied with the school board's order, informing the
students and their parents that alternative reading programs would no
longer be provided and that the students would be required to attend
the regular reading program and use the Holt series books.3 7 Seven
middle school students refused to participate in the regular reading pro-
gram on religious grounds and were initially suspended for three days. 3 8
Later, these same students were suspended for ten more days for the
same reasons. Two of these students were suspended a third time for an
additional ten days.3 9 After the suspensions, and despite the school
board's resolution, two students continued in alternative reading pro-
grams, one continuing into early 1984 and the other for the remainder
of the school year.
40
The plaintiffs' first appellate brief asserted that local school officials
attempted to stir up sentiment against the families objecting to the Holt
series. At a PTA meeting, held at Church Hill Elementary School on
December 5, 1983, an announcement was handed out. It read in part:
As principal of your school and a mother, I now feel that we
must stand for your child's rights. It is not appropriate for a
few local people controlled by outside sources to try to impose
their beliefs on all, and be allowed to disrupt the education of
our boys and girls in Church Hill.
4 1
Other allegations regarding school officials creating opposition to the
plaintiff parents are raised in the parents' appellate brief. These allega-
tions included the fact that the superintendent of the school board and a
teacher in a public school addressed a PTA meeting about the textbook
34. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 8 (quoting the testimony given by
Harold Silver, Chairman of the Hawkins County School Board, during the trial on
remand).
35. Id. (quoting the deposition of Bill Snodgrass).
36. Circuit Six 1, 765 F.2d 75,76 (6th Cir. 1985).
37. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
38. Id.
39. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 7.
40. Id. at 9-10; Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 18.
41. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 10.
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selection process. Further allegations stated that a juvenile court judge
helped to form a group called "CARE," which opposed parents who
objected to the textbooks. The judge also allegedly threatened to arrest
children who refused to use the Holt series. Finally, the parents alleged
that the author of the announcement quoted above and another public
school principal in the county had written letters, which incorporated
materials supplied by People for the American Way, to the editor of a
local newspaper.
Discussion
It appears from the allegations in the briefs filed in this litigation
that both parties started with the good intention of asserting their be-
liefs about the proper goals and procedures for educating the children
of Hawkins County. However, in the heat of highly emotional debate,
both sides seem to have lost their objectivity and to have acted question-
ably. The end result was a power struggle for control of the public
schools of Hawkins County which was carried into the court system be-
cause neither side could compromise after their positions polarized and
hardened.
THE PARENTS' RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE HOLT SERIES
Vicki Frost reviewed the Holt series and produced a 212 page docu-
ment setting out her objections to it. In the brief of the appellees, the
Fundamentalist Christian parents and their children, these objections
were distilled to include sixteen themes. The major concern of the par-
ents in this case, was that the Holt series presented a one-sided view of
the world which excluded their religious beliefs and values. 4 2 This as-
pect of the parents' case is supported by a study conducted by the Na-
tional Institute of Education. 43 Testimony, by the author of that study
at the trial on remand, suggests that the Holt series contains a pervasive
bias against the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs which stems from both
omission and denigration of Judeo-Christian values. According to the
appellees' brief, no single story in the Holt series standing alone would
have caused the parents "to draw the line" 44 that they feel the schools
could not cross without violating their right to free exercise; however,
the lack of balance in the Holt series does cross the parents' line and
raises first amendment questions. The appellees' brief states that they
do not object to mere exposure of their children to ideas contrary to
their Fundamentalist Christian beliefs but rather to the constant barrage
of such themes without a balancing presentation of "traditional" Ameri-
42. Id. at 11-13, 26-33.
43. Id. at 26-33. See also PAW STUDY, supra note 4. PAW has conducted a study of
religion in public school textbooks which also supports this argument. A study conducted
by a liberal public interest group, AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPERATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, TEACING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1985)
[hereinafter AU STUDY] supports Appellees' lack of balance argument.
44. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 51. See also Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
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can Christian values. Nor do the parents demand that the public schools
teach their religious beliefs to all children. Rather, the plaintiff parents'
demand is for the schools to teach in such a way as not to offend or
denigrate their Fundamentalist Christian beliefs. Vicki Frost testified on
remand:
I can deal with small offenses but when you come over to bur-
den and continuously over and over and over story after story
after story, with virtually nothing to counteract that or nothing
to balance that from, you know, from our religious viewpoint,
you're proving my point, very well about offense and burden.
Something can be a little offensive and you tolerate it but there
comes a point where toleration moves to burden.
4 5
According to Bob Mozert:
[T]he families derive their religious beliefs from the entire Bi-
ble, and [believe] that they could not violate any [b]iblical
teaching. For them to disobey a [b]iblical command would re-
sult in spiritual or physical punishment.... The children from
these families also could not merely study the Holt books that
violate their religious beliefs, even if the children were not
forced by school officials to believe the ideas expressed in the
readings. . . . [S]tudying these religiously offensive materials
violates the Bible, which says 'learn not the ways of the hea-
then,' and, 'have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of
darkness, but rather reprove them, for it is shameful even to
mention what the disobedient do in secret.'
4 6
Many themes in the Holt series were found to be biblically forbid-
den by the parents and these objections were set forth in their brief.
Such themes specifically included: futuristic supernaturalism ("man as
God"), evolution, humanism (using "man as the measure of all life"),
one world government ("syncretism"), contrasting belief in the super-
natural with science, situational ethics, values clarification, magic, denial
that there is life after death, teaching that heaven and hell do not exist,
teaching that all religions are merely different roads to God, skeptical
portrayal of religion, pacifism, elimination of sexual roles, reversal of
sexual roles, and questioning authority, including that of parents.
Defendants characterized the plaintiffs' objections in a manner simi-
lar to that of both the court and the plaintiffs; however, defendants
couched the objections in such a way as to emphasize the conflict be-
tween the parents' values and the objectives of the Tennessee public
schools. 4 7 For example, defendants stated plaintiffs' objections to the
process of "values clarification" as follows:
The plaintiffs . . . object to the exploration of moral dilemmas
in stories and to their children being exposed to views on many
complex issues. They do not want a teacher to ask their chil-
45. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 40.
46. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 26, at 14 (quoting Jeremiah 10:2 and Ephe-
siam 5:11-12, respectively).
47. Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 14-17. See supra notes 6-14 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of those objectives.
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dren to understand how a character in a story feels or to apply
their values to a story in order to decide whether a character in
a story did the right thing.
48
The parents' objections to the material presented by the Holt series and
the response of the Hawkins County Public School system will serve as
the focus of this paper. The plaintiff parents' objections are essentially
the same as those raised by Fundamentalist Christians throughout the
United States over the last several years.4 9 The response of the school
board and officials is not atypical. This struggle over curriculum poses
constitutional questions as to who will control the public schools of this
country-parents, professional educators, or the courts.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE
Tennessee Eastern District Court Summary Judgment Holdings
The plaintiffs and their children filed a civil rights action on Decem-
ber 2, 1983.50 They sought injunctive relief to provide reading pro-
grams alternative to the Holt series as well as money damages, alleging
violation of both their first amendment right to free exercise and the
fundamental right of parents to control the education, as well as reli-
gious and moral instruction of their children. The case proceeded
through two memorandum opinions which resulted in dismissal by the
Eastern District Court of Tennessee in 1984. An appeal went to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985 resulting in a reversal and re-
mand. A memorandum decision was entered on remand in 1986. A sec-
ond appeal went to the Sixth Circuit in 1987. Certiorari was denied by
the United States Supreme Court in 1988.
In the first memorandum opinion the court stated plaintiffs' posi-
tion as:
[T]heir First Amendment freedom to believe as they choose is
meaningless if the state can force their children to read books
that contain ideas and values to which they do not sub-
scribe .... The complaint contains no allegation that the de-
fendants are attempting to coerce the school children into
performing any symbolic act, subscribing to any particular
value, or professing any particular form of belief. The plain-
tiffs' assertion appears to be that the mere exposure to this broad
spectrum of ideas and values which they find offensive amounts
to a constitutional violation.
5 '
The court held that only one claim, which alleged that the Holt series
teaches that one does not need to believe in God in a specific way but
that any faith in the supernatural can lead to salvation, may have stated a
violation of plaintiffs' constitutional right to free exercise. This would be
so only if the Holt series "appear[s] to assert that salvation or some form
48. Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 11.
49. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
50. The plaintiffs' action was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).




of religion is necessary at all or that no religion is necessary."' 52 The
court found that plaintiffs had not specified which parts of the Holt se-
ries would substantiate their claim. Citing Williams v. Board of Educa-
tion,53 the court held that there was no constitutional right protecting
"plaintiffs from exposure to morally offensive value systems or from expo-
sure to antithetical religious ideas."' 54 Consequently, the court partially
granted and partially denied defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and required the plaintiffs to
substantiate their allegations regarding the one possible constitutional
claim.
After plaintiffs presented specific citations to those parts of the Holt
series which allegedly taught that one does not need to believe in God in
a specific way but that any type of faith in the supernatural is an accepta-
ble method of salvation, the district court rendered its second memoran-
dum opinion. 5 5 The court again cited Williams for the proposition that
the first amendment does not guarantee religious freedom from expo-
sure to ideas and stated that "[w]hat is guaranteed is that the state
schools will be neutral on the subject, neither advocating a particular
religious belief nor expressing hostility to any or all religions." 56 Find-
ing that the Holt series "carefully adopt[s] this constitutionally man-
dated neutrality," 57 the court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated the standards to be used in de-
ciding free exercise claims:
[C]ourts apply a two-step analysis. First, it must be determined
whether the government action does, in fact, create a burden
on the litigant's exercise of his religion. If such a burden is
found, it must then be balanced against the governmental in-
terest, with the government being required to show a compel-
ling reason for its action.
58
In analyzing the parties' cases, the Sixth Circuit noted the parents'
assertions that their sincerely held religious beliefs were violated by ex-
posure to the Holt series and that refusal to participate in the offensive
reading program would lead to expulsion of their children from the
Hawkins County Public Schools thereby denying them a government
benefit because of their religious beliefs. Defendants' denial that the
parents' religious beliefs were sincerely held and that mere exposure to
the Holt series could offend such beliefs raised material issues of fact
and law, thus making the district court's dismissal improper. Further,
defendants alleged that their interest in teaching reading to elementary
school students in the system was a compelling state interest justifying
infringement of the plaintiffs' free exercise rights and that accommodat-
52. Id.
53. 388 F. Supp. 93 (D.W. Va. 1975), afftd, 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975).
54. Memorandum Opinion 1, 579 F. Supp. at 1053 (emphasis added).
55. Memorandum Opinion 11, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
56. Id. at 203.
57. Id.
58. Circuit Six 1, 765 F.2d 75, 78 (6th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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ing the demand for alternative reading programs would be a violation of
the establishment clause. The plaintiffs countered this allegation and
claimed that their proposal for alternative reading programs would not
impair the schools' ability to teach reading. The Sixth Circuit found that
these assertions also raised significant issues of law and fact and re-
versed the dismissal by the district court, remanding the case for resolu-
tion of these issues.
On remand, Chief Judge Hull noted the importance of this case:
This action juxtaposes two of our most essential constitutional
liberties-the right of free exercise of religion and the right to
be free from a religion established by the state. Moreover, it
implicates an important state interest in the education of our
children. The education of our citizens is essential to prepare
them for effective and intelligent participation in our political
system and is essential to the preservation of our freedom and
independence.
59
Judge Hull quoted the standard of review required by the Sixth Cir-
cuit and added that "it must be determined whether the state has acted
in a way which constitutes 'the least restrictive means of achieving [the]
compelling state interest,' as measured by its impact upon the plain-
tiffs." 60 Threshold issues in determining whether free exercise rights
have been impermissibly burdened involve the determination of
whether the beliefs asserted to be violated are religious and whether
they are sincerely held by those asserting them.6 1 In the instant case,
these facts were stipulated by the parties. An assertion by the schools
that the religious beliefs allegedly burdened must be "central to the
plaintiffs' faith" before they are entitled to first amendment protection
was rejected by Judge Hull as being based on dicta from the cases
cited.6 2 Judge Hull then agreed with the parents' assertion that the Holt
series lacked balance in its presentation of values:
It appears to the court that many of the objectionable passages
in the Holt books would be rendered inoffensive, or less offen-
sive, in a more balanced context. The problem with the Holt
series, as it relates to the plaintiffs' beliefs, is one of degree. One
story reinforces and builds upon the others throughout the in-
dividual texts and the series as a whole. The plaintiffs believe
that, after reading the entire Holt series, a child might adopt
the views of a feminist, a humanist, a pacifist, an anti-Christian,
a vegetarian, or an advocate of a 'one world government.'
Plaintiffs sincerely believe that the repetitive affirmation of
these philosophical viewpoints is repulsive to the Christian
faith-so repulsive that they must not allow their children to be
exposed to the Holt series. This is their religious belief. They
59. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1195 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (citations omitted).
60. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1197 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981)).
61. Judge Hull cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
62. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1198.
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have drawn a line, 'and it is not for us to say that the line [they]
drew was an unreasonable one.'
63
Judge Hull turned to Thomas v. Review Board64 for the test to deter-
mine whether the state's action burdened plaintiffs' right to free exercise
of their religion. "Where the state conditions receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief. . . a
burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free.exercise is nonetheless substantial."' 65 The
court then considered the precedents, which included Thomas, Sherbert v.
Verner,66 Spence v. Bailey, 67 and Moody v. Cronin.6 8 Both Thomas and Sher-
bert were cases based on denial of unemployment benefits to persons
who lost their jobs because of refusing to work in certain situations for
religious reasons. In both cases, the Supreme Court held for the reli-
gionists on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause. In the two lower court
decisions, school children had refused to participate in certain classes
because of their religious beliefs. In both cases the courts found that
denial of diplomas, suspension, expulsion, and other punishments con-
stituted infringement of the right to free exercise. In light of these
cases, Judge Hull found that the Hawkins County School Board had "ef-
fectively required that the student-plaintiffs either read the offensive
texts or give up their free public education" thus denying them a gov-
ernment benefit on the basis of their religious beliefs and violating their
right to free exercise.
69
The court looked again to Thomas for the standard to determine
whether this burden on the parents' and students' right to free exercise
of their religion was justified by a compelling state interest.
The mere fact that the [plaintiffs'] religious practice is bur-
dened by a government program does not mean that an ex-
emption accommodating [their] practice must be granted. The
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty [only] by show-
ing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some com-
pelling state interest.
70
Judge Hull found that "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very
apex of the function of a state."' 7 1 The ultimate issue in this case, in the
eyes ofJudge Hull, is whether Tennessee, acting through its local school
board in Hawkins County, "can achieve literacy and good citizenship for
all students without forcing them to read the Holt series."172 Based on
63. Id. at 1199 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
65. Remand Decision, 647 F.Supp. at 1199 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 717-18 (1981)).
66. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
67. 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972).
68. 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. I1. 1979).
69. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
70. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
71. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972)).
72. Id. at 1201.
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the facts that Tennessee permits education of its students in both private
schools and at home in addition to its public schools and that the state
had approved several basic reading series for use in its public schools,
the court concluded that there were acceptable alternatives for achieving
the compelling state interest in educating its students which would be
less restrictive than that proposed by the Hawkins County Public
Schools. 73 Judge Hull's opinion refuted the assertion by the schools
that the difficulty in administering alternative reading programs renders
implementation of such programs impossible by referring to expert tes-
timony that "the state's interest in uniformity is by no means absolute"
because teaching is best accomplished through individualized educa-
tion. 74 The fact that in the future the parents' and students' objections
might extend to other portions of the curriculum of the Hawkins County
Public Schools was found to be irrelevant because those objections and
the instant case were limited to the reading program, with the line being
drawn only at the Holt series as being intolerable to the plaintiffs' reli-
gious beliefs. The fact that nine students were accommodated in alter-
native reading programs for a significant part of the school year, without
disruption of the educational process, belied defendants' argument
based on such disruptions. The court found that granting plaintiffs' re-
quest for an alternative reading program would not bring a flood of re-
quests for alternative programs from everyone with an objection to
some aspect of the public school curriculum. The court denied that
there would be such a flood but was careful to limit its holding to the
facts of this case.
7 5
In granting relief to plaintiffs, the court recognized that by accom-
modating their religious objections, the schools might be seen as violat-
ing the establishment clause by causing the state to become excessively
entangled with religion through its schools. 76 The court stated: "It is
hard to imagine any reading program for the plaintiffs offered at the
schools which would not present Establishment Clause problems."
7 7
To avoid this problem, the court made use of the "opt-out" provision in
the Tennessee statutes, 78 whereby students and parents may choose a
home schooling option rather than attending the public schools. The
court extrapolated from this statute and held that plaintiffs in this case
may opt-out of the reading program in the Hawkins County Public
Schools. If students elect not to participate in the reading program at
the schools, home schooling in reading would provide a satisfactory al-
ternative without an excessive entanglement of the state in religion
through its schools. The court required that the reading proficiency of
students opting out be rated by standardized tests already in use by the
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1202.
76. Excessive entanglement of the government with religion is a part of the test, de-
fined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), used to determine whether there has
been a violation of the Establishment Clause.
77. Remand Decision, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050 (Supp. 1988).
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state; any deficiencies would have to be corrected. The court left the
details of such a program to the parents and professional educators.
Upon appeal of the remand decision, a three judge panel of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and remanded
Judge Hull's decision with directions to dismiss the complaint. 79 Chief
Judge Lively wrote the opinion for the court. This decision focused on
the fact that the plaintiff students were not compelled to believe or to
assert a belief in ideas contrary to their religion. Upon remand, the
court relied on testimony and found that plaintiffs never asserted that
the materials objected to actually offended plaintiffs' religious beliefs
but only that they could be so interpreted.
Both witnesses [Vicki Frost and Bob Mozert] testified under
cross-examination that the plaintiff parents objected to
passages that expose their children to other forms of religion
and to the feelings, attitudes, and values of other students that
contradict the plaintiffs' religious views without a statement
that the other views are incorrect and that plaintiffs' views are
the correct ones.
80
The Sixth Circuit panel identified the threshold issue as being
whether a government requirement that a person be exposed to ideas
objectionable to his or her religious beliefs can be a burden on the con-
stitutional right to free exercise. ChiefJudge Lively referred to an affi-
davit filed by the Superintendent of the Hawkins County schools which
distinguishes inculcation of values from mere exposure to them: "expo-
sure to something does not constitute teaching, indoctrination, opposi-
tion or promotion of the things exposed." 8' Repeated exposure is no
more inculcation than is a single such occurrence. Further, there was no
proof that any plaintiff student was ever required to affirm a religious
belief or to act in any way either required or forbidden by his or her
religious beliefs. Citing plaintiffs' testimony, the court found that it was
unlikely that a more balanced presentation would satisfy their objections
since to them there is only one acceptable religious viewpoint: the "bib-
lical" one that they hold. To accommodate plaintiffs' religious views the
schools would necessarily violate the establishment clause under the
holding of Epperson v. Arkansas 8 2 because such an accommodation would
be to tailor a public school's curriculum to satisfy religious principles or
prohibitions.
8 3
Balance in the treatment of religion lies in the eye of the be-
holder. Efforts to achieve the particular "balance" desired by
any individual or group by the addition or deletion of religious
material would lead to a forbidden entanglement of the public
schools in religious matters, if done with the purpose or pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 8
4
79. Circuit Six H, 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 1062.
81. Id. at 1063.
82. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
83. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
84. Circuit Six 11, 827 F.2d at 1065 (citations omitted).
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Judge Lively found that the district court incorrectly applied the
standards of Sherbert and Thomas to the instant case. Those cases were
distinguished because there was government compulsion to engage in
conduct which violated the plaintiffs' religious convictions. In the in-
stant case, absent any showing that reading and discussing the Holt se-
ries involved affirmation or denial of religious beliefs or performance or
non-performance of religious acts, there could be no violation of the
right to free exercise. The Sixth Circuit held that in order for the free
exercise clause to be violated there must be an element of government
compulsion. 85
ChiefJudge Lively also distinguished the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 86
from the instant case because the decision in that case was based on the
unique circumstance that compulsory attendance at public school until
the age of sixteen actually threatened the existence of the Old Order
Amish way of life through exposure of Amish children to the outside
world. In the instant case, plaintiffs insist that their children acquire all
the skills necessary to live in the outside world but take exception to
their exposure to certain ideas. In addition, there was no threat to plain-
tiffs' religious practices posed by exposure of their children to the ideas
objectionable to those religious beliefs. The court found that the plain-
tiff parents could avoid such exposure by choosing the options provided
by Tennessee law: private or home schooling.
The Sixth Circuit opinion cites Bethel School District v. Fraser87 as
standing for the proposition that the public schools serve the purpose of
inculcating democratic values, including "tolerance of divergent polit-
ical and religious" ideas while at the same time respecting others'
beliefs. 88
The 'tolerance of divergent . . . religious views' referred to by
the Supreme Court is a civil tolerance, not a religious one. It
does not require a person to accept any other religion as the
equal of the one to which that person adheres. It merely re-
quires a recognition that in a pluralistic society we must 'live
and let live.' 89
The opinion also recognizes the ability of local school authorities to de-
termine the curriculum for their school systems without interference by
the courts so long as that curriculum does not violate the fundamental
rights of students, teachers, or parents. 90
Judge Lively summarizes the holding in the case:
[Tihe requirement that public school students study a basal
reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create
85. The Sixth Circuit Court based its decision upon precedents such as Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961); and School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For a discussion of these
cases see infra notes 178-89, 196-206 and accompanying text.
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
88. Id. (citing Circuit Six 11, 827 F.2d at 1068).
89. Circuit Six 11, 827 F.2d at 1069.
90. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66:2
FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIANS
an unconstitutional burden under the [f]ree [e]xercise [c]lause
when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or
engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or re-
quired by their religion. There was no evidence that the con-
duct required of the students was forbidden by their religion.
Rather, the witnesses testified that reading the Holt series
"could" or "might" lead the students to come to conclusions
that were contrary to teachings of their and their parents' reli-
gious beliefs. This is not sufficient to establish an unconstitu-
tional burden. 9 '
IMPLICANTIONS OF THE MOZERT CASE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION
Overview of Fundamentalist Chnstian Objections to Public Education
The list of the plaintiffs' objections in the Mozert case is a statement
of the general objections that Fundamentalist Christians have to Ameri-
can public education generally. 9 2 Additional goals not brought to light
by the case include a return to the phonics method of teaching reading93
and creation of a "voucher tuition-credit system" to be used by parents
to send their children to the school of their choice, public or private,
rather than be burdened with both taxes to support the public schools
and tuition. 94 These goals are not addressed in this paper.
The conservative Christian position regarding education is most
succinctly stated in the "STUDENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS."
1. THE RIGHT TO BE TAUGHT TO READ THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
IN THE FIRST GRADE. If I am unable to read materials available
in my home by mid-year of the First Grade, I have been denied
my right and should be transferred immediately to an intensive
Phonics method of instruction.
2. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. Schoolpersons may not force me to
discuss, or play Magic Circle, or answer questions, write assign-
ments, or keep journals about my religion, moral values, family,
attitudes and feelings, sex behavior and private parts of the
body, political attitudes, or what I and my family do at home.
3. THE RIGHT TO MY RELIGIOUS FAITH AND BELIEFS. Schoolper-
sons may not force me to do assignments or engage in class-
room activities which criticize or downgrade my religion.
Examples of such practices are: teaching that any religion or
non-religion is as good as another, that there are many gods, or
that God did not create the world; teaching witchcraft, the oc-
cult, or astrology; conducting Eastern mysticism, yoga, Tran-
scendental Meditation (TM), Quieting Reflex (QR), guided
fantasy or imagery, or "stress" courses using hypnotic
practices.
4. THE RIGHT TO SHARE INFORMATION WITH MY PARENTS by tak-
ing home any textbooks, materials, lessons, and assignments,
91. Circuit Six 11, 827 F.2d at 1070.
92. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
93. STUDENT's BILL, supra note 1.
94. See Miller, supra note 3.
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and by giving them access to computer software and sound and
video tapes of classroom activities.
5. THE RIGHT TO HAVE AND TO HOLD MY MORAL VALUES AND
STANDARDS, MY POLITICAL OPINIONS, AND MY CULTURAL ATrI-
TUDES. Schoolpersons may not impose on me the value system
that ethics are situational or that moral dilemmas have no right
or wrong answers; may not ask me to make personal decisions
whether to lie, to cheat, to steal, to take drugs, to drink alcohol,
to engage in premarital sex with either gender, or to kill (as
promoted in the "lifeboat game" or in discussions of abortion,
euthanasia, and suicide); may not require me to role-play open-
ended psychological problems; may not put me in a school en-
vironment of premarital promiscuity by the in-school dispens-
ing of contraceptives and abortion services.
6. THE RIGHT TO ALTERNATE ASSIGNMENTS WHEN I OR MY PAR-
ENTS BELIEVE THAT SCHOOLPERSONS ARE VIOLATING MY RIGHTS
OR IMPOSING UPON ME LESSONS, FILMS OR MATERIALS INAPPRO-
PRIATE FOR MY GRADE LEVEL. Since thousands of good books
and materials are easily available, when I or my parents object
to a course, book, or assignment, schoolpersons have the duty
to give me alternate schoolwork for full credit and without dis-
crimination. Schoolpersons have the obligation to notify par-
ents when classroom materials may be objectionable (such as
the film "The Lottery").
7. THE RIGHT TO HAVE MY FAMILY TREATED WITH RESPECT.
Schoolpersons may not, through lesson, film or innuendo, con-
vey the notions that parents are old-fashioned, untrustworthy,
uninterested in me, have obsolete values and attitudes, or
might abuse me. When my parents exercise their rights to ex-
cuse me from a course, class, book or assignment, schoolper-
sons may. not retaliate against them or me, embarrass me in
front of my classmates, or take action against me which is per-
ceived as punishment or humiliation.
8. THE RIGHT TO BE INSPIRED AND ENCOURAGED BY CLASSROOM
LESSONS, NOT DEPRESSED OR DISTURBED. I have the right to be
taught the greatness of America and our Constitution, and that
ours is a land of freedom and opportunity for those who learn,
work hard and persevere. Schoolpersons may not depress me
with lessons, discussions or films about death, dying, violence,
surgery, suicide, or dire predictions about the end of the world.
9. THE RIGHT TO THE SANCTITY OF MY BODY AND TO SAFETY ON
THE SCHOOL PREMISES. Schoolpersons may not touch me in the
private parts of my body, or talk to me about touching me in my
private parts. Schoolpersons have the obligation to provide for
my security against physical attack and abuse, vandalism or
theft of my property, peddlers of illegal drugs, and the use of
profanity, blasphemy or vulgarity by schoolpersons or students.
10. THE RIGHT TO FULL COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS. Schoolpersons have the obligation to give full notifica-
tion to parents and students about applicable laws and the pro-
cedures to implement them. Schoolpersons have the
obligation to comply fully with all laws requiring parental con-
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sent for certain courses or materials, as well as all laws mandat-
ing such exercises as the daily recital of the Pledge of
Allegiance to the American Flag or studies in the U.S.
Constitution.
9 5
This statement goes beyond the objections of the plaintiff parents in
Mozert by including the requirement of full compliance with federal and
state laws and the right to physical and emotional safety on school
grounds. Certainly, no person could rationally take issue with the right
of a student to be safe while at school, but many of the other so-called
rights propounded by the Eagle Forum, which wrote the "Students Bill
of Rights," are at least controversial and at worst egregious, especially in
light of the traditional role of public education in the United States and
Supreme Court rulings regarding religion in the public schools.
9 6
The pamphlet containing this statement of students' rights also
contains two other lists, setting out "THE STUDENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES"
and "THE PILLARS OF SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS." The list of stu-
dent's responsibilities are statements that students will respect their fel-
low persons in the school community and act "properly" as students,
generally promising to comport themselves consistently with the obliga-
tions imposed by their "BILL OF RIGHTS." The "PILLARS OF SUPPORT"
language is more controversial:
1. In the public school classroom, the child is a captive audi-
ence and schoolpersons are authority figures. This authority is
limited by the students' rights, their parents' rights, and the
constant supervision of citizens and taxpayers.
2. All individuals who utilize taxpayers' money must accept
citizen surveillance of their decisions and performance of du-
ties. This applies to the President, Congress, federal, state and
local officials, school board members, librarians, and all school
personnel.
3. Under U.S. law and Supreme Court decisions, parents are
the primary educators of their children. All school courses,
materials and activities are subject to the primary control of
parents acting in supervision of their own children and in the
unhampered exercise of their constitutional rights.
9 7
Propositions one and two are not particularly arguable in that they are
statements of conventional wisdom. Could anyone seriously argue that
school children are not a captive audience? However, the assertion in
proposition three which states that "under United States law and
Supreme Court decisions, parents are the primary educators of their
children," may be drawing too fine a point from precedent.9 8 Primary
control of the curricula of the public schools properly lies in the hands
95. STUDENT'S BILL, supra note 1.
96. See infra notes 94-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of values
education in public education in the United States; see infra notes 158-223 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Supreme Court precedent regarding religion and parents'
rights to determine curriculum content in the public schools.
97. STUDENT'S BILL, supra note 1.
98. See infra notes 158-223 and accompanying text for a full discussion of federal judi-
cial precedent regarding the rights of parents to control public school curricula.
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of professional educators who are guided by community standards as well
as federal, state and local law.
The remainder of this Note will consider both traditional and cur-
rent viewpoints as to the nature and goals of public education and
whether there can be a reasonable accommodation of the Fundamental-
ist Christians' demands that would leave the public education system of
the United States able to carry out its mandate and abide by Supreme
Court precedent with regard to the religion clauses.
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND VALUES EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
The Beginnings
Since before the American Revolution, the education of their chil-
dren has been of great concern to the people of this nation. The earliest
efforts to provide education were primarily motivated by religion, with
the first schools being associated with churches, providing for the educa-
tion of ministers and ensuring the ability of churchmembers to read the
Bible.9 9 Zeal for education, however, was not limited to the colonists or
to religious groups. Education was a high priority throughout the fron-
tier period of American history and every section of the growing country
sought to provide for the education of its children, as demonstrated by
the Ordinance of 1785.100
The curricula of the early public school systems were greatly influ-
enced by Protestant Christianity, as reflected in the textbooks used at
that time.1 0 ' Sectarianism was avoided, not religion, and the schools
99. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 15; NEUFELDT, Religion, Morality and Schooling [here-
inafter NEUFELDT], in RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLING (T. Hunt & M.
Maxson ed. 1981) [hereinafter Hunt & Maxson]; D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE CO-
LONIAL EXPERIENCE 8, 138 (1958); Edwards, Civil Religion and the American Public Schools
[hereinafter Edwards], in Hunt & Maxson, supra, at 179; Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral
Child, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105, 107-114 (1978) [hereinafter Moskowitz]. See also Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 n.7 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. See Elson, GUARDIANS OF TRADITION 3 (1964) [hereinafter GUARDIANS]; WRIGHT,
supra note 15 (with specific attention on chapters one through four).
An example of the national concept of the importance of education is the Ordinance
of 1785 which
prescribed that each township should be laid out with thirty-six numbered sec-
tions of 640 acres each, and that Section 16 [in each township] should be reserved
for public education. The Ordinance of 1787 [reauthorizing the earlier Ordi-
nance] had declared that 'religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of edu-
cation shall forever be encouraged.'
WRIGHT, supra note 15 (quoting the Ordinance of 1787).
101. See generally, WRIGHT, supra note 15; GUARDIANS, supra note 100; Moskowitz, supra
note 99; Perko, Schooling and the American Civil Religion, in UME PUBLIC EDUCATION POLICY
STUDIES (1986) [hereinafter Perko]; H. PERKINSON, Two HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT (1979) [hereinafter PEREINSON]. Perkinson's book is a compen-
dium of quotations of educational philosophy from some famous and not so famous Amer-
icans interspersed with Perkinson's interpretations and comments. American educational
thinkers from Franklin andJefferson to Mann and Dewey invoke various "universal" tenets
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promoted Protestant unity.' 0 2 Throughout the nineteenth century, reli-
gious aspects of public school education were de-emphasized, at least
partly to defuse conflicts between Catholic and Jewish immigrants and
the predominant Protestant populace over the way religion would be
presented in the schools. 103 The removal of "Judeo-Christian" reli-
gious influence has continued to the present day, and it is now widely
recognized that textbooks and teachers nationwide actually avoid discus-
sion of Judeo-Christian religion in order to avoid controversy in the
classroom and conflict with parents. 1° 4 National enthusiasm for public
education, however, continues to the present time, as demonstrated by
the attention given educational issues in the news media.
The goals of American public education have been viewed consist-
ently from before its widespread establishment 10 5 and some have as-
serted that the general goals of education have been constant
throughout the history of western civilization.' 0 6  Prominent early
American political leaders, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jef-
ferson,' 0 7 believed that the purpose of education was to create good
citizens capable of contributing to their country's growth and prosper-
ity. In this view, a "good citizen" is able to analyze conflicting view-
points and to reach reasoned decisions regarding alternative solutions
to public problems, whether propounded by politicians or other "ex-
perts."10 8 Those who have learned the expectations society has of them
and who are able to fulfill those expectations are good citizens. 10 9 The
importance of instilling the qualities of good citizenship and loyalty to
the national state grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries as a result of the growth of the frontier, rapid increase in immigra-
of Protestant ideology in their discussions of the role that education in general and public
schooling in particular should play in peoples' lives.
102. NEUFELDT, supra note 99, at 10, 15.
103. Perko, supra note 101; NEUFELDT, supra note 99, at 17-23; D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT
SCHOOL WARS (1979) [hereinafter SCHOOL WARS]. Ms. Ravitch studied the history of pub-
lic education in New York City and believes that the history of those schools is a paradigm
for that of the nation's schools in general. See also, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ. 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
104. Miller, supra note 3. See also ASCD REPORT, supra note 3; PAW STUDY, supra note 4;
NIE Study, supra note 3; AU STUDY, supra note 43; Moskowitz, supra note 99, at 110; Brief
for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 16-21.
105. See M. KATz, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM (1968) [hereinafter KATz A];
M. KATz, SCHOOL REFORM (1971) [hereinafter KATZ B]; PERKINSON, supra note 101; Perko,
supra, note 101.
106. P. NASH, A. KAZAMIAS & H. PERKINSON, THE EDUCATED MAN (1982) [hereinafter
EDUCATED].
107. PERKINSON, supra note 101; T. JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR THE MORE GENERAL DIFFU-
SION OF KNOWLEDGE (1779), reprinted in T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 365-373 (M. Peterson ed.
1984) [hereinafter WRITINGS]; T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1892), reprinted in WRrr-
INGS, supra at 42-43; T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in
WRITINGS, supra at 271-274; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13,
1786), reprinted in WRITINGS, supra at 857-860.
108. See WRITINGS, supra note 107, at 42-43, 271-74, 365-73, 857-60. All ofJefferson's
references to education suggest its importance to him due to his belief that only educated
citizens could help preserve the new American republic. See also PERKINSON, supra note
101, at 158-59.
109. PERKINSON, supra note 101, at chapters 3 & 6. See infra notes 94-126 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the nature of these expectations.
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tion and industrialization, and "urbanization," all of which generated
concern over the dilution or distortion of "American" culture and
values. 1"0
Another consistent goal of American public education has been de-
velopment of each individual to the limit of his or her capability. Some
proponents of this viewpoint believe that individual growth is more im-
portant than inculcation of the values system maintained by society as a
whole (creation of "good citizens")."' Although some consider these
two goals to be in conflict," 12 others assert that they are compatible."
l3
A passage from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to his favorite law
professor, George Wythe, states Jefferson's view of the parallel impor-
tance of these two aspects of education: "I think by far the most impor-
tant bill in our whole code is that for the diffusion of knowledge among
the people. No other sure foundation can be devised for the preserva-
tion of freedom and happiness." ' "14 Jefferson believed that the only
hope for this nation was an independant, educated populace which
could make reasoned choices between political candidates and informed
decisions in resolving governmental issues, as well as contributing to the
growth of prosperity. The role of public education to Jefferson was to
promote the intellectual development of all citizens to the best of their
abilities so that they could better fulfill their duties as citizens.' '5 Jeffer-
son did not believe that the Bible should be taught at the elementary or
grammar school level.16
The American Civil Religion and Values Education
[T]here is a "religion," or set of values and normative behav-
iors, held in common by the majority of Americans that gives a
sense of unity and purpose and provides meaning for lives.
This civil religion need not conflict, though it sometimes does,
with whatever church affiliations people hold. Often, in fact, it
is already supported by denominational institutions, particu-
larly by those of conservative Christian traditions.' 
17
An interesting and thoughtful view of the function of public schools in
the United States has been presented in connection with the concept of
110. Moskowitz, supra note 99, at 109-110; Perko, supra note 101, at 13; NEUFELDT,
supra note 99, at 23-24; Valiance, Hiding the Hidden Curriculum [hereinafter Valiance], in
HIDDEN CURRICULUM, supra, note 11, at 18-19.
111. See generally PERKINSON, supra note 101, at chapter 9; HIDDEN CURRICULUM, SUpra
note 11.
112. PERKINSON, supra note 101, at chapter 9; HIDDEN CURRICULUM, supra note 11; KATZ
B, supra note 105, at 88.
113. PERKINSON, supra note 101, at chapter 9 (with specific attention to 310); Miller,
supra note 3. The belief that these two goals are compatible is apparent within the lan-
guage of the Ordinance of 1787.
114. WRITINGS, supra note 107, at 859.
115. See infra note 140 (for citations referring to Jefferson's philosophy of education).
116. WRITINGS, supra note 97, at 273. Jefferson likely would be maligned today by Fun-
damentalist Christians for being a secular humanist because of his rather independent
views on the relative roles of faith and reason, God and man.
117. Edwards, supra note 99, at 180.
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the "American Civil Religion.""18
The central belief of this "religion" is that Americans are chosen by
God to establish a new social order on earth. The God of this religion is
closely related to order, law, and "right." 119 There is a common set of
"saints," including Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, who embody
honor and good in political leadership. Holidays, such as the Fourth of
July and Memorial Day, and national shrines, such as Arlington Ceme-
tery and Gettysburg are also symbols of this religion. The "holy scrip-
tures" of this religion are the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The public schools serve to transmit
the values of the civil religion and also serve as one of its strongest sym-
bols, its "church."12 0 The American Civil Religion unites Americans of
all religions in a "common societal faith."'
' 2'
Although the American Civil Religion has not been entirely static,
going through periodic revisions in response to changing political and
cultural pressures, the values it espouses have been fairly constant. 122 A
study of the curricula mandated by statute in each of the fifty states
found that inculcation of certain virtues, along with teaching of "basic
studies," is required by every state.123 These virtues include tolerance,
patriotism, morality, truthfulness, honesty, generosity, and subordina-
tion to authority. These are the same virtues espoused by the American
Civil Religion. 124 Citing the striking similarities in public schools
throughout the country, despite the fact that each school system is lo-
cally controlled, one author identifies the motivation behind universal
public education as a major factor in creating this uniformity.
Anxious over the fate of a fledgling republic, and concerned
about the diversity among the immigrants who, by the 1850's,
were entering the country at the rate of 200,000 a year, educa-
tors such as [Horace] Mann created an institution calculated to
effectively socialize children into the civil religion of the repub-
lic .... All needed to develop a sense of themselves as Ameri-
cans, and to cultivate those virtues thought necessary for
118. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (Richey & Jones. ed. 1974); BELLAH, CIVIL
RELIGION IN AMERICA (1968) [hereinafter BELLAHI; YULISH, THE SEARCH FOR A CIVIC RELI-
GION (1980). Civil religion has been a difficult concept to define because it is an abstrac-
tion of a "transcendental faith," but a reasonable definition has been proposed:
[Clivil religion is a set of beliefs and attitudes that explains the meaning and pur-
pose of any given political society in terms of its relationship to a transcendent,
spiritual reality, that are held by the people generally of that society, and that are
expressed in public rituals, myths, and symbols.
Edwards, supra note 99, at 182.
119. BELLAH, supra note 118, at 9.
120. See generally Edwards, supra note 99; Perko, supra note 101.
121. Edwards, supra note 99, at 181.
122. See, e.g., Perko, supra note 101; Edwards, supra note 99, at 187.
123. Edelman, Basic American, 6 NOLPE SCHOOL L.J. 6, 97-98 (1978) (cited in Perko,
supra note 101, at 9). For example, the state of Colorado requires that the public schools
teach history, culture and civil government, including the contributions of minorities, pro-
vide information as to the honor and use of the flag, instruction in the United States Con-
stitution and the value of temperance. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-101 to 119 (1973 & 1984).
124. Perko, supra note 101, at 9; Edwards, supra note 99, at 186-89. See generally Val-
lance, supra note 110.
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democratic life and economic success .... The study of Ameri-
can history, inculcation of virtues such as honesty and industry,
and concern with developing respect [tolerance] for individual
and group differences were all perceived as vital to the survival
and prospering of American life.
12 5
Thus, the public school systems throughout the United States serve to
instill the democratic values commonly held by the vast majority of the
population, those of the American Civil Religion.1
26
THE AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION AND FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIANS
Struggles over curricula of the public schools and the precepts of
the American Civil Religion have occurred from time to time in the his-
tory of American public education. These struggles generally have re-
flected the efforts of groups with new-found political strength
challenging the precepts of the American Civil Religion and demanding
that their views be incorporated within it.127 The American Civil Reli-
gion has accommodated such changes in the past and is likely to do so in
the future. The current "battle for the public schools" is simply the
most recent manifestation of this sort of struggle, pitting Fundamental-
ist Christian ideologies against the more widely held "nonsectarian"
tenets of the American Civil Religion.
Civil religion is not all good. Dangers inherent in it include a na-
tionalism in which the state itself becomes the center of worship rather
than serving to bind together its citizens by means of common historic
events and traditions. 12 8 Fusion of God and nation can become a ra-
tionale for attacking nonconformist or non-conservative ideas or groups
and for strengthening the position of conservative, jingoistic groups.
12 9
Anyone disagreeing with the chauvinistic beliefs of such groups is
branded as irreligious, immoral and unfit to hold political office.
130
Another danger in the American Civil Religion is that it exemplifies
"male WASP culture,"' 3 1 ignoring the contributions of women as well
as those of other ethnic and racial groups to our national development.
The danger in this is that "[w]hen one believes that God has chosen the
white man in America to rule the world, it follows that the destruction of
others is simply doing the will of Divine Providence. According to this
view, any means is morally right if the world is thus 'made safe for de-
mocracy.' "132 It is arguable that United States involvement in Viet
Nam and the political repression of opposition to the war was at least in
part a negative manifestation of the American Civil Religion.
125. Perko, supra note 101, at 13.
126. Vallance, supra note 110, at 9-10.
127. See generally SCHOOL WARS, supra note 103; KArz A, supra note 905; KA-rz B, supra
note 105; Perko, supra note 101; Edwards, supra note 99.
128. Edwards, supra note 99, at 185.
129. E.g., BELLAH, supra note 118; Edwards, supra note 99; Perko, supra note 101.
130. Edwards, supra note 99, at 185.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 186.
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Many of the Fundamentalist Christians' objectives for reforming
public education in the United States may be viewed as exarcerbating
the least desirable aspects of the American Civil Religion. Anyone dis-
agreeing with the views of Fundamentalist Christians are branded as im-
moral and irreligious. Fundamentalist Christians demand that America
be portrayed in the schools only as a just and righteous God-fearing
nation that can do no wrong. America, as God's chosen nation, should
rule the world. The public schools, in which Fundamentalist Christian
children are exposed to ideas contrary to those of their parents, are
characterized as the center of a conspiracy to destroy the United States
by sapping its morality and its will to resist the communist threat. Once
the schools sap the technological and moral strength of the United
States, it is predicted that it will combine with the Soviet Union in an
overarching one-world government that recognizes no God.' 3 3 Thus
viewed as an enemy of Fundamentalist Christian ideologies, the public
schools must either be radically changed so as to present the "proper
Christian perspective" or be destroyed. 134 Some educators and reli-
gious leaders believe that destruction of public education is the absolute
goal of the Fundamentalist Christians involved in attacks on the public
school systems of this nation.
13 5
Despite the extreme position they take, Fundamentalist Christians
have identified at least one genuine problem with the system of public
education and the way that it reflects the American Civil Religion. Stud-
ies of textbooks used in public schools throughout the United States
have shown that religion and the influences it has had on the develop-
ment of our nation have been ignored.1 3 6 It is not possible to accurately
recount the history of the development of this nation without including
a discussion of the influence of Judeo-Christian religion. From the mi-
gration of the Pilgrims to the Abolition movement, from the labor strug-
gles of the Industrial Revolution to the Civil Rights movement of the
1960's and the present-day Sanctuary movement, religion has played a
vital role in the development and growth of the spirit of this country.
Such contributions must be recognized by American public education if
it is to accurately reflect and transmit the social values and history of this
nation.
As the parents in Mozert argue, omission of any reference to a par-
ticular religion could be viewed as bias against that religion.' 3 7 The
Fundamentalist Christians are a group with recently recognized political
133. See generally LaHaye, supra note 1; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 13.
134. See WooD, Secular Humanism and the Public Schools, in UME PUBLic EDUCATION STUD-
1ES (1986) [hereinafter WOOD]. Wood quotes Jerry Falwell as stating:
One day, I hope in the next ten years, I trust that we will have more Christian day
schools than there are public schools. I hope I live to see the day when as in the
early days of our country, we won't have any public schools. The churches will
have taken them over again and Christians will be running them.
Id. at 8.
135. Interview with a Colorado educator who asked not to be identified (Apr. 11,
1987).
136. NIE Study, supra note 3; PAW STUDY, supra note 4; AU STUDY, supra note 43.
137. Brief for of Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 26-33.
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strength I3 a and are asserting their perceived right to have their views
incorporated into the American Civil Religion. This situation is similar
to those battles already fought to force the American Civil Religion to
accommodate "new" or different viewpoints so as to more accurately
reflect the overall ideals of American society and should be resolved in
the same way.' 3 9 However, it would be wrong to adopt all of the
changes in public education demanded by the Fundamentalist Chris-
tians, especially with regard to their objections to the methods of teach-
ing used today in most school districts. It is clear that the mandate of
the public schools of the United States is to create good citizens who are
able to make rational political choices and to foster the greatest individ-
ual growth possible. 140 It is also clear that implementing all of the
changes in public school curricula demanded by Fundamentalist Chris-
tians would inhibit the public schools' ability to achieve that mandate.
Present Professional Concepts of Values Education
Present-day educators believe that the schools have a two-fold re-
sponsibility in teaching values and morals. 141 First, consistent with the
basic purpose of education, the schools are required to transmit the cul-
tural norms of the society in which they function. This involves teaching
the predominant values-orientation of that society as well as its more
generalized cultural characteristics and attitudes. 14 2 Secondly, schools
should serve to foster the growth of individual students so that every
student reaches maximum potential as a person. 14 3 However, debate
rages over how best to accomplish these dual goals; and, there is debate
over their relative importance. For example, should society's values and
moral framework be inculcated in students, that is, imprinted on them
by means of a doctrinal approach that brooks no exception? Or should
the schools teach students the general outlines of societal standards, ex-
posing them to as many differing viewpoints as possible and then equip
each student with the skills necessary to make his or her own choice as to
which values-system is preferred?
The generally accepted view among educators is that mere inculca-
138. The "Moral Majority" was first recognized by most people as a politically power-
ful group during the campaign for the 1980 presidential election.
139. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
141. See generally HIDDEN CURRICULUM, supra note 11; Hunt & Maxson, supra note 99;
DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING (Cochrane Manley-Casimir ed. 1980) [hereinafter
DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING]; Moskowitz, supra note 99; GALABRAITH & JONES,
MORAL REASONING (1976) [hereinafter MORAL REASONING]; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIA-
TION, VALUES CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES (1976) [hereinafter NEA VALUES]; KAY, MORAL
EDUCATION (1975) [hereinafter KAY]; MORAL EDUCATION (Crittendon & Sullivan ed. 1971).
142. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text. Both Edwards and Perko argue
that the ACR comprises this aspect of education in the United States. See also Maxson, The
Impact of Schooling on Children's Acquisition of Values [hereinafter Maxson], in Hunt & Maxson,
supra note 99, at 201.
143. See generally PERKINSON, supra note 101; HIDDEN CURRICULUM, supra note 11.
Although some perceive the emphasis on individual growth as a recent development, be-
ginning in the twentieth century, it is clear that Jefferson favored public education because
it would help students achieve the most that they could in life.
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tion of values and morals on students is not effective.144 A person can
"know" what decision is morally correct and not act consistently with
that knowledge. In order to effectively learn values systems or morality,
students need to be able not only to recognize the "correct" choice in
circumstances "testing" their morality, but also to act on that choice. 14 5
Educators, educational sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers dif-
fer as to the best approaches to be used in developing the ability to act
morally. However, most of these professionals agree that acting mor-
ally is a rational process involving consideration of alternative actions
and choosing that action which fits each individual's perceptions as to
what is moral.' 4 6 Exposure to alternative solutions to moral dilemmas
and the ability to project oneself into the situation of another are widely
agreed to be important in fostering moral development. 14 7 The ability
to reason analytically and to think critically are essential in fostering the
moral development of children. Moral development involves incorpo-
rating a values system into one's life. Most people in the United States
adhere to a common values system which has been identified by some as
the American Civil Religion.1
4 8
Current psychological research suggests that children learn best
through experience, whether genuine or vicarious, and that imagery,
role-taking and role-playing are techniques important in developing
thinking skills as well as socially acceptable values. These techniques
give children the opportunity to "practice" making choices about appro-
priate behavior in morally ambiguous situations. By practicing in these
ways, children can develop their own sense of what is morally correct by
applying the values they have learned at home, in church and at school,
in ways that are not threatening to their health or safety. Avoiding
threats to health and safety is one of the goals of the Student's Bill of
Rights. 149 Although Fundamentalist Christians are opposed to role-
playing, guided imagery (use of the imagination), critical thinking and
reading, and discussion of current social issues involving families, these
techniques have found wide acceptance as effective tools in developing
values and should not be discarded. Local school boards, on the advice
of professional educators, have adopted these techniques throughout
144. See Kohlberg, The Moral Atmosphere of the School [hereinafter Kohlberg B.], in HID-
DEN CURRICULUM, supra note 11, at 61; Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to
Moral Education [hereinafter Kohlberg A], in NEA VALUES, supra note 141, at 18; Cochrane,
Moral Education and the Curriculum, in DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING, supra note 141,
at 60; KAy, supra note 141; Maxson, supra note 142.
145. See Friere, The Banking Concept of Education, in HIDDEN CURRICULUM, supra note 11,
at 283; Fenstermacher, Manner as Medium for Morals [hereinafter Fenstermacher], in Hunt &
Maxson, supra note 99, at 123; Maxson, supra note 142; Raths, Freedom, Intelligence, and
Valuing [hereinafter Raths], in NEA VALUES, supra note 141, at 9; Simon, Values Clarification
vs. Indoctrination [hereinafter Simon], in NEA VALUES, supra note 141, at 135.
146. See Kohlberg A, supra note 144; Kohlberg B, supra note 144; Fenstermacher, supra
note 145; Raths, supra note 145.
147. See Kohlberg A, supra note 144; Kohlberg B, supra note 144; KAy, supra note 141;
MORAL REASONING, supra note 141; Moskowitz, supra note 99; NEA VALUES, supra note 141,
at 75 (emphasis on Part Two which is titled "Techniques").
148. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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the country. Unless it can be demonstrated that these teaching tech-
niques violate the fundamental rights of students, teachers or parents,
courts are powerless to interfere.
Present Professional Concepts of Teaching Thinking Skills
Many educators believe that the change from the "Industrial Era"
to the "Information Age" requires a change in educational goals and
practices. Because of the information explosion, it is now impossible for
teachers, charged with the responsibility of teaching "content" curricu-
lum, to cover all of the material involved in their specialties. Thus, there
is a need to develop skills in problem solving, reasoning, conceptualiza-
tion and analysis. 150 In other words, the changing nature of our society
requires schools to teach thinking skills as well as facts and, perhaps, to
change the emphasis of education away from feeding facts into chil-
dren's brains to stressing development of thinking skills. Recent devel-
opments in educational psychology and neurobiology have improved
our understanding of the development of thinking skills.' 5 1 The latest
research in these areas suggests that educators should include in every
curriculum those mental tactics holding the most promise for multiply-
ing the natural powers of the mind. 15 2 Typically, the approaches recom-
mended for accomplishing development of thinking skills differ in many
respects, but there is general consensus as to the importance of some
techniques.153 Those techniques emphasize classroom discussion, role-
taking and role-playing. In other words, involving children in the exer-
cise of thinking, and exposing them to approaches to thinking taken by
others, helps them to develop their own abilities. This is accomplished
by allowing each student to evaluate not only the approaches to thinking
he or she uses, but those of other students as well. 1 4 Use of current
social problems, personal experiences, and literature serve to expose
children to interesting situations in which they develop the ability to
think, whether the thought process is intended to reach some
moral/value decision or to solve a problem in logic or mathematics. 155
If these techniques were not utilized in our public schools, many profes-
sionals believe, the quality of education received by American children
would decline and students would not adequately be prepared for their
150. McTighe & Schollenberger, Why Teach Thinking [hereinafter McTighe], in Associ-
ATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING MINDS 3 (Costa ed.
1985) [hereinafter DEVELOPING MINDS]. History, science, and social studies are part of the
"content" curriculum.
151. See generally DEVELOPING MINDS, supra note 150; Frameworksfor Teaching Thinking, 43
EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 3 (1986) [hereinafter Framework for Thinking].
152. Perkins, Thinking Frames, 43 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 4, 5 (1986) [hereinafter
Perkins].
153. DEVELOPING MINDS, supra note 150, at parts VII, VIII; Framework for Thinking, supra
note 151.
154. DEVELOPING MINDS, supra note 150, at part VI.
155. See id.; Brandt, Overview, 43 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 3 (1986); Perkins, supra note
153; Marzano & Arredondo, Restructuring Schools Through the Teaching of Thinking Skills, 43
EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 20 (1986); Brief for Appellant Schools, supra note 18, at 1-8.
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lives as citizens. 156 Schools producing citizens who are unable to think
critically and analyze ramifications of possible choices would be failing
in their primary function. Schools which did not teach their students to
think critically would not be developing each student to their maximum
potential and would fall short of the second major goal of public educa-
tion in the United States.
15 7
The statements of professional educators, educational philoso-
phers, sociologists, and psychologists regarding the importance of val-
ues/moral education and teaching of thinking skills directly contradict
Fundamentalist Christians' preferred approaches to these subjects. This
conflict created the most basic issue presented in Mozert: Who will con-
trol the curriculum of our public schools? In order to suggest an answer
to that question, it is necessary to consider Supreme Court decisions in
the area of the religion clauses as they relate to the public schools and
their curricula.
Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools
Although approaches to teaching religion in the public schools vary
somewhat from community to community, there is a consistent policy
prohibiting the advancement of or opposition to religion or non-reli-
gion. 158 The Supreme Court has indicated that teaching about religion
is permissible. The Educational Policies Service of the National School
Boards Association provides copies of policy guidelines proposed or
adopted by local school boards. 15 9 Several of these policy guidelines
serve as the basis of discussion in this section of the note.
A policy guideline adopted by the Boulder Valley Public Schools in
Boulder, Colorado in 1977 requires teachers to meet with their building
principals at the beginning of the school year if they plan to present
school programs which involve religious content. The aim is to insure
that such programs actually serve an educational or cultural purpose
and are not intended to promote religion. There is an "appeal" process
whereby teachers and principals who cannot reach agreement regarding
appropriate content for such programs meet with a review committee to
be sure that both teacher and principal are complying with the guide-
lines. There has been a relatively high amount of strife in the Boulder
public schools with regard to "religious education," arising mostly from
Fundamentalist Christian parents and students. 160
The policy guidelines from the other school systems are more gen-
156. McTighe, supra note 150; Hughes, Introduction to DEVELOPING MINDS, supra note
150, at 1.
157. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
158. Interview with Lauren Kingsbery, Legal Counsel for the Colorado Association of
School Boards (Mar., 1987). Ms. Kingsbery provided copies of policy statements from the
States of Colorado and Washington, and the local school boards of Boulder, Colorado,
Mountain View, California and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. See also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
THE PUBLIC ScHooLs AND GUIDELINES ON RELIGION (n.d.).
159. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
160. Miller, supra note 3.
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eral than those used in Boulder. These policies state that public schools
should remain neutral about religion. The guidelines for Colorado and
for the Cedar Rapids public schools incorporate the three-prong test for
determining a violation of the establishment clause set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.' 6 1 In order to pass constitutional muster, school instruction
must have a secular purpose, a secular primary effect, and require no
excessive entanglement with religion. 16 2 All these policy guidelines em-
phasize the importance of religion in our national heritage and in our
daily lives but carefully limit teaching to the effects and not the dogma of
religion. The guidelines prohibit religious exercises, celebrations, and
ceremonies. Each stresses the need to avoid either promoting any sec-
tarian or non-religious viewpoint or making children feel uncomfortable
about their personal religious faith. Religious music, symbols and dis-
plays used in the schools must have an objective, educational purpose.
All these policy guidelines are intended to teach the importance of reli-
gious tolerance and the acceptance of differences between members of
our pluralistic society.
Despite such carefully defined neutral guidelines having been estab-
lished by the public schools, many teachers are afraid to teach anything
which might be perceived as religious or non-religious because of the
uproar they anticipate from Fundamentalist Christian parents and
pupils.16 3 There is a definite chilling effect from the attacks by Funda-
mentalist Christians on the public schools. According to one educator,
this chilling effect is not limited to religion alone but spills over into any
area that involves personal feelings, family life, sex education or values
clarification. 164
In Board of Education v. Pico, 165 Justice Blackmun emphasized the im-
portance of first amendment liberties and stated that "[tihe classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'; the first amendment therefore
'does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room.' "166 This country is a "marketplace of ideas" and laws that cast a
"chilling effect" leading to prior restraint on the free flow of ideas are
not favored. 167 Fundamentalist Christians have been able to intimidate
public school teachers into avoiding concepts which might arouse the
Fundamentalist's ire. This is a form of prior restraint which generates a
chilling effect and prevents teachers in the public schools from accom-
plishing their mandate: developing citizens to their fullest potential.
161. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
162. Id. at 612.
163. Miller, supra note 3; Mertz, supra note 3.
164. Interview with a Colorado educator who asked not to be identified (Apr. 11,
1987).
165. 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (Blackman, J., concurring).
166. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
167. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (which states
that any system of prior restraint comes to this court with a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (which holds that it is the
chief purpose of the speech guaranty to prevent previous restraints against publication).
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THE SUPREME COURT, THE SCHOOLS AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The Supreme Court has often considered the societal role of educa-
tion generally and of public education specifically.16 8 The Court holds
the same views of the role of public education as do professional educa-
tors, sociologists, and politicians. 169
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a prin-
cipal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
170
This dictum, quoted from Brown v. Board of Education,17 1 provides a
starting point for a discussion of the Supreme Court's view of the role of
public education in our society. This statement is also relevant to the
issues raised by Mozert. The parallel arises because the basic conflict in
Brown concerned acknowledgement and acceptance of our ratially plu-
ralistic, democratic society. Mozert involved another aspect of the same
conflict-given the pluralistic religious society of the United States today,
can any single religious group, any more than any single racial group,
control the curriculum of the public schools?
In Meyer v. Nebraska,1 72 the Nebraska Legislature passed a statute
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to students who had not
passed the eighth grade. The avowed purpose of the law was "to pro-
mote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the im-
mature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English
and acquire American ideals .... ,,173 The Court acknowledged that
states could go "very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally ... but the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected." ' 74 The Court did not question
the right of a state to "prescribe a curriculum for the institutions which
168. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Board ofEduc. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 202 (1963); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
169. See supra notes 94-126 and accompanying text.
170. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
171. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
172. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
173. Id. at 401.
174. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
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it supports"' 17 5 but it did strike down the statute because it was applied
arbitrarily to prevent language teachers from practicing their profession
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. This case is an early recogni-
tion by the Court of a state or local government's discretion in control-
ling the curriculum it has prescribed for its schools and the limit
imposed by the Constitution on that discretion.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters'17 6 resolved a conflict over the right of par-
ents to send their children to private schools in the face of an Oregon
statute requiring attendance at public school from the ages of eight to
sixteen years or until completion of the eighth grade. Once again the
Court used the fourteenth amendment to resolve the issue and found
that the statute would interfere with school corporations' business and
property. In striking down the statute, the Court stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations. 1
7 7
Although the Fundamentalist Christian plaintiffs in Mozert cite Pierce
as supportive of parents' duty and right to prevent standardization of
their children by public schools,' 7 8 their reliance is misplaced. The
holding in Pierce goes only to the fact that states cannot prohibit estab-
lishment and maintenance of private schools within their borders. In
reaching its decision, the Court considered the fact that existing private
schools in Oregon would be denied equal protection of their right to
property if the statutory ban on private schools was allowed to stand.
The Court acknowledged the pluralistic character of American society
by allowing parents to exercise the option to send their children to pri-
vate schools if they prefer such schools. The Court's statement that par-
ents have the "right and.., high duty ... to prepare... [their children]
for additional obligations" refers to training beyond that available in public
schools, such as religious indoctrination, which should take place at
home and in church.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,179 Jehovah's Wit-
nesses children refused for religious reasons to obey a board of educa-
tion resolution requiring all students to salute the flag. As a result, the
children were expelled from school and their parents threatened with
punishment. In its decision, applying the free exercise clause to the
schools, the Court focused on the fact that the defendants' refusal to
comply with the resolution did not interfere with the rights of any other
175. Id. at 402. The idea that the states have discretion to determine the curriculum
used in the schools it supports runs through the court's decisions relating to schools.
176. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
177. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
178. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 64-68.
179. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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individuals to salute the flag and that the only conflict was between au-
thority and rights of the individual. Acknowledging Minersville School Dis-
trict v. Gobitis,180 which had upheld the same resolution just three years
earlier, the Court recognized that "the State may 'require teaching by
instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organ-
ization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty,
which tend to inspire patriotism and love of our country.' "s18, "Here,
however, [unlike the facts in Gobitis], we are dealing with a compulsion of
students to declare a belief."' 8 2 The Court found that the Barnette case
turned on the ability of the State to compel anyone to profess any kind of
belief. The Court asserted that government of limited power need not
be a weak government and that to protect individuals' rights under such
a government "is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual
freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for
which history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end."' 18 3 The
Court utilized the fourteenth amendment to apply the first amendment
to the states so as to protect citizens against state power to compel be-
lief. The Court found that boards of education have important func-
tions, and that:
Boards of Education .. .have ... discretionary functions, but
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of [c]onstitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of gov-
ernment as mere platitudes.'
8 4
Because the Bill of Rights was intended to protect the minority from
tyranny of a majority of the population, the Court stated that each indi-
vidual's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech and press, to
freedom of assembly and to worship could not be subjected to political
controversy and majority determination. Although boards of education
have expertise not shared by the courts, which generally is good reason
for courts not to interfere in their decisions regarding curricula, the
courts will step in to protect individual liberties.
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification
of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.
It seems trite to say that the First Amendment to our Constitu-
tion was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these begin-
nings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the
[s]tate or of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up
government by the consent of the governed, and the Bill of
Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce
180. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
181. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 604 (StoneJ., dissenting)).
182. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 637.
184. Id.
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that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opin-
ion, not public opinion by authority....
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an excep-
tion, they do not now occur to us.
18 5
The Court overruled Gobitis and struck down the requirement of
participation in recitation of the pledge by all students. Barnette was de-
cided in the midst of World War II, a time when the nation faced an
implacable threat from totalitarian enemies and the need for national
unity was intensely felt. Despite these circumstances, the Court found
that individual liberty was more important than inculcation of uniform
beliefs in the schools.
The Sixth Circuit applied the holding of Barnette to the Mozert
case.1 8 6 In so doing, it recognized that mere exposure to ideas cannot
threaten an individual's fundamental rights because it involves neither
compulsion nor inculcation. The plaintiff parents' reliance on Barnette in
their brief'8 7 is misplaced because, although the holding applies to any
attempt to compel declaration of a belief, no such compulsion existed in
the Hawkins County Public Schools. Moreover, prohibition of exposure
of students to ideas, as sought by the parents in Mozert, would raise free
speech issues and defeat the entire purpose of education.' 8 8 Finally,
imposition of the Fundamentalist Christians' educational preferences
would interfere with the rights of other students in the schools to re-
ceive the best education possible by limiting their exposure to ideas,
further removing this case from the four corners of Barnette.
In Everson v. Board of Education,' 89 the Court upheld a New Jersey
statutory scheme to provide school bus transportation to students in pri-
vate schools, most of which were sectarian, because the benefit was to
individual students and their parents and not directly to sectarian
schools. Despite the result, this case contains language which on its face
leaves no doubt about there being a need for a "wall of separation"
between church and state.19 0 The legacy of this case has been a mixed
185. Id. at 641-42. This standard is asserted consistently in Supreme Court cases deal-
ing with the curricula of the public schools. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 206 (1963).
186. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
187. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 68.
188. The chilling effect of censorship by prior restraint is forbidden by the first amend-
ment right to free speech. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Mertz, supra note 3. Ms. Mertz stated that, in her
view and that of many educators, the purpose of education was to expose children to as
many ideas as possible so that they will realize the importance of ideas and thinking. See
also Miller, supra note 3 (which corroborates that this concept of education is certainly
encompassed within the educational goals and philosophies discussed within supra notes
94-126, 127-52 and accompanying text).
189. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
190. Id. at 16.
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message to "separationists" and "accommodationists"'1' alike: some
interaction between church and state is permissible but not to the extent
that the state aids or opposes any one or all religions or non-religion;
nor can the state punish persons for having or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs.
A challenge to the Champaign, Illinois mandatory "time-release
program," providing for religious training in public school buildings by
church representatives, was involved in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education.19 2 Relying on Everson, the Court found excessive entangle-
ment between church and state and struck down the law. Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence in McCollum outlined the history of public
education in the United States and identified the reasons for secular
public education:
It is pertinent to remember that the establishment of this prin-
ciple of Separation in the field of education was not due to any
decline in the religious beliefs of the people .... The secular
public school did not imply indifference to the basic role of reli-
gion in the life of the people, nor rejection of religious educa-
tion as a means of fostering it. The claims of religion were not
minimized by refusing to make the public schools agencies for
their assertion. The non-sectarian or secular public school was
the means of reconciling freedom in general with religious
freedom. The sharp confinement of the public schools to secu-
lar education was a recognition of the need of a democratic so-
ciety to educate its children, insofar as the [s]tate undertook to
do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm in which
pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are most easily
and most bitterly engendered. Designed to serve as perhaps
the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep
scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The
preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of
[g]overnment from irreconcilable pressures by religious
groups, of religion from censorship and coercion, however sub-
tly exercised, requires strict confinement of the [s]tate to in-
struction other than religious, leaving to the individual's church
and home, indoctrination in the faith of his choice.' 9 3
Everson and McCollum stand for the proposition that there can be no
advancement or inhibition of religion in the public schools. Contrary to
the plaintiff parents' contentions in the Mozert case, this is not due to
antipathy toward religion but, at least in part, to a desire to avoid the
political and social turmoil that would result from advancing some reli-
191. See F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION 8-9 (1976). An "accommodationist" is
one who would accommodate the unrestrained interaction between church and state de-
spite the prohibition of the establishment clause.
192. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
193. Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The concern with avoiding political
strife over religion in the schools is picked up as dictum in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622-24 (1971). See also supra notes 1-5, 96-99 and accompanying text (for an historical
overview of strife in the schools over religion).
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gious beliefs and not others in the public schools. It has been shown
that the public schools in this country have strict guidelines of neutrality
with regard to religion and religious teaching. 19 4 Yet, the plaintiff par-
ents in Mozert would have the courts breach the "wall of separation" that
has stood between government and religion more or less firmly for two
hundred years so that the curricula of the public schools would reflect a
"Christian perspective." In their appellate brief, plaintiffs cite the con-
flict that arose in Hawkins County when they sought to have their view-
point represented in the curriculum of the local primary and middle
schools.' 9 5 Fundamentalist Christians throughout the country would
have the public schools breach the "wall of separation" regardless of the
resulting strife, even though most public schools are carefully neutral in
their approach to religion.
The Court again addressed the role of religion in the public schools
in Engel v. Vitale.19 6 Justice Black, writing for the Court, asserted that
the role of the religion clauses is to prevent religious persecution. The
Court struck down the required recital of "The Regent's Prayer," a non-
sectarian prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents. The
Board of Regents is an agency charged with overseeing public education
in New York and had composed the prayer in order to promote both
spiritual and moral training in the schools. The fact that religious exer-
cises are excluded from the public schools is not an indication of hostil-
ity toward religion, rather it is an affirmation of the freedom of each
person in the country to choose the way he or she believes and how to
express those beliefs. Fundamentalist Christians consistently ignore the
plain language used by the Court in its decisions, such as Engel, to affirm
the importance of religion in our society and rail against those decisions
because of their desire to impose their beliefs on the public schools. 1' 7
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 198 the Court, with-
out comment, struck down required reading of the King James Bible in
Pennsylvania public schools and the recital of the Lord's Prayer in the
public schools of Maryland. Abington emphasized the importance of reli-
gion in both the development of the country and in the daily lives of
citizens and held that the state must remain neutral, neither promoting
nor opposing religion or non-religion. In dictum, Justice Clark pointed
out that teaching about the Bible as literature or the influence of religion
historically would offend neither the establishment clause nor the free
exercise clause. 19 9 Justice Clark also examined the interplay between
the religion clauses and concluded that "[t]he distinction between the
two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predi-
194. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
195. Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27, at 7-11.
196. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
197. See generally Brief for Appellee Parents, supra note 27.
198. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
199. This viewpoint is picked up in other Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The policy guidelines referred to in supra notes 147-54
and accompanying text also emphasize this aspect of education and religion.
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cated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be
so attended. '20 0 Justice Brennan, concurring, noted that parents ob-
jecting to the secular nature of public education had the choice of send-
ing their children to private sectarian schools. 20 1 Citing Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California,20 2 where the Court upheld compul-
sory military training at state universities, Justice Brennan addressed the
interplay between the religion clauses and pointed out that government
power to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs is
different from government inability to compel behavior offensive to reli-
gious principles. The deciding factor in Hamilton was the fact that at-
tendance at the state university was by choice. Justice Brennan stressed
the ability of the government to regulate the "behavioral manifestations
of religious beliefs, [but] it may not interfere at all with the beliefs them-
selves."' 20 3 He also considered the role of the Court in cases involving
public schools:
It is not the business of this Court to gainsay the judgments of
experts on matters of pedagogy. Such decisions must be left to
the discretion of those administrators charged with the supervi-
sion of the nation's public schools. The limited province of the
courts is to determine whether the means which the educators
have chosen to achieve legitimate pedagogical ends infringe the
constitutional freedoms of the First Amendment.
20 4
This theme runs through many Supreme Court decisions, including
some involving the religion clauses and others involving disciplining of
students. 20 5 However, Fundamentalist Christians would have us believe
that the courts are practically running the schools.
20 6
The state of Arkansas enacted, but never enforced, a law prohibit-
ing teaching from any textbook containing a discussion of the theory of
evolution. In Epperson v. Arkansas,20 7 a public school teacher challenged
the validity of that law because she had violated it and feared prosecu-
tion. The Court struck down the law. While recognizing the control
that states and localities have over education and the fact that teaching
about religion is not prohibited in the public schools, Justice Fortas, writ-
200. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 206, 223 (1963). In
Mozert, this distinction played a critical role in the Sixth Circuit Court's reversal of the
remand decision.
201. Id. at 242. However, Justice Stewart, dissenting, cites Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943), for the proposition that the first amendment is available to all and
not just those who can pay their way. Abington, 374 U.S. at 313.
202. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
203. Abington, 374 U.S. at 254.
204. Id. at 279.
205. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (discipline); Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (right to hear); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(discipline); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (discipline); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., .393 U.S. 503 (1969) (discipline); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (estab-
lishment clause).
206. See generally T. Ascik, Why Are We Going Backwards in Education?, Speech at the Heri-
tage Foundation (July 16, 1986); WooD, supra note 134; LaHaye, supra note 1.
207. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Epperson was recently upheld when the court struck down a
Louisiana law requiring "equal time" for teaching of "creation science" along with biolog-
ical theories of evolution. See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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ing for the court, stated: "There is and can be no doubt that the First
Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and
learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any reli-
gious sect or dogma." 20 8 This statement was used in the reversal of the
Remand Decision. Allowing students to opt-out of the reading program
adopted by the Hawkins County Public Schools would be tailoring the
curriculum to the principles of the Fundamentalist Christians' religious
beliefs.
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania passed statutes providing for direct
supplementation of income to nonpublic school teachers and institu-
tions. Subsequently, these statutes were attacked for violating the estab-
lishment clause. The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman2 0 9 resolved this issue
and crystallized the three part test used by the Court to determine
whether a state has violated the establishment clause. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger set out the Lemon test: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' ",210
Chief Justice Burger further refined the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test: "In order to determine whether the government entangle-
ment with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and pur-
poses of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
[s]tate provides, and the resulting relationship between the government
and the religious authority."'2 11 The Court did not address the first two
prongs of the test in this case because it found that both statutes created
excessive entanglement between the states and religion due to the need
for supervision and administration by the states of the funding programs
which clearly were designed to aid secular institutions. Another concern
of the Court was raised in dictum: the potential for political strife due to
government entanglement with religion. Because religious beliefs are
held so passionately, state involvement with religion or non-religion is
likely to cause political turmoil. Other dictum within the Court's opin-
ion recognized the impossibility of eliminating all interaction between
state and church. The goal is to prevent the intrusion of either the
208. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106.
209. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon Test has been applied in cases involving finan-
cial assistance to religion or religious schooling in a number of cases. See, e.g., Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (which held that New
York financial aid programs to private schools, mostly sectarian, violated establishment
clause by advancing religion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (state financial aid to
private schools inculcating religious values and belief violates establishment clause); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (provision of
standardized testing to ensure compliance with state educational standards is secular pur-
pose); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Minnesota law allowing deductions of certain
expenses to all parents of schoolchildren whether enrolled in public or private schools not
in violation of establishment clause because it serves secular purpose of educating the
citizenry); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (New York City's use of federal funds to
finance remedial instruction by public school teachers in private schools created excessive
entanglement).
210. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 615.
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church or the state into the precincts of the other. The effort of the
plaintiff parents in Mozert and of Fundamentalist Christians throughout
the country is a clear attempt to have religion intrude into the govern-
mental precinct of the public schools. Such intrusion is forbidden by the
establishment clause and Supreme Court precedent. There is no secular
purpose motivating Fundamentalist Christians, nor is the primary effect
of their educational proposals secular. If the Religious Right is success-
ful in imposing its will on the public schools, there will be an impermis-
sible entanglement between the state and religion because each school
board will be required to create a curriculum "tailored" to accommo-
date Fundamentalist Christian beliefs.
The role of tradition in the relationship between the state and reli-
gion was addressed in Walz v. Tax Commission.21 2 In Walz, the argument
was made that a grant of tax exemptions to places of worship would
create an establishment of a state religion. "That claim could not stand
up to more than 200 years of virtually universal practice imbedded in
our colonial experience and continuing into the present. '2 13 Tradition
and historical practice have been used to overcome arguments that the
establishment clause has been violated.
2 14
The role of the public schools in instilling democratic values and
developing students to their fullest potential has been recognized
throughout their existence.2 15 The separation of religion and the state
is as old as the national government. Although the Religious Right
would have us believe that the Supreme Court reversed a prevailing
practice of prayer in the schools, only slightly more than thirty percent
of the schools in the nation ever regularly conducted devotional exer-
cises. 2 16 As demonstrated above, 2 17 the traditional practice in the pub-
lic schools is not to teach religion. Fundamentalist Christians would
breach this tradition in order to promote their religious beliefs. The fact
that their conduct and attitude causes significant political strife through-
out the country does not seem to faze the Fundamentalist Christians,
even though the Court has consistently found that one purpose of the
need for separation of church and state is to avoid such strife. Although
there is little consensus regarding the Founding Fathers' reasons and
intentions in drafting the religion clauses as they now stand, 21 8 there is
general agreement among scholars that a major purpose was to avoid
the turmoil the Founding Fathers had seen arising from entanglement of
212. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
213. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
214. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The Nebraska legislature's
practice of beginning each session with a prayer in the "Judeo-Christian tradition" is per-
missible as a continuation of a practice "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country." Id. at 624; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (statute which "happens to
coincide" with the tenets of some or all religions is not necessarily in violation of the
establishment clause if it reflects "traditionalist values").
215. See supra notes 94-144 and accompanying text.
216. R. DIERENFIELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1962).
217. See supra notes 94-144 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Tension, supra note 4; TRIBE, supra note 8.
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religion and government.
2 1 9
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,22 0 Old Order Amish parents challenged Wis-
consin's compulsory attendance statute which required children to at-
tend public or private schools until the age of sixteen. The parents
alleged the statute was a violation of their right to free exercise. Chief
Justice Burger recognized the strong state interest in educating its chil-
dren but found that "however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests. '22 1 One interest which is able to
overcome that of the state's interest in universal compulsory education
is the right to free exercise of religion. Dictum to the effect that parents
have a strong interest in the religious education and upbringing of their
children is drawn from the Pierce opinion 22 2 and was used by the Court
in Yoder to illustrate that the state's interest in educating its children can
be overcome. The holding in Yoder determined that where the state's
interest in universal compulsory education conflicts with a parent's right
to see to the religious upbringing of his children under the free exercise
clause, the state's interest must yield. The Court found that the educa-
tion of teenage children within the Old Order Amish society is
equivalent to vocational training in the public schools and that the
state's interest in educating Amish children was not strong enough to
overcome the Amish parents' rights to raise their children according to
their religious beliefs.
In Mozert, the plaintiff parents relied on Yoder as supporting their
position. The Sixth Circuit distinguished the facts of Yoder from the
facts involved in Mozert and consequently found that the plaintiff par-
ents' reliance on Yoder was misplaced.
22 3
In Board of Education v. Rowley, 22 4 parents of a deaf child sued, under
the Education of the Handicapped Act (the Act), 2 25 to obtain the serv-
ices of a universal sign language interpreter for their child in school.
The school provided an "individualized educational program," includ-
ing a special hearing aid and individual tutors, for the child, who was
doing exceptionally well in school without an interpreter. The Court
held that the legislative history of the Act indicated that the schools must
provide a "meaningful" education to handicapped children and no
more. The fact that the child in this case was doing exceptionally well
was found to be an indication that she was receiving a meaningful educa-
tion. The Court set out standards of review for determining whether
programs meet the requirements of the Act: courts must not only be
careful to limit their review to a determination of whether the require-
219. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
220. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
221. Id. at 215.
222. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
223. See supra notes 731-83 and accompanying text.
224. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
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ments of the Act are met, but also allow the states to choose educational
methods suitable for children in the program and not impose the court's
own views in overturning "a State's choice of appropriate educational
theories."
2 2 6
The holding in Rowley, which is consistent with Pierce and other pre-
cedent, suggests that parents may have input in the education of their
children but that control of education resides in the state and local gov-
ernments providing it. Thus, the argument in Mozert that parents have
been given absolute control over the education of their children by the
Supreme Court is groundless. The Court has consistently held that lo-
cal and state government has discretion to control curriculum in the
public schools and that parents have the right and duty to see to the
education of children beyond that provided in those schools.
2 2 7
The Supreme Court also addressed the question of curriculum con-
trol in Board of Education v. Pico.2 28 Pico involved the ability of a school
board to remove books from public school libraries. The Court held
that there is a "right to hear" founded in the first amendment:
[J]ust as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally
to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful
manner, such access prepares students for active and effective
participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in
which they will soon be adult members. Of course all First
Amendment rights accorded to students must be construed 'in
light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.'
2 29
While school boards have discretion in determining a curriculum to
meet the "duty to inculcate community values" in their students, this
discretion is limited to the classroom and does not extend to school li-
braries where "the regime of voluntary inquiry ... holds sway." 230 Be-
cause Pico is a plurality decision, it has little, if any, precedential value
but it does confirm the discretion of local school boards to determine a
curriculum for their schools without court interference so long as there
is no violation of students' first amendment rights and freedoms.
The "right to hear" language in Pico is implicit in the Sixth Circuit
holding in Mozert that mere exposure to ideas cannot violate the estab-
lishment clause. Since the public schools are especially important as
marketplaces of ideas and some educators assert that the whole process
of education is no more than exposure of students to as many ideas as
226. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982).
227. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 206 (1963); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). These
cases provide a general discussion regarding the discretion of school boards, state and
local governments' to prescribe the curriculum of the public schools without court inter-
vention absent interference with fundamental rights. The Pierce case stands for the propo-
sition that parents control children's education beyond that provided in the public schools.
See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
228. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
229. Id. at 868.
230. Id. at 869.
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possible, creation of a "right to hear" in the schools seems to be a rea-
sonable solution to the dilemma presented by the challenge to public
education posed by the Religious Right. The religious concepts es-
poused by Fundamentalist Christians could be presented as part of gen-
eral discussions in programs addressing the social or historical
significance of religion. In this way, but in no other, the religious views
of any group could be introduced into the curriculum of a public school.
Going further to accommodate any religious or non-religious viewpoint
would be a clear violation of the establishment clause.
A recent example of the limits imposed upon the first amendment
rights of schoolchildren is Bethel School District v. Fraser2 3 1 in that a high
school honor student challenged the discipline imposed on him for mak-
ing a suggestive speech that caused a disruption at an assembly of stu-
dents. The Court found that students' rights to free speech are limited
by the need to maintain discipline in the school setting and stated that
"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automati-
cally coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. '23 2 Recog-
nizing that the primary purpose of free public education is the
preparation of pupils for citizenship and "the inculcation of fundamen-
tal values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem," 23 3 the Court went on to hold that:
These fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility' es-
sential to a democratic society must, of course, include toler-
ance of divergent political and religious views, even when the
views expressed may be unpopular. But these 'fundamental
values' must also take into account consideration of the sensi-
bilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of
fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopu-
lar and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be
balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teach-
ing students the boundaries of socially appropriate behaviour.
Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society
requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the
other participants and audiences.
234
The Supreme Court in Fraser recognized limits to the first amend-
ment right to free speech of school children.2 3 5 It would be but a short
step from this position to limit students' rights to free exercise of their
religious beliefs in the schools. Such a limitation would avoid the often
repeated problems in the public schools arising from the tension be-
tween the religion clauses. However, it is difficult to advocate limiting
any fundamental right because starting down that path might place the
individual rights revolution of the last forty years on the edge of the
231. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
232. Id. at 682. The Fraser Court relied primarily on the authority of Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
233. Id. at 681.
234. Id.
235. See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (which recognized
the limitations upon school children's first amendment right to free speech).
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steep and slippery slope to its demise. A more reasonable approach to
present resolving the religious strife in the public schools would be to
formalize the concept that there is a "right to hear" inherent in and
complimentary to the first amendment right to freedom of speech, as
held in Pico and implied in Judge Lively's opinion in Mozert.
CONCLUSIONS
Time and again the Supreme Court has found that the main func-
tion of public schools is the inculcation of society's values in preparation
of students for adult life as citizens. The public school system has great
discretion in determining the ways in which the schools go about accom-
plishing these goals but that discretion is limited by the constitutional
rights of pupils, parents, and teachers. Although parents have impor-
tant roles in determining their children's religious training, the Court
has consistently found that the appropriate place for such training is not
the public schools but in private schools, at home, and in church. Cur-
riculum is controlled by state and local government through profes-
sional educators hired to determine the best means of educating our
youth. Courts will step into the process of curriculum planning and im-
plementation only where the fundamental rights of parents, students, or
teachers are threatened. Fundamentalist Christians derogate the discre-
tion of professional educators and the state to control the school system
by inappropriately citing dicta from Supreme Court decisions. The Fun-
damentalist Christians' court challenges to curriculum decisions of pro-
fessional educators, such as in Mozert, are an attempt to force the public
schools into using teaching techniques and philosophies tacitly rejected
by educators when they select other methods. This is ironic in view of
the fact that Fundamentalist Christians rail about the manner in which
the Supreme Court has forced the removal of religion from the public
schools making them into a training ground for the "Godless religion of
secular humanism." The challenge thrust upon the public schools by
the Religious Right is inappropriate because there has been no infringe-
ment by the schools on Fundamentalist Christian students' constitu-
tional rights in the various cases discussed above.
Among the values necessary for maintaining our pluralistic demo-
cratic society is tolerance toward views which differ from the norm. A
corollary to this value is the need for all persons to accept the rule of the
majority so long as the fundamental rights of the minority are not violated. In
Mozert, the Fundamentalist Christian minority in attempted to impose its
values upon the local public school system through the judicial system.
The changes in public education sought by the plaintiff parents in Mozert
are representative of those sought by the Fundamentalist Christian mi-
nority throughout the United States. Such changes would radically alter
the function of the public schools in our society. The Fundamentalist
Christian assault on the public school system is an attempt to impose the
will of a minority upon the majority in a situation where there has been
no violation of the minority's constitutional rights. The principles of
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democratic government will not permit this imposition; Fundamentalist
Christians must acknowledge and accept the fact that they live in a soci-
ety with great diversity in religious beliefs.
The primary goal of the Fundamentalist Christian challenge to pub-
lic education is either to "put religion back into the schools" or to de-
stroy the system and replace it with a system run by Christians.
Consideration of the history of American public education demonstrates
that "religion," as conceived by Fundamentalist Christians, was never a
part of the public school curriculum. Supreme Court precedent estab-
lishes that accommodating any religious group's demand to include its
viewpoint in the public school curriculum would be a violation of the
establishment clause. Restricting the range of ideas available to stu-
dents implicates first amendment rights of free speech. Furthermore,
the pressures put on the public school systems by the Religious Right
actually give rise to a chilling effect which causes teachers to censor the
material they present in class, even though such material complies with
local and constitutional guidelines. Fundamentalist Christian high pres-
sure tactics cannot and will not be tolerated either by the courts or the
majority of the population if the end result is to inhibit the free speech
rights of others. These attacks also cause significant social and political
strife. One of the few areas of agreement regarding the rationale behind
the religion clauses is the belief that they intended to prevent the strife
from government involvement with religion.
Given the traditional role of the public schools in creating good citi-
zens, the Fundamentalist Christian goal of replacing them with Christian
schools is also improper. Part of the education of a good citizen is the
development of democratic values, including tolerance for the sensibili-
ties and viewpoints of others. Refusal to accept the beliefs of others on
religious grounds can be accepted in society so long as it does not in-
fringe on the rights of people to believe as they choose. Religious intol-
erance cannot be accepted in the public schools anymore than racial
intolerance because of its philosophical conflict with democratic values.
The Religious Right demands elimination of certain curriculum
content and teaching techniques because of alleged violation of Funda-
mentalist Christian beliefs. The teaching techniques challenged by the
Fundamentalist Christians have been demonstrated by both research
and application to be the most effective ways to teach students the skills
and material necessary for their success in today's increasingly complex
society. Since the second major goal of education is the development of
individuals to their fullest capacity, accommodation of Fundamentalist
Christian demands for use of less effective teaching methods would be
improper.
The demands for change in public education made by the Funda-
mentalist Christian minority are inappropriate in light of the United
States Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, the traditional role of
public schoools in society and the need for effective education. The
Religious Right derogates the judicial system for having removed reli-
[Vol. 66:2
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gion from the schools but at the same time it attempts to use the judici-
ary to further its own views. The courts have consistently found that the
demands of the Fundamentalist Christian minority cannot be accommo-
dated in the schools without violating first amendment rights of others.
Although Fundamentalist Christians are correctly concerned about the
failure of public schools to recognize the role of religion in the history
and society of our nation and the world, their general demands cannot
be met without violating the establishment clause. In fact, there is good
reason to believe that this lack of objective presentation of religious
views in the schools arises primarily due to the activities of the Funda-
mentalist Christians. It is a well-accepted equitable principle that one
cannot plead his own wrong as grounds for relief. If the Religious Right
want their children taught from a "Christian perspective," they will have
to utilize alternatives such as home schooling or private education to do
so because their demands cannot be met in the public schools without
violating constitutional law.
Joseph C. Cohen, Jr.

